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Abstract
Traditionally, much of the research in the field of optimization algorithms has assumed that problem pa-
rameters are correctly specified. Recent efforts under the robust optimization framework have relaxed this
assumption by allowing unknown parameters to vary in a prescribed uncertainty set and by subsequently
solving for a worst-case solution. This dissertation considers a rather different approach in which the un-
known or misspecified parameter is a solution to a suitably defined (stochastic) learning problem based on
having access to a set of samples. Practical approaches in resolving such a set of coupled problems have been
either sequential or direct variational approaches. In the case of the former, this entails the following steps:
(i) a solution to the learning problem for parameters is first obtained; and (ii) a solution is obtained to the
associated parametrized computational problem by using (i). Such avenues prove difficult to adopt partic-
ularly since the learning process has to be terminated finitely and consequently, in large-scale or stochastic
instances, sequential approaches may often be corrupted by error. On the other hand, a variational ap-
proach requires that the problem may be recast as a possibly non-monotone stochastic variational inequality
problem; but there are no known first-order (stochastic) schemes currently available for the solution of such
problems. Motivated by these challenges, this thesis focuses on studying joint schemes of optimization and
learning in three settings: (i) misspecified stochastic optimization and variational inequality problems, (ii)
misspecified stochastic Nash games, (iii) misspecified Markov decision processes.
In the first part of this thesis, we present a coupled stochastic approximation scheme which simultaneously
solves both the optimization and the learning problems. The obtained schemes are shown to be equipped
with almost sure convergence properties in regimes when the function f is either strongly convex as well
as merely convex. Importantly, the scheme displays the optimal rate for strongly convex problems while in
merely convex regimes, through an averaging approach, we quantify the degradation associated with learning
by noting that the error in function value after K steps is O
(√
ln(K)/K
)
, rather than O
(√
1/K
)
when
θ∗ is available. Notably, when the averaging window is modified suitably, it can be see that the original rate
of O
(√
1/K
)
is recovered. Additionally, we consider an online counterpart of the misspecified optimization
problem and provide a non-asymptotic bound on the average regret with respect to an oﬄine counterpart.
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We also extend these statements to a class of stochastic variational inequality problems, an object that
unifies stochastic convex optimization problems and a range of stochastic equilibrium problems. Analogous
almost-sure convergence statements are provided in strongly monotone and merely monotone regimes, the
latter facilitated by using an iterative Tikhonov regularization. In the merely monotone regime, under a
weak-sharpness requirement, we quantify the degradation associated with learning and show that expected
error associated with dist(xk, X
∗) is O
(√
ln(K)/K
)
.
In the second part of this thesis, we present schemes for computing equilibria to two classes of convex
stochastic Nash games complicated by a parametric misspecification, a natural concern in the control of large-
scale networked engineered system. In both schemes, players learn the equilibrium strategy while resolving
the misspecification: (1) Stochastic Nash games: We present a set of coupled stochastic approximation
distributed schemes distributed across agents in which the first scheme updates each agent’s strategy via
a projected (stochastic) gradient step while the second scheme updates every agent’s belief regarding its
misspecified parameter using an independently specified learning problem. We proceed to show that the
produced sequences converge to the true equilibrium strategy and the true parameter in an almost sure
sense. Surprisingly, convergence in the equilibrium strategy achieves the optimal rate of convergence in a
mean-squared sense with a quantifiable degradation in the rate constant; (2) Stochastic Nash-Cournot
games with unobservable aggregate output: We refine (1) to a Cournot setting where we assume that
the tuple of strategies is unobservable while payoff functions and strategy sets are public knowledge through
a common knowledge assumption. By utilizing observations of noise-corrupted prices, iterative fixed-point
schemes are developed, allowing for simultaneously learning the equilibrium strategies and the misspecified
parameter in an almost-sure sense.
In the third part of this thesis, we consider the solution of a finite-state infinite horizon Markov Deci-
sion Process (MDP) in which both the transition matrix and the cost function are misspecified, the latter
in a parametric sense. We consider a data-driven regime in which the learning problem is a stochastic
convex optimization problem that resolves misspecification. Via such a framework, we make the following
contributions: (1) We first show that a misspecified value iteration scheme converges almost surely to its
true counterpart and the mean-squared error after K iterations is O(1/√K); (2) An analogous asymptotic
almost-sure convergence statement is provided for misspecified policy iteration; and (3) Finally, we present
a constant steplength misspecified Q-learning scheme and show that a suitable error metric is O(1/√K) +
O(√δ) after K iterations where δ is a bound on the steplength.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Increasingly, optimization and game-theoretic problems need to be solved in uncertain and networked regimes
complicated by parametric misspecification. One approach relies on estimation of these parameters through
a separate learning process that necessitates aggregating data in an oﬄine fashion. Historically, this oﬄine
avenue can be formalized by a two-step, and in effect, a serial approach: (i) The first step requires the
learning of such parameters by possibly fitting a model to a set of samples, a problem that falls within the
purview of statistical learning [1]; (ii) Given an estimate of such parameters, optimization algorithms can be
subsequently applied. Unfortunately, in many dynamic settings complicated by streaming data and the need
for online decision-making, one cannot impose such a separation in these processes and both optimization and
learning need to be carried out simultaneously, particularly when exact solutions to the statistical learning
problem can only be obtained in the limit. An alternate approach can be constructed in settings where an
oﬄine aggregation of data cannot be managed. Instead, in this setting, the observations are a function of the
computational decisions. In this context, we consider an online avenue that is customized to the problem of
interest (for instance stochastic Nash-Cournot games). Accordingly, in this dissertation, we consider three
problem settings corrupted by misspecification in Chapters 2–4:
(i) Static stochastic convex optimization and monotone variational inequality problems;
(ii) Static stochastic Nash games;
(iii) Markov decision processes.
Before proceeding, we provide a short motivation and discussion of the contributions in each of these chap-
ters.
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1.1 Misspecified stochastic optimization and variational
inequality problems
Convex optimization has proven to be a useful model for resolving a broad class of problems (cf. [2]). In
settings where equilibria and competition assume relevance, variational inequality problems have gained im-
mensely in relevance. Yet, in both contexts, it is assumed that the functions (in the context of optimization)
and the maps (in the variational inequality setting) are prescribed precisely. However, as problems grow in
intricacy and complexity, this assumption cannot be expected to hold. For instance, convex optimization
models have found utility in portfolio optimization; however, covariance matrices in such setting rely esti-
mation. Similarly, variational inequality formulations have allowed for capturing imperfectly competitive
equilibrium problems; again, the parametrization of the utility functions may not always be available. In
short, there is an increasing need to develop algorithms that can resolve misspecification while solving the
correctly misspecified problem.
When one considers the joint problem of learning the misspecified parameter and optimizing the system,
two approaches may be utilized: (i) The first of these is a sequential approach, i.e. specifying the model
and/or parameters based on statistical learning and then solving the resulting optimization problems of
interest. Any practically implemented sequential scheme has to terminate the learning problem after finite
time. This results in an estimator of the learning problem corrupted by error and this error propagates
into the solution of the optimization problem; (ii) A second approach uses the variational avenue and relies
on converting the joint learning and optimization problem into a higher dimensional variational inequality
problem. However, unless rather strong assumptions are imposed, the mapping associated with the varia-
tional inequality problem is not necessarily monotone, which prevents us to use recently developed stochastic
approximation schemes for solving monotone stochastic variational inequality problems.
Motivated by the lack of available simultaneous approaches, we propose coupled stochastic approximation
schemes in Chapter 2 that allows for solving misspecified stochastic optimization and variational inequality
problems. For the misspecified optimization problem, we consider the cases when the function is either
strongly convex or merely convex. Almost sure convergence properties can be shown in both cases. When
the function is strongly convex, the scheme displays the same optimal rate as the true parameter is available,
i.e. O
(√
1/K
)
after K steps. While in merely convex regimes, we can quantify the degradation associated
with learning by using an averaging method, and the error in function value after K steps is O
(√
ln(K)/K
)
,
rather than O
(√
1/K
)
when parameter information is available. To recover the original rate of O
(√
1/K
)
,
we modify the averaging window and get the desired result. In addition, we consider an online counterpart
of the misspecified optimization problem and provide a non-asymptotic bound on the average regret. All of
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these results can be extended to a class of misspecified stochastic variational inequality problems, which are
general cases for stochastic convex optimization and a range of stochastic equilibrium problems. A major
difference lies in the merely monotone regimes. We need to use an iterative Tikhonov regularization to get
almost-sure convergence results in that case. Also, under merely monotone assumptions, we can quantify the
degradation associated with learning and show that the expected distance between the iterate and optimal
set is O
(√
ln(K)/K
)
.
1.2 Misspecified stochastic Nash games
While convex Nash games can be compactly captured by a variational inequality problem, the contributions
of the prior section cannot adequately address the intricacies that are presented by Nash games. For instance,
a key concern in the computation of equilibria is the need for developing distributed protocols that abide
by privacy concerns. This motivates the next chapter of this dissertation. In particular, when designing
protocols for Nash games, particularly in the absence of a centralized controller, the goal lies computing
Nash equilibria when the utility functions are misspecified and rely on agent-specific information that can
only be learnt through a set of oﬄine observations. In many regimes, this set of observations may not be
available. Consider, for instance, a Nash-Cournot game in which each player decides its own production
level of a common commodity while the price of the commodity is based on the aggregate sales. In this
regime, players may have a correct model for the price function but an incorrect estimate of its parameters.
In this setting, our intent lies in developing an online scheme which relies on observing true prices that
allows for learning the misspecified price function parameter. This avenue does not necessitate accumulating
observations.
Motivated by these challenges, in Chapter 3, we propose schemes for computing equilibria to misspecified
stochastic Nash games. In the proposed schemes, players learn the equilibrium strategy while resolving
the misspecification. We consider two settings: (1) general stochastic Nash games with observable aggregate
output; (2) stochastic Nash-Cournot games with unobservable aggregate output. In the first case, we propose
coupled stochastic approximation distributed schemes across agents. Each agent updates its strategy through
a gradient step while updating its belief regarding misspecified parameters through a learning step. Both
the true equilibrium strategy and the true parameter can be shown to be achieved in an almost sure sense.
The scheme displays the same optimal rate of convergence in the equilibrium strategy in a mean-squared
sense as the true parameter is available. In the second case, we consider a special type of Nash games,
i.e. Nash-Cournot game, and assume that the aggregate output is unavailable. In addition, we impose a
common knowledge assumption: payoff functions and strategy sets are public knowledge. This is a common
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assumption for analyzing Nash-Cournot games without information of aggregate output. By using the
difference between the observed true price and estimated price, we propose iterative fixed-point schemes
which can learn the equilibrium strategies and the misspecified parameter simultaneously in an almost-sure
sense. Furthermore, we can extend the result to nonlinear price functions.
1.3 Misspecified Markov decision processes
While the previous two sections have considered static problems, a natural extension lies in sequential
decision-making problems. In particular, we consider the Markov decision-making problems (MDPs). Such
problems assume relevance in a range of settings (cf. [3, 4]). Yet, in such sense, the transition matrices
and the cost functions may be misspecified. Several avenues have been adopted when transition matrices
are not known precisely including robust optimization and Q-learning. Yet, there is little available when
cost functions are misspecified and in the presence of streaming data, traditional schemes cannot be directly
employed. In fact, there is little by way of asymptotics and error analysis for resolving such MDPs with
streaming data. Similarly as in misspecified stochastic optimization problems, sequential approaches can, at
best, provide approximate solutions.
Motivated by these challenges, we propose a simultaneous scheme for learning and computation in Chap-
ter 4 to solve a finite-state infinite horizon MDP in which the transition matrix and the parametrization
of the cost function are unavailable. We consider a data-driven regime in which the learning problem is
a stochastic convex optimization problem that resolves misspecification. Three types of schemes are con-
sidered: (1) misspecified value iteration scheme; (2) misspecified policy iteration scheme; (3) misspecified
Q-learning scheme. The misspecified value iteration scheme can be shown to converge almost surely to its
true counterpart and the associated mean-squared error of convergence is provided based on the presence of
learning. When the steplength is constant, we can also get an optimized error bound for the value funtion
in terms of the number of iteration steps. In the context of misspecified policy iteration scheme, we can
provide an analogous asymptotic almost-sure convergence statement and error analysis as in the case with
information of the transition matrix and cost function. Finally, we present a constant steplength misspecified
Q-learning scheme and provide a suitable error bound based on iteration steps and steplength.
1.4 Notation
Throughout the paper, we use ‖x‖ to denote the Euclidean norm of a vector x, i.e., ‖x‖ =
√
xTx. We use
ΠK to denote the Euclidean projection operator onto a set K, i.e., ΠK(x) , argminy∈K ‖x − y‖. A square
4
matrix H is said to be a P-matrix if every principal minor of H is positive. Similarly, H is a P0-matrix if
every principal minor of H is nonnegative.
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Chapter 2
Misspecified Stochastic Optimization
and Variational Inequality Problems
2.1 Introduction
In the last two decades, robust optimization [5, 6] approaches have grown in relevance when decision-makers
are faced with optimization problems with uncertain parameters. Succinctly, in such an approach, given an
uncertainty set that captures the realizations assumed by such a parameter, the robust solution represents
the worst-case over this set of realizations. Naturally, an appropriate choice of such an uncertainty set is
crucial and as the availability of data reaches levels hitherto unseen, there is growing interest in data-driven
approaches [7] for constructing such sets. Our interest is in closely related yet distinct settings driven by data
in which the point estimate of a parameter may be obtained through a learning problem, suitably defined
through the aggregation of data. We provide two instances of such problems:
(i) Portfolio optimization Portfolio optimization problems prescribe the optimal constructions of port-
folios over a set of assets, for which the mean and covariance of returns are not necessarily known. Traditional
approaches have assumed that such returns are available while more recent robust optimization models have
utilized factor-based models in constructing uncertainty sets [8, 9, 10]. An alternate, and possibly less con-
servative, data-driven model of such a problem that employs a point estimate of the mean and covariance
matrix requires the solution of two coupled problems: (1) A portfolio optimization problem parametrized by
(θ∗,Σ∗) representing the mean and covariance matrix of returns; and (2) A learning problem that utilizes
data to obtain the best (θ∗,Σ∗).
(ii) Power systems operation The operation of power grids relies on the solution of hourly (or more
frequent) commitment and dispatch problems, each of which is reliant on a range of parameters that are often
uncertain. These parameters include supply-side information regarding capacity of wind-power as well as
load forecasts. Recently robust optimization approaches have proved to be exceedingly popular [11, 12, 13].
An alternate formulation is given by the following two coupled problems: (1) An economic dispatch problem
parametrized by θ∗, a vector that captures the unknown supply and demand side parameters; and (2) A
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learning problem that computes θ∗ through the accumulation of data.
We believe that such coupled formulations have broad applicability beyond merely the settings mentioned
above in (i) and (ii). They may also find application in inventory control problems with stochastic demand [14,
15, 16, 17], robust network design [18], robust routing in communication networks [19], amongst others. To
recap the difference between the two problem frameworks, it can be seen that (R-Opt), a robust optimization
framework, minimizes the worst-case of the optimal value f(x; θ) over the uncertainty set Uθ while (L-Opt)
considers the joint solution of an optimization problem in x, parametrized by θ∗, where θ∗ is a solution to a
learning problem with a metric g(θ). The following formulations may provide a clearer comparison:
R-Opt minimize max
θ∈Uθ
f(x; θ)
subject to x ∈ X.
L-Opt minimize
x∈X
f(x; θ∗)
minimize
θ∈Θ
g(θ)
We consider regimes where the function f(x; θ) is a convex expected-value function and the resulting problem
is given by the following:
min
x∈X
E[f(x; θ∗, ξ(ω))], (Pox(θ∗))
where X ⊆ Rn is a closed and convex set, ξ : Ω→ Rd is a d−dimensional random variable defined on a prob-
ability space (Ω,Fx,Px), f : X ×Rd×Rm → R is a real-valued function, and θ∗ denotes an m−dimensional
vector of parameters. Estimating such parameters often requires the resolution of a suitably defined learning
problem, given by a stochastic optimization problem (Lθ), and defined next:
min
θ∈Θ
g(θ) , E[g(θ; η)], (Lθ)
where Θ ⊆ Rm is a closed and convex set, η : Λ → Rp is a random variable defined on a probability space
(Λ,Fθ,Pθ), and g : Θ× Λ→ R is a real-valued function. When one considers the joint problem of learning
and optimization, then there are at least two obvious approaches that immediately emerge as possibilities:
(a) Sequential approach: Consider an inherently serial process wherein the first stage incorporates a
model/parameter specification phase based on statistical learning while the second stage leverages these
findings in developing and solving the actual optimization problem of interest. Such an ordering relies on
the learning problems being relatively small and tractable compared to the optimization problems, ensuring
that accurate solutions are available within a reasonable time period. Strictly speaking, if one terminates
the learning process prematurely with an estimator θˆ, the resulting estimator is essentially corrupted by
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error in that θˆ 6= θ∗. This error propagates into the solution xˆ of the computational problem, denoted by
Pox(θˆ) and the associated gap might be quite significant. Note that unless the learning problem is solvable
via a finite termination algorithm, such a approach cannot provide asymptotic statements but can, at best,
provide approximate solutions. Consequently, an inherently serial process reliant on a prematurely truncated
learning scheme often fails to provide accurate solutions to the computational problem.
(b) Variational approach: Under suitable convexity and differentiability requirements, the following holds:
x∗ solves (Pox(θ∗)) and θ∗ solves (Lθ),
if and only if (x∗, θ∗) is a solution to the (stochastic) variational inequality problem VI(Z,F ) [20] where
Z , X ×Θ and H(z) ,
E[∇xf(x; θ, ξ)]
E[∇θg(θ; η)]
 .
Recall that z∗ is a solution to VI(Z,F ) if (z− z∗)TF (z) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ Z. Furthermore, if x∗ and θ∗ denote
solutions to (Pox(θ∗)) and (Lθ), respectively, then an oft-used avenue in obtaining a solution (x∗, θ∗) entails
obtaining a solution to VI(Z,F ). However, unless rather strong assumptions are imposed, the map H is not
necessarily monotone, precluding the use of recently developed stochastic approximation schemes for solving
monotone stochastic variational inequality problems [21, 22, 23], extragradient-based variants [24, 25], and
accelerated approaches [26].
Simultaneous approach: This chapter is motivated by the inadequacy of available approaches and, more
generally, the absence of asymptotically convergent schemes with provable non-asymptotic rates. We present a
framework where the learning and the computational problems are solved simultaneously via a joint set of
stochastic approximation schemes. Such an avenue has several advantages. First, under such an approach,
one can provide rigorous statements of asymptotic convergence of the obtained estimators for both, the
solution to the computational problem and the associated learning problem. Second, error bounds on the
expected error can be provided for a fixed number of steps under a regime with constant and diminishing
steplengths. Third, the statements may be extended to the variational regime in which the computational
problem is given by the variational counterpart of (Pox(θ∗)), given by (Pvx(θ∗)); such a problem requires an
x∗ ∈ X such that
E[F (x∗; θ∗, ξ(ω))]T (x− x∗ ) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X, (Pvx(θ∗))
where X ⊆ Rn is a closed and convex set, ξ : Ω → Rd is a d−dimensional random variable defined on a
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probability space (Ω,Fx,Px), F : X ×Rd ×Rm → Rn is a real-valued continuous mapping. Note that when
F (x∗; θ∗, ξ) , ∇xf(x∗; θ∗, ξ), this reduces to a convex optimization problem. Furthermore, the choice of
using a variational problem, rather than merely an optimization problem, is founded on the need to model
a variety of multiagent settings complicated by a breadth of strategic interactions, ranging from purely
cooperative to distinctly noncooperative [27].
2.1.1 Related decision-making models
While unaware of the availability of general purpose tools that can resolve precisely such problems, we
describe settings where such questions have assumed relevance:
Adaptive control [28]: In tracking problems in adaptive control [29], the authors consider a perturbation
approach for analyzing a adaptive tracking algorithm and consider three estimation schemes, specifically
least mean squares (LMS) scheme, its recursive variant (RLMS), and the Kalman filter (which requires
some distributional assumptions on the noise). First, much of this treatment is in the unconstrained regime
with tractable (often quadratic estimation objectives), allowing for deriving closed-form (and often linear)
update rules. Second, when the noise in the estimation process is Gaussian, the Kalman filter provides
a minimum variance estimator. If on the other hand, the noise is non-Gaussian, then the Kalman filter
provides the optimal linear estimator (in the sense that no linear filter provides smaller variance). In fact,
these assumptions often form the basis of most adaptive control algorithms (cf. [30] and [31] for a discussion
adaptive control and stochastic approximation.) Our focus is on static stochastic problems with far less
assumptions on the nature of the problem and the associated distributions. Specifically, we allow for more
general stochastic convex objectives (or monotone maps in the context of VIs) in either the optimization or
the learning problem, allow for convex feasibility sets for both the optimization or the learning problems,
and impose relatively mild moment assumptions on the noise (unlike the Gaussian assumptions that are
necessary in some of the estimation models).
Iterative learning control: A related avenue lies in iterative learning control (ILC) has its roots in the
studies by Uchiyama [32] and Arimoto et al. [33]. ILC [34] is a form of tracking control employed for repetitive
control problems, instances being chemical batch processes, robot arm manipulators, and reliability testing
rigs. Our problem is more restrictive in its focus (static problems) but allow for more general settings in
terms of nonlinearity and the underlying distributional requirements.
Multi-armed bandit problems: The multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem considers the question of how
to play given a collection of slot machines faced by a gambler. Each machine provides a random reward
from a distribution specific to that machine. The gambler aims to maximize the expected sum of rewards
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earned through a sequence of lever pulls. The total discounted reward is maximized by the index policy
that pulls the bandit having greatest value of the Gittins index [35]. In effect, the reward function needs to
be learnt while optimizing the system. There has been significant research on such problems over the last
several decades, including on the question of computation [36] and finite-time analysis [37].
Finally, related questions have also been studied in revenue management where [38] examined the devas-
tating effect of learning with an incorrect model while maximizing revenue.
2.1.2 Outline and contributions
Broadly speaking, this chapter focuses on the development of stochastic approximation schemes that gen-
erate iterates {xk} and {θk} and makes the following contributions. (i) In Section 2.2, we prove the a.s.
convergence of the produced iterates to the prescribed solutions and derive error bounds in a standard and
an averaging regime. In particular, we quantify the degradation in the convergence rate from introducing
an additional learning phase; (ii) Section 2.2 concludes with a precise non-asymptotic bound on the average
regret associated with employing the proposed scheme instead of an oﬄine algorithm; (iii) In Section 2.3,
we extend the a.s. convergence results to accommodate stochastic variational inequality problems, rather
than merely convex optimization problems. Error analysis is carried out under a suitably defined growth
property; (iv) In Section 2.4, we provide some supporting numerics and conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 Stochastic optimization problems with imperfect information
In this section, we focus on examining (Pox(θ∗)) under various assumptions. We begin by stating the coupled
stochastic approximation scheme and providing the necessary assumptions in Section 2.2.1. Convergence
analysis of the presented scheme is provided in Section 2.2.2 while diminishing and constant steplength
rate analysis is performed in Section 2.2.3. We conclude with a discussion of an online algorithm with the
associated bounds on the decay of average regret in Section 2.2.4.
2.2.1 Algorithm statement and assumptions
As mentioned in the previous section, we propose a set of coupled stochastic approximation schemes for
computing x∗ and θ∗.
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Algorithm 1 (Coupled SA schemes for stochastic optimization problems). Step 0. Given x0 ∈
X, θ0 ∈ Θ and sequences {γk,x, γk,θ}, k := 0
Step 1.
xk+1 := ΠX
(
xk − γk,x(∇xf(xk; θk) + wk)
)
, k ≥ 0 (Optk)
θk+1 := ΠΘ
(
θk − γk,θ(∇θg(θk) + vk)
)
, k ≥ 0 (Learnk)
where wk , ∇xf(xk; θk, ξk)−∇xf(xk; θk) and vk , ∇θg(θk; ηk)−∇θg(θk).
Step 2. If k > K, stop; else k := k + 1, go to Step. 1.
We begin by stating an assumption on the functions f and g.
Assumption 1 (Problem properties, A1-1). Suppose the following hold:
(i) For every θ ∈ Θ, f(x; θ) is strongly convex and continuously differentiable with Lipschitz continuous
gradients in x with convexity constant µx and Lipschitz constant Lx, respectively.
(ii) For every x ∈ X, the gradient ∇xf(x; θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ with constant Lθ.
(iii) The function g(θ) is strongly convex and continuously differentiable with Lipschitz continuous gradients
in θ with convexity constant µθ and Lipschitz constant Cθ, respectively.
Under Assumption (A1-1), the coupled problem admits a unique solution, as shown next.
Lemma 1 (Solvability). Consider the problems (Pox(θ∗)) and (Lθ) and suppose assumption (A1) holds.
Then (Pox(θ∗)) and (Lθ) collectively admit a unique solution.
Proof. This follows from the strong convexity of g over Θ and the strong convexity of f(•; θ) over X.
Additionally, we make the following assumptions on the steplength sequences employed in the algorithm.
Assumption 2 (Steplength requirements, A2-1). Let {γk,x} and {γk,θ} be chosen such that:
(i)
∑∞
k=0 γk,x =∞,
∑∞
k=0 γ
2
k,x <∞
(ii) γk,θ = γk,xL
2
θ/(µxµθ).
We define a new probability space (Z,F ,P), where Z , Ω× Λ, F , Fx × Fθ and P , Px × Pθ. We use
Fk to denote the sigma-field generated by the initial points (x0, θ0) and errors (wl, vl) for l = 0, 1, · · · , k− 1,
i.e., F0 =
{
(x0, θ0)
}
and Fk =
{
(x0, θ0),
(
(wl, vl), l = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1)} for k ≥ 1. We make the following
assumptions on the filtration and errors.
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Assumption 3 (A3). Let the following hold:
(i) E[wk | Fk] = 0 and E[vk | Fk] = 0 a.s. for all k.
(ii) E[‖wk‖2 | Fk] ≤ ν2x and E[‖vk‖2 | Fk] ≤ ν2θ a.s. for all k.
We conclude this subsection by stating three results (without proof) that will be subsequently employed
in developing our convergence statements. The first two of these are relatively well-known super-martingale
convergence results (cf. [39, Lemma 10, Pg. 49–50])
Lemma 2. Let vk be a sequence of nonnegative random variables adapted to σ-algebra Fk and such that
E[vk+1|Fk] ≤ (1− uk)vk + βk for all k ≥ 0 almost surely,
where 0 ≤ uk ≤ 1, βk ≥ 0, and
∑∞
k=0 uk =∞,
∑∞
k=0 βk <∞ and limk→∞ βkuk = 0. Then, vk → 0 a.s.
Lemma 3. Let vk, uk, βk and γk be non-negative random variables adapted to σ-algebra Fk. If
∑∞
k=0 uk <
∞, ∑∞k=0 βk <∞ and
E[vk+1|Fk] ≤ (1 + uk)vk − γk + βk for all k ≥ 0 almost surely.
Then, {vk} is convergent and
∑∞
k=0 γk <∞ almost surely.
Finally, we present a contraction result reliant on monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity requirements
(cf. [40, Theorem 12.1.2, Pg. 1109]).
Lemma 4. Let H : K → Rn be a mapping that is strongly monotone over K with constant µ, and Lipschitz
continuous over K with constant L. If q ,
√
1− 2µγ + γ2L2, then for any γ > 0, we have that for any x, y,
we have ‖ΠK(x− γH(x))−ΠK(y − γH(y))‖ ≤ q‖x− y‖.
2.2.2 Almost-sure convergence
Our first convergence result shows that under the prescribed assumptions, Algorithm 1 generates a sequence
of iterates that converges to the unique solution.
Proposition 1 (Almost-sure convergence under strong convexity of f). Suppose (A1-1), (A2-1)
and (A3) hold. Let {xk, θk} be computed via Algorithm 1. Then, xk → x∗ and θk → θ∗ a.s. as k → ∞,
where θ∗ denotes the unique solution of (Lθ) and x∗ denotes the unique solution to (Pox(θ∗)).
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Proof. Note that x∗ = ΠX(x∗ − γk,x∇xf(x∗; θ∗)). Then, by the nonexpansivity of the Euclidean projector,
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 may be bounded as follows:
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 = ‖ΠX(xk − γk,x(∇xf(xk; θk) + wk))−ΠX(x∗ − γk,x∇xf(x∗; θ∗))‖2
≤ ‖(xk − x∗)− γk,x(∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗))− γk,xwk‖2.
By adding and subtracting γk,x∇xf(x∗, θk), this expression can be further expanded as follows:
‖(xk − x∗)− γk,x(∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θk))− γk,x(∇xf(x∗; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗))− γk,xwk‖2
= ‖(xk − x∗)− γk,x(∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θk))‖2 + γ2k,x‖∇xf(x∗; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2 + γ2k,x‖wk‖2
− 2γk,x[(xk − x∗)− γk,x(∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θk))]T (∇xf(x∗; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗))
− 2γk,x[(xk − x∗)− γk,x(∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θk))]Twk + 2γ2k,x(∇xf(x∗; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗))Twk.
By leveraging the fact that E[wk | Fk] = 0, we have
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ Term 1 + Term 2 + Term 3 + γ2k,xE[‖wk‖2 | Fk], (2.1)
where Terms 1 – 3 are defined as follows:
Term 1 , ‖(xk − x∗)− γk,x(∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θk))‖2,
Term 2 , γ2k,x‖∇xf(x∗; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2,
and Term 3 , −2γk,x[(xk − x∗)− γk,x(∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θk))]T (∇xf(x∗; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗)).
By Lemma 4 and (A1-1), it follows that
Term 1 ≤ (1− 2γk,xµx + γ2k,xL2x)‖xk − x∗‖2. (2.2)
Furthermore, the Lipschitz continuity of ∇xf(x∗; θ) in θ (A1-1) allows for deriving the following bound:
Term 2 ≤ γ2k,xL2θ‖θk − θ∗‖2. (2.3)
Finally, Term 3 can be bounded by invoking the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, Lemma 4, (A1-1) and the
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triangle inequality, we obtain
2γk,x‖(xk − x∗)− γk,x(∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θk))‖‖∇xf(x∗; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖
≤ 2γk,x
√
1− 2γk,xµx + γ2k,xL2x‖xk − x∗‖Lθ‖θk − θ∗‖
≤ 2γk,xLθ‖xk − x∗‖‖θk − θ∗‖
≤ γk,xµx‖xk − x∗‖2 + γk,x(L2θ/µx)‖θk − θ∗‖2,
(2.4)
where the last inequality follows from 2aT b ≤ ‖a‖2 + ‖b‖2. Combining (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4), we get
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ (1− γk,xµx + γ2k,xL2x)‖xk − x∗‖2
+ (γk,xL
2
θ/µx + γ
2
k,xL
2
θ)‖θk − θ∗‖2 + γ2k,xν2x.
(2.5)
Recall that θ∗ satisfies the fixed point relationship θ∗ = ΠΘ(θ∗ − γθ,k∇θg(θ∗)), which, together with non-
expansivity of the Euclidean projector, allows for deriving the following bound on ‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2:
‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 = ‖ΠΘ(θk − γθ,k(∇θg(θk) + vk))−ΠΘ(θ∗ − γθ,k∇θg(θ∗))‖2
≤ ‖θk − θ∗ − γθ,k(∇θg(θk)−∇θg(θ∗))− γθ,kvk‖2
= ‖θk − θ∗ − γθ,k(∇θg(θk)−∇θg(θ∗))‖2 + γ2θ,k‖vk‖2 − 2(θk − θ∗ − γθ,k(∇θg(θk)−∇θg(θ∗)))T vk.
By taking conditional expectations and by recalling that E[vk | Fk] = 0, we obtain the following bound:
E[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ ‖θk − θ∗ − γk,θ(∇θg(θk)−∇θg(θ∗))‖2 + γ2k,θE[‖vk‖2 | Fk]
≤ q2k,θ‖θk − θ∗‖2 + γ2k,θν2θ ,
(2.6)
where qk,θ ,
√
1− 2γk,θµθ + γ2k,θC2θ . Next, by adding (2.5) and (2.6) and by invoking (A2-1), we obtain the
following bound.
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] + E[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk]
≤ (1− γk,xµx + γ2k,xL2x)‖xk − x∗‖2 + (q2k,θ + γk,xL2θ/µx + γ2k,xL2θ)‖θk − θ∗‖2 + γ2k,xν2x + γ2k,θν2θ
= (1− γk,xµx + γ2k,xL2x)‖xk − x∗‖2 + (1− γk,xL2θ/µx + γ2k,x(L2θ + L4θC2θ/(µ2xµ2θ)))‖θk − θ∗‖2
+ γ2k,xν
2
x + γ
2
k,xν
2
θL
4
θ/(µ
2
xµ
2
θ)
≤ (1− αγk,x + βγ2k,x)(‖xk − x∗‖2 + ‖θk − θ∗‖2) + δγ2k,x,
14
where α = min{µx, L2θ/µx}, β = max{L2x, L2θ + L4θC2θ/(µ2xµ2θ)} and δ = ν2x + ν2θL4θ/(µ2xµ2θ). From (A2-1), we
have that
∑∞
k=0(αγk,x − βγ2k,x) =∞,
∑∞
k=0 δγ
2
k,x <∞, and
lim
k→∞
δγ2k,x
αγk,x − βγ2k,x
= 0.
Then, by invoking the super-martingale convergence theorem (Lemma 2), we have that ‖xk − x∗‖2 + ‖θk −
θ∗‖2 → 0 a.s. as k →∞, which implies that xk → x∗ and θk → θ∗ a.s. as k →∞.
Next we weaken the strong convexity requirement on the function f through the following assumption.
Assumption 4 (A1-2). Suppose the following holds in addition to (A1-1 (ii)) and (A1-1 (iii)).
(i) For every θ ∈ Θ, f(x; θ) is convex and continuously differentiable with Lipschitz continuous gradients
in x with Lipschitz constant Lx.
Furthermore, we make the following assumptions on the steplength sequences employed in the algorithm.
Assumption 5 (A2-2). Let {γk,x}, {γk,θ} and some constant τ ∈ (0, 1) be chosen such that:
(i)
∑∞
k=0 γ
2−τ
k,x <∞ and
∑∞
k=0 γ
2
k,θ <∞,
(iii)
∑∞
k=0 γk,x =∞ and
∑∞
k=0 γk,θ =∞,
(iii) βk =
γτk,x
2γk,θµθ
↓ 0 as k →∞.
Proceeding as in the previous result, we present a convergence result under these weakened conditions.
Theorem 1 (Almost-sure convergence under convexity of f). Suppose (A1-2), (A2-2) and (A3)
hold. Suppose X is bounded and the solution set X∗ of (Pox(θ∗)) is nonempty. Let {xk, θk} be computed via
Algorithm 1. Then, θk → θ∗ a.s. as k → ∞, and xk converges to a random point in X∗ a.s. as k → ∞,
where θ∗ denotes the unique solution of (Lθ) and X∗ denotes the solution set of (Pox(θ∗)).
Proof. By the nonexpansivity of the Euclidean projector, we have for any x∗ ∈ X∗ that
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 = ‖ΠX(xk − γk,x(∇xf(xk; θk) + wk))−ΠX(x∗)‖2
≤ ‖(xk − x∗)− γk,x∇xf(xk; θk)− γk,xwk‖2.
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By adding and subtracting γk,x∇xf(x∗, θk), this expression can be further expanded as follows:
‖(xk − x∗)− γk,x∇xf(xk; θ∗)− γk,x(∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(xk; θ∗))− γk,xwk‖2
= ‖(xk − x∗)− γk,x∇xf(xk; θ∗)‖2 + γ2k,x‖∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(xk; θ∗)‖2 + γ2k,x‖wk‖2
− 2γk,x[(xk − x∗)− γk,x∇xf(xk; θ∗)]T (∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(xk; θ∗))
− 2γk,x[(xk − x∗)− γk,x∇xf(xk; θ∗)]Twk + 2γ2k,x(∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(xk; θ∗))Twk.
Noting that E[wk | Fk] = 0, we have
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ Term 1 + Term 2 + Term 3 + γ2k,xE[‖wk‖2 | Fk], (2.7)
where Terms 1 – 3 are defined as follows:
Term 1 , ‖(xk − x∗)− γk,x∇xf(xk; θ∗)‖2,
Term 2 , γ2k,x‖∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(xk; θ∗)‖2,
and Term 3 , −2γk,x[(xk − x∗)− γk,x∇xf(xk; θ∗)]T (∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(xk; θ∗)).
By invoking the convexity of f(x; θ) in x and the gradient inequality (see A1-2), we have that
Term 1 = ‖xk − x∗‖2 + γ2k,x‖∇xf(xk; θ∗)‖2 − 2γk,x(xk − x∗)T∇xf(xk; θ∗)
≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 + γ2k,x‖∇xf(xk; θ∗)‖2 − 2γk,x(f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗))
≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2γ2k,x‖∇xf(xk; θ∗)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2 + 2γ2k,x‖∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2
− 2γk,x(f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)),
where the last inequality follows from the identity ‖(a − b) + b‖2 ≤ 2‖a − b‖2 + 2‖b‖2. From the Lipschitz
continuity of ∇xf(x; θ) in x, the right hand side can be bounded as follows:
‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2γ2k,x‖∇xf(xk; θ∗)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2 + 2γ2k,x‖∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2 − 2γk,x(f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗))
≤ (1 + 2γ2k,xL2x)‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2γ2k,x‖∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2 − 2γk,x(f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)). (2.8)
By the Lipschitz continuity of ∇xf(x; θ) in θ (A1-2),
Term 2 ≤ γ2k,xL2θ‖θk − θ∗‖2. (2.9)
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By adding and subtracting ∇xf(x∗; θ∗), and by invoking the Lipschitz continuity of ∇xf(x; θ) in x (A1-2)
and the triangle inequality, we may derive a bound for Term 3 as follows:
Term 3 ≤ 2γk,x‖(xk − x∗)− γk,x∇xf(xk; θ∗)‖‖∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(xk; θ∗)‖
≤ 2γk,x‖(xk − x∗)− γk,x(∇xf(xk; θ∗)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗))− γk,x∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖Lθ‖θk − θ∗‖
≤ 2γk,x
(
(1 + γk,xLx)‖xk − x∗‖+ γk,x‖∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖
)
Lθ‖θk − θ∗‖
= 2γk,xLθ‖xk − x∗‖‖θk − θ∗‖+ 2γ2k,xLθLx‖xk − x∗‖‖θk − θ∗‖+ 2γ2k,xLθ‖∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖‖θk − θ∗‖.
By using the fact that 2ab ≤ a2 + b2, we have further that
Term 3 ≤ γ2−τk,x L2θ‖xk − x∗‖2 + γτk,x‖θk − θ∗‖2 + γ2k,xLθLx‖xk − x∗‖2
+ γ2k,xLθLx‖θk − θ∗‖2 + γ2k,xL2θ‖θk − θ∗‖2 + γ2k,x‖∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2,
(2.10)
where τ ∈ (0, 1) is chosen to satisfy (A2-2). Combining (2.7), (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10), we obtain the following
bound on the conditional error.
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ (1 + γ2−τk,x L2θ + γ2k,x(2L2x + LθLx))‖xk − x∗‖2 + (γτk,x + γ2k,x(2L2θ + LθLx))‖θk − θ∗‖2
+ 3γ2k,x‖∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2 − 2γk,x(f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)). (2.11)
From (2.6), we have that
E[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ q2k,θ‖θk − θ∗‖2 + γ2k,θν2θ , (2.12)
where qk,θ ,
√
1− 2γk,θµθ + γ2k,θC2θ . Choose βk =
γτk,x
2γk,θµθ
by (A2-2). Note that by assumption βk+1 ≤ βk.
By multiplying the left hand side of (2.12) by βk+1 and adding to the left hand side of (2.11), we get
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] + βk+1E[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] + βkE[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk] (2.13)
≤ (1 + γ2−τk,x L2θ + γ2k,x(2L2x + LθLx))‖xk − x∗‖2 + (βkq2k,θ + γτk,x + γ2k,x(2L2θ + LθLx))‖θk − θ∗‖2
+ 3γ2k,x‖∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2 + βkγ2k,θν2θ − 2γk,x(f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗))
≤ (1 + γ2−τk,x L2θ + γ2k,x(2L2x + LθLx))‖xk − x∗‖2 +
βkq
2
k,θ + γ
τ
k,x + γ
2
k,x(2L
2
θ + LθLx)
βk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 4
·βk‖θk − θ∗‖2
+ 3γ2k,x‖∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2 + βkγ2k,θν2θ − 2γk,x(f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)).
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Term 4 on the right hand side of (2.13) can be further expanded as
βkq
2
k,θ + γ
τ
k,x + γ
2
k,x(2L
2
θ + LθLx)
βk
= q2k,θ +
γτk,x + γ
2
k,x(2L
2
θ + LθLx)
βk
= 1− 2γk,θµθ + γ2k,θC2θ +
γτk,x
βk
+
γ2k,x(2L
2
θ + LθLx)
βk
= 1 + γ2k,θC
2
θ + 2γk,θγ
2−τ
k,x µθ(2L
2
θ + LθLx).
(2.14)
Combining (2.13) and (2.14), we get
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] + βk+1E[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk]
≤ (1 + γ2−τk,x L2θ + γ2k,x(2L2x + LθLx))‖xk − x∗‖2 + (1 + γ2k,θC2θ + 2γk,θγ2−τk,x µθ(2L2θ + LθLx))βk‖θk − θ∗‖2
+ 3γ2k,x‖∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2 + βkγ2k,θν2θ − 2γk,x(f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗))
≤ (1 + γ2k,θC2θ + 2γk,θγ2−τk,x µθ(2L2θ + LθLx))(‖xk − x∗‖2 + βk‖θk − θ∗‖2)
+ (γ2−τk,x L
2
θ + γ
2
k,x(2L
2
x + LθLx))‖xk − x∗‖2
+ 3γ2k,x‖∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2 + βkγ2k,θν2θ − 2γk,x(f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)).
We define the following:
uk , γ2k,θC2θ + 2γk,θγ2−τk,x µθ(2L2θ + LθLx), σk , 2γk,x(f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)),
and ρk , (γ2−τk,x L2θ + γ2k,x(2L2x + LθLx))‖xk − x∗‖2 + 3γ2k,x‖∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2 + βkγ2k,θν2θ .
Then, we have
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] + βk+1E[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ (1 + uk)(‖xk − x∗‖2 + βk‖θk − θ∗‖2) + ρk − σk.
By boundedness of X and (A2-2), we have that
∑∞
k=0 uk <∞ and
∑∞
k=0 ρk <∞. So, by Lemma 3 we get
that there exists a random variable V such that ‖xk − x∗‖2 + βk‖θk − θ∗‖2 → V in an almost sure sense as
k →∞ and ∑∞k=0 σk = ∑∞k=0 2γk,x(f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)) <∞.
By (A2-2), Lemma 2 and (2.12), we can get that ‖θk − θ∗‖ → 0 a.s. as k → ∞. Thus, it follows that
‖xk−x∗‖ → V a.s. as k →∞. Since∑∞k=0 γk,x =∞, we get lim infk→∞ f(xk; θ∗) = f(x∗; θ∗) a.s. as k →∞.
Since the set X is closed, all accumulation points of {xk} lie in X. Furthermore, since f(xk; θ∗)→ f(x∗; θ∗)
along a subsequence a.s., by continuity of f it follows that {xk} has a subsequence converging a.s. to some
point in X, say x˜, which satisfies f(x˜; θ∗) = f(x∗; θ∗). That means x˜ is some random point in X∗. Moreover,
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since ‖xk−x∗‖ is convergent for any x∗ ∈ X∗ a.s., the entire sequence {xk} converges to some random point
in X∗ a.s.
2.2.3 Diminishing and constant steplength rate analysis
While the previous section focused on the almost sure convergence of the prescribed learning and computa-
tional schemes, a natural question is whether one can develop rate statements. We begin with an examination
of the global rate of convergence and show that O(1/K) rate estimate is derived for an upper bound on the
mean-squared error in the solution xK when f(•; θ∗) is strongly convex in (•) and K represents the number
of steps, consistent with the result obtained for stochastic approximation (cf. [41, 42]). In addition, it is seen
that when the function loses strong convexity, an analogous rate estimate is available by using averaging,
akin to an approach first employed in [43], where longer stepsizes were suggested with consequent averaging
of the obtained iterates.
Proposition 2 (Rate estimates for strongly convex f). Suppose (A1-1) and (A3) hold. Suppose
γx,k = λx/k and γθ,k = λθ/k with λx > 1/µx and λθ > 1/(2µθ). Let E[‖∇xf(xk; θk) + wk‖2] ≤ M2 and
E[‖∇θg(θk) + vk‖2] ≤M2θ for all xk ∈ X and θk ∈ Θ. Let {xk, θk} be computed via Algorithm 1. Then, the
following hold after K iterations:
E[‖θK − θ∗‖2] ≤ Qθ(λθ)
K
and E[‖xK − x∗‖2] ≤ Qx(λx)
K
,
where Qθ(λθ) , max
{
λ2θM
2
θ (2µθλθ − 1)−1,E[‖θ1 − θ∗‖2]
}
,
Qx(λx) , max
{
λ2xM˜
2(µxλx − 1)−1,E[‖x1 − x∗‖2]
}
, and M˜ ,
√
M2 +
L2θQθ(λθ)
µxλx
.
Proof. Suppose Ak , 12‖xk − x∗‖2 and ak , E[Ak]. Then, Ak+1 may be bounded as follows by using the
non-expansivity of the Euclidean projector:
Ak+1 =
1
2
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 = 1
2
∥∥ΠX (xk − γx,k(∇xf(xk; θk) + wk))−ΠX(x∗)∥∥2
≤ 1
2
‖xk − x∗ − γx,k(∇xf(xk; θk) + wk)‖2
= Ak +
1
2
γ2x,k‖∇xf(xk; θk) + wk‖2 − γx,k(xk − x∗)T (∇xf(xk; θk) + wk).
(2.15)
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Note that E[(xk−x∗)Twk] = E[E[(xk−x∗)Twk|Fk]] = E[(xk−x∗)TE[wk|Fk]] = 0. By taking expectations on
both sides of (2.15) and by invoking the bounds E[‖∇xf(xk; θk)+wk‖2] ≤M2 and E[‖∇θg(θk)+vk‖2] ≤M2θ ,
it follows that
ak+1 ≤ ak + 1
2
γ2x,kM
2 − γx,kE[(xk − x∗)T∇xf(xk; θk)]. (2.16)
But f(x; θ) is strongly convex in x with constant µx for every θ ∈ Θ, leading to the following expression:
E[(xk − x∗)T∇xf(xk; θk)] = E[(xk − x∗)T (∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θk))]
+ E[(xk − x∗)T (∇xf(x∗; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗))] + E[(xk − x∗)T∇xf(x∗; θ∗)]
≥ µxE[‖xk − x∗‖2] + E[(xk − x∗)T (∇xf(x∗; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗))].
(2.17)
Combining (2.16) and (2.17), we get
ak+1 ≤ (1− 2γx,kµx)ak + 1
2
γ2x,kM
2 − γx,kE[(xk − x∗)T (∇xf(x∗; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗))]
≤ (1− 2γx,kµx)ak + 1
2
γ2x,kM
2 +
1
2
γx,kµxE[‖xk − x∗‖2] + 1
2
γx,k
µx
E[‖∇xf(x∗; θk)−∇xf(x∗; θ∗)‖2]
≤ (1− γx,kµx)ak + 1
2
γ2x,kM
2 +
1
2
γx,k
µx
L2θE[‖θk − θ∗‖2]. (2.18)
Suppose γθ,k = λθ/k. Since the function g(θ) is strongly convex, we can use the standard rate estimate (cf.
inequality (5.292) in [42]) to get the following
E[‖θk − θ∗‖2] ≤ Qθ(λθ)
k
, (2.19)
where Qθ(λθ) , max
{
λ2θM
2
θ (2µθλθ − 1)−1,E[‖θ1 − θ∗‖2]
}
with λθ > 1/(2µθ). Suppose γx,k = λx/k, allow-
ing us to claim the following:
ak+1 ≤
(
1− µxλx
k
)
ak +
1
2
λ2xM
2
k2
+
1
2
λxL
2
θQθ(λθ)
µxk2
=
(
1− µxλx
k
)
ak +
1
2
λ2xM˜
2
k2
,
where M˜ ,
√
M2 +
L2θQθ(λθ)
µxλx
. By assuming that λx > 1/µx, the result follows by observing that
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ Qx(λx)
k
,
where Qx(λx) , max
{
λ2xM˜
2(µxλx − 1)−1,E[‖x1 − x∗‖2]
}
.
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Remark: Notice that here we assume that f and g are both smooth and strongly convex. A more general
framework is that of composite objectives where the objective is a sume of nonsmooth and smooth stochastic
components. Lan [44] proposed the accelerated stochastic approximation (AC-SA) algorithm for solving
stochastic composite optimization (SCO) problems and proved that it achieves the optimal rate. In related
work, Ghadimi and Lan [45, 46] propose a multi-stage AC-SA algorithm, which possesses an optimal rate
of convergence for solving strongly convex SCO problems in terms of the dependence on different problem
parameters. While this problem class is beyond the current scope, this approach may aid in refinement of
the constants in the Proposition 2 in some regimes.
A shortcoming of the previous result is the need for strong convexity of f(x, θ) in x for every θ ∈ Θ. In
our next result, we weaken this requirement and allow for a merely convex f , extending the optimal constant
stepsize result in [42]. Specifically, given a prescribed number of iterations, say K, the optimal “constant
stepsize” derives the error minimizing steplength; in other words, γk = γ for 1 ≤ k ≤ K. This is in contrast
with the constant stepsize result presented in Proposition 3, where γk = γ for all k. steps. The following
Lipschitzian assumption is imposed on the function f(x; θ).
Assumption 6 (A6). Suppose the following holds in addition to (A1-2).
(i) For every x ∈ X, f(x; θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ with constant Dθ.
Theorem 2 (Rate estimates under convexity of f). Suppose (A3) and (A6) hold. Suppose E[‖xk −
x∗‖2] ≤ M2x , E[‖∇xf(xk; θk) + wk‖2] ≤ M2 and E[‖∇θg(θk) + vk‖2] ≤ M2θ for all xk ∈ X and θk ∈ Θ.
Let {xk, θk} be computed via Algorithm 1. For 1 ≤ i, t ≤ k, we define vt , γx,t∑k
s=i γx,s
, x˜i,k ,
∑k
t=i vtx
t and
DX , maxx∈X ‖x− x1‖. Suppose for 1 ≤ t ≤ K, γx is defined as follows:
γx =
√
4D2X + L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + lnK)
(M2 +M2x)K
,
where Qθ(λθ) , max
{
λ2θM
2
θ (2µθλθ − 1)−1,E[‖θ1 − θ∗‖2]
}
, and γθ,k = λθ/K with λθ > 1/(2µθ). Then the
following holds for 1 ≤ i ≤ K:
∣∣E[f(x˜i,K ; θK)− f(x∗; θ∗)]∣∣ ≤ √Qθ(λθ)Dθ + Ci,K√BK√
K
,
where Ci,K =
K
K−i+1 and BK = (4D
2
X + L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + lnK))(M
2 +M2x).
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Proof. By using the same notation in Proposition 2, we have from (2.16) that
ak+1 ≤ ak + 1
2
γ2x,kM
2 − γx,kE[(xk − x∗)T∇xf(xk; θk)]
≤ ak + 1
2
γ2x,kM
2 − γx,kE[(xk − x∗)T∇xf(xk; θ∗)]− γx,kE[(xk − x∗)T (∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(xk; θ∗))].
(2.20)
Note that f(x; θ) is convex in x for every θ ∈ Θ, allowing us to leverage the gradient inequality.
E[(xk − x∗)T∇xf(xk; θ∗)] ≥ E[f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)]. (2.21)
Combining (2.20) and (2.21), we obtain the following:
ak+1 ≤ ak + 1
2
γ2x,kM
2 − γx,kE[f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)]− γx,kE[(xk − x∗)T (∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(xk; θ∗))].
This allows for constructing the following bounds:
γx,kE[f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)]
≤ ak − ak+1 + 1
2
γ2x,kM
2 − γx,kE[(xk − x∗)T (∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(xk; θ∗))]
≤ ak − ak+1 + 1
2
γ2x,kM
2 +
1
2
γ2x,kE[‖xk − x∗‖2] +
1
2
E[‖∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(xk; θ∗)‖2]
≤ ak − ak+1 + 1
2
γ2x,kM
2 +
1
2
γ2x,kM
2
x +
1
2
L2θE[‖θk − θ∗‖2]
≤ ak − ak+1 + 1
2
γ2x,k(M
2 +M2x) +
1
2
L2θQθ(λθ)
k
, (2.22)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that 2ab ≤ a2 + b2, the third inequality follows from the
boundedness of E[‖xk−x∗‖2] and Lipschitz continuity of ∇xf(x; θ) in θ, and the last inequality follows from
(2.19). As a result, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we have the following:
k∑
t=i
γx,tE[f(xt; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)] ≤
k∑
t=i
(at − at+1) + 1
2
k∑
t=i
γ2x,t(M
2 +M2x) +
1
2
k∑
t=i
L2θQθ(λθ)
t
≤ ai + 1
2
k∑
t=i
γ2x,t(M
2 +M2x) +
1
2
k∑
t=i
L2θQθ(λθ)
t
≤ ai + 1
2
k∑
t=i
γ2x,t(M
2 +M2x) +
1
2
L2θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln k). (2.23)
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Next, we define vt , γx,t∑k
s=i γx,s
and DX , max
x∈X
‖x− x1‖. The following holds invoking these definitions:
E
[
k∑
t=i
vtf(x
t; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)
]
≤ ai +
1
2
∑k
t=i γ
2
x,t(M
2 +M2x) +
1
2L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln k)∑k
t=i γx,t
. (2.24)
Next, we consider points given by x˜i,k ,
∑k
t=i vtx
t. By convexity of X, we have that x˜i,k ∈ X and by the
convexity of f(x; θ∗) in x, we have f(x˜i,k; θ∗) ≤
∑k
t=i vtf(x
t). From (2.24) and by noting that a1 ≤ 12D2X
and ai ≤ 2D2X for i > 1, we obtain the following for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
E[f(x˜i,k; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)] ≤
4D2X +
∑k
t=i γ
2
x,t(M
2 +M2x) + L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln k)
2
∑k
t=i γx,t
. (2.25)
Suppose γx,t = γx for t = 1, . . . , k. Then, it follows that
E[f(x˜1,k; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)] ≤ 4D
2
X + kγ
2
x(M
2 +M2x) + L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln k)
2kγx
. (2.26)
By minimizing the right hand side in γx > 0, we obtain that
γx =
√
4D2X + L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln k)
(M2 +M2x)k
.
This implies the following bound:
E[f(x˜1,k; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)] ≤
√
Bk
k
,
where Bk , (4D2X + L2θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln k))(M2 +M2x). Next, we can also claim that for 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
E[f(x˜i,k; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)] ≤ Ci,k
√
Bk
k
, (2.27)
where Ci,k =
k
k−i+1 . Thus, by employing (2.19), (2.27) and the Lipschitz continuity of f(x; θ) in θ, we have
the required result:
∣∣E[f(x˜i,k; θk)− f(x∗; θ∗)]∣∣ ≤ ∣∣E[f(x˜i,k; θk)− f(x˜i,k; θ∗)]∣∣+ |E[f(x˜i,k; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)]|
≤ DθE[‖θk − θ∗‖] + E[f(x˜i,k; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)]
≤
√
Qθ(λθ)Dθ√
k
+ E[f(x˜i,k; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)] ≤
√
Qθ(λθ)Dθ + Ci,k
√
Bk√
k
.
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Remark: In effect, in the context of learning and optimization, the averaging approach leads to a complexity
bound given loosely by
O
 aθ√K + b+ cθ
√
ln(K)√
K︸ ︷︷ ︸
degradation from learning
 ,
where aθ, b, cθ are suitably defined. If θ
∗ is available, then aθ, cθ = 0, leading to the standard bound of
O(1/√K). While it is not surprising that the requirement to learn θ∗ imposes a degradation, it appears
that this degradation is not severe. However, by changing the averaging window, this degradation disappears
from a rate standpoint. Specifically, the next result is a corollary of Theorem 2 and uses a modified averaging
window, as seen in [41].
Corollary 1 (Rate estimates under convexity of f). Suppose (A3) and (A6) hold. Suppose E[‖xk −
x∗‖2] ≤ M2x , E[‖∇xf(xk; θk) + wk‖2] ≤ M2 and E[‖∇θg(θk) + vk‖2] ≤ M2θ for all xk ∈ X and θk ∈ Θ.
Let {xk, θk} be computed via Algorithm 1. Let k be a positive even number. For k/2 ≤ t ≤ k, we define
vt , γx,t∑k
s=k/2 γx,s
, x˜k/2,k ,
∑k
t=k/2 vtx
t and DX , maxx∈X ‖x − x1‖. Suppose for 1 ≤ t ≤ K, γx is defined
as follows:
γx =
√
4D2X + L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln 2)
(M2 +M2x)k
,
where Qθ(λθ) , max
{
λ2θM
2
θ (2µθλθ − 1)−1,E[‖θ1 − θ∗‖2]
}
, and γθ,k = λθ/K with λθ > 1/(2µθ). Then the
following holds:
∣∣E[f(x˜K/2,K ; θK)− f(x∗; θ∗)]∣∣ ≤ √Qθ(λθ)Dθ + 2√B√
K
,
where B , (4D2X + L2θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln 2))(M2 +M2x).
Proof. When i = k/2 where k is a positive even number, the second inequality of (2.23) becomes
k∑
t=k/2
γx,tE[f(xt; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)] ≤ ak/2 + 1
2
k∑
t=k/2
γ2x,t(M
2 +M2x) +
1
2
k∑
t=k/2
L2θQθ(λθ)
t
≤ ak/2 + 1
2
k∑
t=k/2
γ2x,t(M
2 +M2x) +
1
2
L2θQθ(λθ)
 k∑
t=1
1
t
−
k∑
t=k/2−1
1
t

≤ ak/2 + 1
2
k∑
t=k/2
γ2x,t(M
2 +M2x) +
1
2
L2θQθ(λθ) [1 + ln(k)− ln(k/2)]
≤ ak/2 + 1
2
k∑
t=k/2
γ2x,t(M
2 +M2x) +
1
2
L2θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln 2). (2.28)
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Then, (2.26) becomes
E[f(x˜1,k; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)] ≤ 4D
2
X + kγ
2
x(M
2 +M2x) + L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln 2)
2kγx
.
By minimizing the right hand side in γx > 0, we obtain that
γx =
√
4D2X + L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln 2)
(M2 +M2x)k
.
This implies the following bound:
E[f(x˜1,k; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)] ≤
√
B
k
,
where B , (4D2X + L2θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln 2))(M2 +M2x). Next, we can also claim that,
E[f(x˜k/2,k; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)] ≤ Ck
√
B
k
,
where Ck =
k
k−k/2+1 ≤ 2. Thus, we have the required result:
∣∣E[f(x˜k/2,k; θk)− f(x∗; θ∗)]∣∣ ≤ √Qθ(λθ)Dθ + 2√B√
k
.
We now present a constant steplength error bound where the steplength is fixed over the entire algorithm.
As mentioned before, this differs from Theorem 2 in that the number of iterations is not fixed. Constant
steplength statements are particularly relevant in networked regimes where the coordination of changing
steplength sequences across a collection of agents may prove complicated.
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Proposition 3 (Constant steplength error bound). Suppose (A3) holds. Suppose γθ,k := γθ and
γx,k := γx. Suppose E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ M2x and E[‖∇xf(xk; θk) + wk‖2] ≤ M2 for all xk ∈ X. Suppose
Ak , 12‖xk − x∗‖2 and ak , E[Ak]. Let {xk, θk} be computed via Algorithm 1.
(i) Suppose (A1-1) holds. Then, the following holds:
lim sup
k→∞
ak ≤ 1
2µx
γxM
2 +
1
2µ2x
γθν
2
θL
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
;
(ii) Suppose (A1-2) and (A6) hold and 0 < τ < 1. Then, the following holds:
lim sup
k→∞
∣∣E[f(xk; θk)− f(x∗; θ∗)]∣∣ ≤ 1
2
γxM
2 +
1
2
γ1−τx M
2
x +
1
2
γτ−1x L
2
θ
γθν
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
+Dθ
√
γθν2θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
.
Proof. By (2.6), we get the following:
E[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ q2k,θ‖θk − θ∗‖2 + γ2k,θν2θ ,
where qk,θ ,
√
1− 2γk,θµθ + γ2k,θC2θ . Suppose γθ,k := γθ is chosen such that (1 − qθ) < 1 where qθ,k := qθ.
By taking the expectation and limit supremum on both sides, we have
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2] ≤ q2θ lim sup
k→∞
E[‖θk − θ∗‖2] + γ2θν2θ ,
or,
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖θk − θ∗‖2] ≤ γθν
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
. (2.29)
(i) f is strongly convex: From (2.18), for γx,k := γx where γx is sufficiently small, we have the following:
ak+1 ≤ (1− γxµx)ak + 1
2
γ2xM
2 +
1
2
γx
µx
L2θE[‖θk − θ∗‖2].
It follows that
lim sup
k→∞
ak+1 ≤ (1− γxµx) lim sup
k→∞
ak +
1
2
γ2xM
2 +
1
2
γx
µx
L2θ lim sup
k→∞
E[‖θk − θ∗‖2]
≤ (1− γxµx) lim sup
k→∞
ak +
1
2
γ2xM
2 +
1
2
γx
µx
L2θ
γθν
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
.
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It follows that
lim sup
k→∞
ak ≤ 1
2µx
γxM
2 +
1
2
1
µ2x
L2θ
γθν
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
.
(ii) f is convex: From (2.22), for γx,k := γx, we have the following:
γxE[f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)] ≤ ak − ak+1 + 1
2
γ2xM
2 − γxE[(xk − x∗)T (∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(xk; θ∗))]
≤ ak − ak+1 + 1
2
γ2xM
2 +
1
2
γ2−τx E[‖xk − x∗‖2]
+
1
2
γτxE[‖∇xf(xk; θk)−∇xf(xk; θ∗)‖2]
≤ ak − ak+1 + 1
2
γ2xM
2 +
1
2
γ2−τx M
2
x +
1
2
γτxL
2
θE[‖θk − θ∗‖2],
where 0 < τ < 1. It follows that
γx lim sup
k→∞
E[f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)] ≤ lim sup
k→∞
ak − lim sup
k→∞
ak+1 +
1
2
γ2xM
2 +
1
2
γ2−τx M
2
x
+
1
2
γτxL
2
θ lim sup
k→∞
E[‖θk − θ∗‖2]
≤ 1
2
γ2xM
2 +
1
2
γ2−τx M
2
x +
1
2
γτxL
2
θ
γθν
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
.
It follows that
lim sup
k→∞
E[f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)] ≤ 1
2
γxM
2 +
1
2
γ1−τx M
2
x +
1
2
γτ−1x L
2
θ
γθν
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
.
By the Lipschitz continuity of f(x; θ) in θ (A6(i)), Ho¨lder’s inequality and (2.29), we have
lim sup
k→∞
∣∣E[f(xk; θk)− f(xk; θ∗)]∣∣ ≤ Dθ lim sup
k→∞
E[‖θk − θ∗‖]
≤ Dθ lim sup
k→∞
√
E[‖θk − θ∗‖2]
= Dθ
√
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖θk − θ∗‖2]
≤ Dθ
√
γθν2θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
.
27
Therefore,
lim sup
k→∞
∣∣E[f(xk; θk)− f(x∗; θ∗)]∣∣ ≤ lim sup
k→∞
∣∣E[f(xk; θk)− f(xk; θ∗)]∣∣+ lim sup
k→∞
∣∣E[f(xk; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)]∣∣
≤ 1
2
γxM
2 +
1
2
γ1−τx M
2
x +
1
2
γτ−1x L
2
θ
γθν
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
+Dθ
√
γθν2θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
.
2.2.4 Regret analysis
In this subsection, we consider the problem of online convex programming in a misspecified regime. In
online convex programming problems, a decision-maker sees an infinite sequence of functions c1, c2, . . . where
each function is convex in its argument over a closed and convex set X. An online convex programming
algorithm [47] generates an iterate xk at each time epoch k and a metric of performance is the regret
associated with not using an oﬄine algorithm that considers the following problem: minx∈X
∑K
k=1 ck(x).
If an online convex algorithm generates iterates x1, x2, . . . , then the regret RK is defined as
RK ,
[
K∑
k=1
ck(xk)−min
x∈X
K∑
k=1
ck(x)
]
.
A desirable feature of an online convex programming algorithm is that it is characterized by sublinear re-
gret [47], which is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Theorem 1 in [47]). Select an arbitrary x1 ∈ F and a sequence of learning rates η1, η2, . . . ∈ R+.
In time step t, after receiving a cost function, select the next vector xt+1 according to the Greedy Projection
algorithm:
xt+1 = ΠF (x
t − ηt∇ct(xt)).
If ηt = t
−1/2, the regret of the Greedy Projection algorithm is:
RG(T ) ≤ ‖F‖
2
√
T
2
+
(√
T − 1
2
)
‖∇c‖2,
where ‖F‖ , maxx,y∈F d(x, y) and ‖∇c‖ , maxx∈F,t∈{1,2,...} ‖∇ct(x)‖.
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Proof sketch: The regret of the Greedy Projection algorithm can be bounded as follows:
RG(T ) ≤ ‖F‖
2
2ηT
+
‖∇c‖2
2
T∑
t=1
ηt.
The result can be immediately obtained when ηt = t
−1/2.
Often the model prescribed in an online optimization regime can be refined to a setting where the
functions are related across time rather than being a sequence of unrelated functions. We consider one
particular regime in which the decision-maker sees a sequence of functions given by f(•; θ1), f(•; θ2), . . . .
Furthermore, neither the values θ1, θ2, . . . are known to the decision-maker nor is the fact that θk → θ∗ as
k →∞. As earlier, we assume that the decision-maker has to furnish x1, x2, . . . and we define the misspecified
regret after K steps associated with our generated sequence {xk, θk} as follows:
RK , E
[
K∑
k=1
f(xk; θk, ξ)−Kf(x∗; θ∗, ξ)
]
.
Unlike the traditional definition, we consider the departure from f(x∗, θ∗) and should be contrasted with
the standard regret metric given by RstdK , E
[∑K
k=1 f(x
k; θ∗, ξ)−Kf(x∗; θ∗, ξ)
]
. For purposes of deriving
analytical bounds, we define the following variant of regret as follows:
R̂K , E
[
K∑
k=1
f(xk; θk, ξ)−
K∑
k=1
f(y∗K ; θ
k, ξ)
]
, where y∗K , argmin
y∈X
E
[
K∑
k=1
f(y; θk, ξ)
]
.
Next, we provide a rate of decay of the upper bound of average regret.
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Theorem 4 (Regret under convexity of f). Suppose (A3) and (A6) hold. Suppose E[‖x − x∗‖2] ≤
M2x , E[‖∇xf(x; θ) + wk‖2] ≤ M2 and E[‖∇θg(θ) + vk‖2] ≤ M2θ for all x ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ. Suppose
E[‖∇xf(y∗K ; θk) + uk‖2] ≤ M2, where uk , E[∇xf(y∗K ; θk, ξ)] −∇xf(y∗K ; θk). Let {xk, θk} be computed via
Algorithm 1. Suppose γk,x = k
−α with 0.5 ≤ α < 1, and γθ,k = λθ/k with λθ > 1/(2µθ). If 0 < β < 1, then
the following holds:
RK
K
≤ M
2
xK
α−1
2
+
M2(K1−α − α)
2(1− α)K +
Dθ
√
Qθ(λθ)(2
√
K − 1)
K
+
M2x
2Kβ
+
L2θQθ(λθ)(ln(K) + 1)
2K1−β
,
where β > 0. Furthermore,
lim sup
K→∞
R(K)
K
≤ 0.
Proof. By using the proof in Theorem 1 in [47] (cf. Theorem 3), we obtain that R̂K/K is bounded as follows:
R̂K ≤ M
2
x
2γK,x
+
M2
2
K∑
k=1
γk,x.
Next, if γk,x = k
−α with 0.5 ≤ α < 1, then we have the following bound on ∑Kk=1 γk,x:
K∑
k=1
γk,x =
K∑
k=1
k−α ≤ 1 +
∫ K
1
x−αdx =
1
1− α (K
1−α − α).
Therefore, we obtain the following bound on R̂K :
R̂K ≤ M
2
xK
α
2
+
M2(K1−α − α)
2(1− α) . (2.30)
Recall that the difference between the real regret and misspecified regret is given by the following:
∣∣∣RK − R̂K∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣E
[
K∑
k=1
f(y∗K ; θ
k, ξ)−Kf(x∗; θ∗, ξ)
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣E
[
K∑
k=1
f(y∗K ; θ
k, ξ)−Kf(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)
]∣∣∣∣∣+ |E [K (f(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)− f(x∗; θ∗, ξ))]| ,
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or ∣∣∣RK − R̂K∣∣∣
K
≤
∣∣∣∣∣E
[
1
K
K∑
k=1
f(y∗K ; θ
k, ξ)− f(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)
]∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 1
+ |E [f(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)− f(x∗; θ∗, ξ)]|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 2
.
(2.31)
We proceed to derive bounds for Terms 1 and 2. Term 1 in (2.31) may be bounded as follows:
∣∣∣∣∣E
[
1
K
K∑
k=1
f(y∗K ; θ
k, ξ)− f(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1K
K∑
k=1
E
[∣∣f(y∗K ; θk, ξ)− f(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)∣∣]
≤ Dθ
K
K∑
k=1
E[‖θk − θ∗‖]
≤ Dθ
K
K∑
k=1
√
Qθ(λθ)
k
.
where the second and third inequalities follow from the Lipschitz continuity of ∇f(y∗; θ) in θ (A6) and (2.19).
Through some analysis, the right hand side may be further bounded as follows:
Dθ
K
K∑
k=1
√
Qθ(λθ)
k
≤ Dθ
√
Qθ(λθ)
K
(
1+
∫ K
1
1√
x
dx
)
≤ Dθ
√
Qθ(λθ)(2
√
K − 1)
K
. (2.32)
This implies that Term 1 in (2.31) converges to zero as K →∞. Next, we consider Term 2 in (2.31). By
the optimality condition for y∗K , we have the following expression:
0 ≥
K∑
k=1
E[(y∗K − x∗)T∇xf(y∗K ; θk, ξ)]
=
K∑
k=1
E[(y∗K − x∗)T∇xf(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)] +
K∑
k=1
E[(y∗K − x∗)T (∇xf(y∗K ; θk, ξ)−∇xf(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ))]. (2.33)
Since f(x; θ) is convex in x for every θ ∈ Θ, we may leverage the gradient inequality.
E[f(x∗; θ∗, ξ)] ≥ E[f(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)] + E[∇xf(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)T (x∗ − y∗K)]
=⇒ E[(y∗K − x∗)T∇xf(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)] ≥ E[f(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)− f(x∗; θ∗, ξ)]. (2.34)
Combining (2.33) and (2.34), we get the following lower bound:
0 ≥
K∑
k=1
E[f(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)− f(x∗; θ∗, ξ)] +
K∑
k=1
E[(y∗K − x∗)T (∇xf(y∗K ; θk, ξ)−∇xf(y∗; θ∗, ξ))].
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This allows for constructing the following bound on
∑K
k=1 E[f(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)− f(x∗; θ∗, ξ)]:
K∑
k=1
E[f(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)− f(x∗; θ∗, ξ)] ≤ −
K∑
k=1
E[(y∗K − x∗)T (∇xf(y∗K ; θk, ξ)−∇xf(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ))]
≤ 1
2
K∑
k=1
δKE[‖y∗K − x∗‖2] +
1
2
K∑
k=1
1
δK
E[‖∇xf(y∗K ; θk, ξ)−∇xf(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)‖2]
≤ 1
2
K∑
k=1
δKM
2
x +
1
2
K∑
k=1
1
δK
L2θE[‖θk − θ∗‖2]
≤ 1
2
K∑
k=1
δKM
2
x +
1
2
K∑
k=1
1
δK
L2θQθ(λθ)
k
, (2.35)
where δK = K
−β with 0 < β < 1 and the last inequality follows from (2.19). Note that
∑K
k=1
1
k ≤ ln(K)+1.
Thus, |E [f(y∗K ; θ∗, ξ)− f(x∗; θ∗, ξ)]| = E[f(y∗K ; θ∗)− f(x∗; θ∗)]
≤ M
2
x
2Kβ
+
∑K
k=1
L2θQθ(λθ)
k
2KδK
≤ M
2
x
2Kβ
+
L2θQθ(λθ)(ln(K) + 1)
2K1−β
.
(2.36)
Combining (2.30), (2.31), (2.32), and (2.36), we have that RK/K can be bounded as follows:
RK
K
≤ R̂K
K
+
RK − R̂K
K
≤ R̂K
K
+
∣∣∣RK − R̂K∣∣∣
K
≤ M
2
xK
α−1
2
+
M2(K1−α − α)
2(1− α)K +
Dθ
√
Qθ(λθ)(2
√
K − 1)
K
+
M2x
2Kβ
+
L2θQθ(λθ)(ln(K) + 1)
2K1−β
.
Furthermore, this implies that the limit superior of the average regret is nonpositive.
Remark: In effect, in the context of learning and optimization, the averaging approach leads to a
complexity bound given loosely by
O
 aK1−α + bKα + dKβ + cθ√K+eθ ln(K)K1−β︸ ︷︷ ︸
contribution from learning
 ,
where a, b, cθ, d, eθ are suitably defined. If θ
∗ is available, then cθ, eθ = 0. Furthermore, by setting α = 0.5
and β = 0.5, this leads to the bound of O(lnK/√K), which is a degradation as the result of learning θ∗.
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2.3 Stochastic variational inequality problems with imperfect
information
Several shortcomings exist in the optimization based formulation represented by (Pox(θ∗)). First, the mis-
specification arises entirely in the objectives while the constraints are known with certainty. Second, the
underlying problem need not be an optimization problem, but could instead be captured by a variational
inequality problem. Such problems [20] can capture a range of problems including economic equilibrium
problems, traffic equilibrium problems, and convex Nash games. In fact, variational inequality problems can
effectively capture optimization problems with misspecified constraints. This motivates the consideration
of the misspecified stochastic variational inequality problem (Pvx(θ∗)) where θ∗ can be learnt through the
solution of the following problem:
(ϑ− θ)TE[G(θ; η)] ≥ 0, ∀ϑ ∈ Θ, (Lvθ)
where G : θ × Rp → Rm, and Θ and η abide by the previous specifications. In the majority of problem
settings, G(θ; θ) , ∇θg(θ; η) but we employ the variational structure to introduce generality. In this section,
we extend the results of the previous section to this regime. Specifically, we develop the convergence theory
under settings where the variational map F is both strongly monotone and merely monotone in x for every
θ ∈ Θ in Section 2.3.1 and provide rate statements in Section 2.3.2.
2.3.1 Almost-sure convergence
As in Section 2.2, we propose a set of coupled stochastic approximation schemes for computing x∗ and θ∗.
Given x0 ∈ X and θ0 ∈ Θ, the coupled SA schemes are stated next:
Algorithm 2 (Coupled SA schemes for stochastic variational inequality problems). Step 0.
Given x0 ∈ X, θ0 ∈ Θ and sequences {γk,x, γk,θ}, k := 0
Step 1.
xk+1 := ΠX
(
xk − γk,x(F (xk; θk) + wk)
)
(Compk)
θk+1 := ΠΘ
(
θk − γk,θ(G(θk) + vk)
)
, (Learnk)
where wk , F (xk; θk, ξk)− F (xk; θk) and vk , G(θk; ηk)−G(θk).
Step 2. If k > K, stop; else k : k + 1, go to Step. 1.
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We begin by stating an assumption similar to (A1-1) on the mappings F and G.
Assumption 7 (A1-3). Suppose the following hold:
(i) For every θ ∈ Θ, F (x; θ) is both strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous in x with constants µx
and Lx, respectively.
(ii) For every x ∈ X, F (x; θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ with constant Lθ.
(iii) G(θ) is strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous in θ with constants µθ and Cθ, respectively.
Now, we can leverage the results in Section 2.2.2 to examine the convergence properties for Algorithm 2.
Proposition 4 (Almost-sure convergence under strong monotonicity of F ). Suppose (A1-3), (A2-
1) and (A3) hold. Let {xk, θk} be computed via Algorithm 2. Then, xk → x∗ a.s. and θk → θ∗ a.s. as
k →∞, where x∗ is the unique solution to (Pvx(θ∗)) and θ∗ is the unique solution to (Lvθ).
Proof. Note that x∗ = ΠX(x∗− γk,xF (x∗; θ∗)) and θ∗ = ΠΘ(θ∗− γk,θG(θ∗)). If we replace ∇xf and ∇θg by
F and G in Proposition 1, respectively, then by the proof of Proposition 1, we get xk → x∗ a.s. and θk → θ∗
a.s. as k →∞.
Next, we weaken the rather stringent requirement of strong monotonicity of the map by using an iterative
Tikhonov regularization, which can be stated as follows.
Algorithm 3 (Coupled regularized SA schemes for stochastic variational inequality problems).
Step 0. Given x0 ∈ X, θ0 ∈ Θ and sequences {γk,x, γk,θ}, k := 0
Step 1.
xk+1 := ΠX
(
xk − γk,x(F (xk; θk) + kxk + wk)
)
(Compk)
θk+1 := ΠΘ
(
θk − γk,θ(G(θk) + vk)
)
, (Learnk)
where wk , F (xk; θk, ξk)− F (xk; θk) and vk , G(θk; ηk)−G(θk).
Step 2. If k > K, stop; else k := k + 1, go to Step. 1.
Unlike in standard Tikhonov regularization, such a scheme updates the regularization parameter k after ev-
ery step. Tikhonov regularization and its iterative counterpart has a long history [39] while iterative regular-
ization schemes have seen relatively less study in the context of variational inequality problems (cf. [48, 49]).
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Of note is the extension to distributed schemes to accommodate monotone Cartesian stochastic variational
inequality problems [22]. We employ such techniques in developing single-loop stochastic approximation
schemes in the context of learning and optimization. The following assumptions will be made on both the
decision variable and parameter.
Assumption 8 (A1-4). Suppose the following holds in addition to (A1-3 (ii)) and (A1-3 (iii)).
(i) For every θ ∈ Θ, F (x; θ) is monotone in x and Lipschitz continuous in x with constant Lx.
In iterative Tikhonov regularization, one cannot independently choose {k} and {γk}; in fact, these
sequences are related and satisfy some collectively imposed requirements.
Assumption 9 (A2-3). Let {γk,x}, {γk,θ}, {k} and some constant τ ∈ (0, 1) be chosen such that:
(i)
∑∞
k=0 γ
2−τ
k,x <∞ and
∑∞
k=0 γ
2
k,θ <∞,
(ii)
∑∞
k=0 γk,xk =∞ and
∑∞
k=0 γk,θ =∞,
(iii) βk =
γτk,x
2γk,θµθ
↓ 0 as k → 0.
(iv)
∑∞
k=0
(k−1−k)
k
<∞.
Before providing a convergence result for Algorithm 3, we introduce the following results.
Lemma 5. Let H : K → Rn be a mapping that is monotone over K, and Lipschitz continuous over K with
constant L. Then, for any γ > 0 and  > 0, we have ‖(x − y) − γ(H(x) −H(y)) − γ(x − y)‖ ≤ q‖x − y‖,
where q =
√
1− 2γ+ γ2(L2 + 2).
Proof. See proof of Theorem 1 in [50].
Lemma 6. Let H : K → Rn be a mapping that is monotone over K. Given k > 0, let yk be a solution to
VI(K,H + kI). Then,
‖yk − yk−1‖ ≤ M(k−1 − k)
k
,
where M = ‖x∗‖ and x∗ is a solution to VI(H,K).
Proof. See Lemma 3 in [50].
The convergence result for Algorithm 3 can be stated as follows.
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Theorem 5 (Almost-sure convergence under monotonicity of F ). Suppose (A1-4) , (A2-3) and (A3)
hold. Suppose X is bounded and the solution set X∗ of (Pvx(θ∗)) is nonempty. Let {xk, θk} be computed via
Algorithm 3. Then, θk → θ∗ a.s. as k →∞, and xk converges to a random point in X∗ a.s. as k →∞.
Proof. We have for any x∗ ∈ X∗ that x∗ = ΠX(x∗−γk,xF (x∗; θ∗)). Suppose yk is a solution to the following
fixed-point problem
yk = ΠX(y
k − γk,x(F (yk; θ∗) + kyk)).
Then, by the triangle inequality ‖xk+1 − x∗‖ may be bounded as follows:
‖xk+1 − x∗‖ ≤ ‖xk+1 − yk‖︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 1
+ ‖yk − x∗‖︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 2
.
Term 2 converges to zero by the convergence statement of Tikhonov regularization methods [20]. By using
the non-expansivity of the Euclidean projector, ‖xk+1 − yk‖2 can be bounded as follows:
‖xk+1 − yk‖2 = ‖ΠX(xk − γk,x(F (xk; θk) + kxk + wk))−ΠX(yk − γk,x(F (yk; θ∗) + kyk))‖2
≤ ‖(xk − yk)− γk,x(F (xk; θk)− F (yk; θ∗))− kγk,x(xk − yk)− γk,xwk‖2.
By adding and subtracting γk,xF (x
k; θ∗), this expression can be further expanded as follows:
‖(xk − yk)− γk,x(F (xk; θ∗)− F (yk; θ∗))− γk,x(F (xk; θk)− F (xk; θ∗))− kγk,x(xk − yk)− γk,xwk‖2
= ‖(xk − yk)− γk,x(F (xk; θ∗)− F (yk; θ∗))− kγk,x(xk − yk)‖2 + γ2k,x‖F (xk; θk)− F (xk; θ∗)‖2 + γ2k,x‖wk‖2
− 2[(xk − yk)− γk,x(F (xk; θ∗)− F (yk; θ∗))− kγk,x(xk − yk)]T × (F (xk; θk)− F (xk; θ∗))
− 2[(xk − yk)− γk,x(F (xk; θ∗)− F (yk; θ∗))− kγk,x(xk − yk)]Twk + 2γ2k,x(F (xk; θk)− F (xk; θ∗))Twk.
Noting that E[wk | Fk] = 0, we have
E[‖xk+1 − yk‖2 | Fk] ≤ Term 3 + Term 4 + Term 5 + γ2k,xE[‖wk‖2 | Fk], (2.37)
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where
Term 3 , ‖(xk − yk)− γk,x(F (xk; θ∗)− F (yk; θ∗))− kγk,x(xk − yk)‖2,
Term 4 , γ2k,x‖F (xk; θk)− F (xk; θ∗)‖2,
Term 5 , −2γk,x[(xk − yk)− γk,x(F (xk; θ∗)− F (yk; θ∗))− kγk,x(xk − yk)]T (F (xk; θk)− F (xk; θ∗)).
By Lemma 5 and (A1-4), Term 3 can be further bounded by
(1− 2γk,xk + γ2k,x(L2x + (k)2))‖xk − yk‖2. (2.38)
By the Lipschitz continuity of F (x; θ) in θ (A1-4), Term 4 can be further bounded by
γ2k,xL
2
θ‖θk − θ∗‖2. (2.39)
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, Lemma 5, (A1-4) as well as the fact that 2ab ≤ a2 + b2, Term 5 can be
further bounded by
2γk,x‖(xk − yk)− γk,x(F (xk; θ∗)− F (yk; θ∗))− kγk,x(xk − yk)‖‖F (xk; θk)− F (xk; θ∗)‖
≤ 2γk,x
√
1− 2γk,xk + γ2k,x(L2x + (k)2)‖xk − yk‖Lθ‖θk − θ∗‖
≤ 2γk,xLθ‖xk − yk‖‖θk − θ∗‖
≤ γ2−τk,x L2θ‖xk − yk‖2 + γτk,x‖θk − θ∗‖2,
(2.40)
where τ ∈ (0, 1) is chosen to satisfy (A2-3). Combining (2.37), (2.38), (2.39) and (2.40), we get
E[‖xk+1 − yk‖2 | Fk] ≤ (q2k,x + γ2−τk,x L2θ)‖xk − yk‖2 + (γτk,x + γ2k,xL2θ)‖θk − θ∗‖2 + γ2k,xν2x, (2.41)
where qk,x =
√
1− 2γk,xk + γ2k,x(L2x + (k)2).
On the other hand, we have that θ∗ is the unique solution to VI(Θ,E[G(•; η)]) and
θ∗ = ΠΘ(θ∗ − γk,θG(θ∗)).
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Therefore, by the nonexpansivity of the Euclidean projector, ‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 may be bounded as follows:
‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 = ‖ΠΘ(θk − γk,θ(G(θk) + vk))−ΠΘ(θ∗ − γk,θG(θ∗))‖2
≤ ‖(θk − θ∗)− γk,θ(G(θk)−G(θ∗))− γk,θvk‖2
= ‖(θk − θ∗)− γk,θ(G(θk)−G(θ∗))‖2 + γ2k,θ‖vk‖2 − 2γk,θ[(θk − θ∗)− γk,θ(G(θk)−G(θ∗))]T vk.
By taking conditional expectations and by recalling that E[vk | Fk] = 0 (A3), we obtain the following:
E[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ ‖(θk − θ∗)− γk,θ(G(θk)−G(θ∗))‖2 + γ2k,θE[‖vk‖2 | Fk]
≤ q2k,θ‖θk − θ∗‖2 + γ2k,θν2θ ,
(2.42)
where qk,θ =
√
1− 2γk,θµθ + γ2k,θC2θ , and the second inequality follows from Lemma 4, (A1-4) and (A3).
Since by (A2-3)
∑∞
k=0(1− q2k,θ) =∞ and
∑∞
k=0 γ
2
k,θν
2
θ <∞, and
lim
k→∞
γ2k,θν
2
θ
1− q2k,θ
= lim
k→∞
γ2k,θν
2
θ
2γk,θµθ − γ2k,θC2θ
= lim
k→∞
γk,θν
2
θ
2µθ − γk,θC2θ
= 0,
we have by Lemma 2 that ‖θk − θ∗‖ → 0 a.s. as k → ∞. Choose βk = γ
τ
k,x
2γk,θµθ
by (A2-3). Note that by
assumption βk+1 ≤ βk. By multiplying the left hand side of (2.42) by βk+1 and adding to the left hand side
of (2.41), we get
E[‖xk+1 − yk‖2 | Fk] + βk+1E[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk]
≤ E[‖xk+1 − yk‖2 | Fk] + βkE[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk]
≤ (q2k,x + γ2−τk,x L2θ)‖xk − yk‖2 + (βkq2k,θ + γτk,x + γ2k,xL2θ)‖θk − θ∗‖2 + βkγ2k,θν2θ + γ2k,xν2x
= (q2k,x + γ
2−τ
k,x L
2
θ)‖xk − yk‖2 +
βkq
2
k,θ + γ
τ
k,x + γ
2
k,xL
2
θ
βk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term6
·βk‖θk − θ∗‖2 + βkγ2k,θν2θ + γ2k,xν2x.
(2.43)
Term 6 on the right hand side of (2.43) can be further expanded as
βkq
2
k,θ + γ
τ
k,x + γ
2
k,xL
2
θ
βk
= q2k,θ +
γτk,x + γ
2
k,xL
2
θ
βk
= 1− 2γk,θµθ + γ2k,θC2θ +
γτk,x
βk
+
γ2k,xL
2
θ
βk
= 1 + γ2k,θC
2
θ + 2γk,θγ
2−τ
k,x µθL
2
θ.
(2.44)
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Combining (2.43) and (2.44), we get
E[‖xk+1 − yk‖2 | Fk] + βk+1E[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk]
≤ (q2k,x + γ2−τk,x L2θ)‖xk − yk‖2 + (1 + γ2k,θC2θ + 2γk,θγ2−τk,x µθL2θ)βk‖θk − θ∗‖2 + βkγ2k,θν2θ + γ2k,xν2x
= (1 + γ2k,θC
2
θ + 2γk,θγ
2−τ
k,x µθL
2
θ)(‖xk − yk‖2 + βk‖θk − θ∗‖2)
− (γ2k,θC2θ + 2γk,θγ2−τk,x µθL2θ + 2γk,xk)‖xk − yk‖2
+ (γ2k,x(L
2
x + (k)
2) + γ2−τk,x L
2
θ)‖xk − yk‖2 + βkγ2k,θν2θ + γ2k,xν2x.
Note that ‖xk+1 − yk‖2 ≤ ‖xk − yk−1‖2 + 2‖xk − yk−1‖‖yk − yk−1‖+ ‖yk − yk−1‖2. We have
E[‖xk+1 − yk‖2 | Fk] + βk+1E[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk]
≤ (1 + γ2k,θC2θ + 2γk,θγ2−τk,x µθL2θ)(‖xk − yk−1‖2 + βk‖θk − θ∗‖2)
+ 2(1 + γ2k,θC
2
θ + 2γk,θγ
2−τ
k,x µθL
2
θ)‖xk − yk−1‖‖yk − yk−1‖+ (1 + γ2k,θC2θ + 2γk,θγ2−τk,x µθL2θ)‖yk − yk−1‖2
− (γ2k,θC2θ + 2γk,θγ2−τk,x µθL2θ + 2γk,xk)‖xk − yk‖2 + (γ2k,x(L2x + (k)2) + γ2−τk,x L2θ)‖xk − yk‖2
+ βkγ
2
k,θν
2
θ + γ
2
k,xν
2
x,
which can be further reduced to
E[‖xk+1 − yk‖2 | Fk] + βk+1E[‖θk+1 − θ∗‖2 | Fk]
≤ (1 + γ2k,θC2θ + 2γk,θγ2−τk,x µθL2θ)(‖xk − yk−1‖2 + βk‖θk − θ∗‖2)
+ 2(1 + γ2k,θC
2
θ + 2γk,θγ
2−τ
k,x µθL
2
θ)‖xk − yk−1‖‖yk − yk−1‖
+ (1 + γ2k,θC
2
θ + 2γk,θγ
2−τ
k,x µθL
2
θ)‖yk − yk−1‖2
− 2γk,xk‖xk − yk‖2 + (γ2k,x(L2x + (k)2) + γ2−τk,x L2θ)‖xk − yk‖2 + βkγ2k,θν2θ + γ2k,xν2x.
By Lemma 6 and (A2-3),
∑∞
k=0 ‖yk − yk−1‖ <∞. and
∑∞
k=0 ‖yk − yk−1‖2 <∞. Therefore, by boundedness
of X, (A2-3) and Lemma 3, we have that there exists a random variable V such that
‖xk − yk−1‖2 + βk‖θk − θ∗‖2 → V a.s. as k →∞.
and
∑∞
k=0 2γk,xk‖xk − yk‖2 < ∞. Since
∑∞
k=0 γk,xk = ∞, we get ‖xk − yk‖ → 0 a.s. as k → ∞. This
implies ‖xk − x∗‖ → 0 a.s. as k →∞.
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2.3.2 Diminishing and constant steplength error analysis
In this section, we estimate the convergence rate of the proposed schemes. Analogous to Section 2.2.3,
we obtain the optimal O(1/K) rate estimate for the upper bound on the expected error in the solution
xK when F (•; θ∗) is strongly monotone in (•). In addition, when F (•; θ∗) is merely monotone and the
variational inequality problem possesses the minimum principle sufficiency (MPS) property (See Lemma 7
for a definition of the MPS property), a rate estimate is still available by using averaging. If we replace ∇xf
and ∇θg by F and G, respectively, in Theorem 2, then we obtain the following:
Theorem 6 (Rate estimate for strongly monotone F ). Suppose (A1-3) and (A3) hold. Suppose
γx,k = λx/k and γθ,k = λθ/k with λx > 1/µx and λθ > 1/(2µθ). Let E[‖F (xk; θk) + wk‖2] ≤ M2 and
E[‖G(θk)+vk‖2] ≤M2θ for all xk ∈ X and θk ∈ Θ. Suppose x∗ is the unique solution to VI(X,E[F (•; θ∗, ξ)]).
Let {xk, θk} be computed via Algorithm 2. Then, the following hold:
E[‖θk − θ∗‖2] ≤ Qθ(λθ)
k
and E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ Qx(λx)
k
,
where
Qθ(λθ) , max
{
λ2θM
2
θ (2µθλθ − 1)−1,E[‖θ1 − θ∗‖2]
}
,
Qx(λx) , max
{
λ2xM˜
2(µxλx − 1)−1,E[‖x1 − x∗‖2]
}
,
and M˜ ,
√
M2 +
L2θQθ(λθ)
µxλx
.
Next, we weaken the strong monotonicity of F , but assume that (Pvx(θ∗)) satisfies the MPS property,
introduced in the following Lemma. Note that this property guarantees weak sharpness of the solution set;
this is analogous to weak-sharpness of minima in optimization problems [51].
Lemma 7 (Theorem 4.3 in [52]). Let H : X → Rn be a mapping that is monotone over the compact polyhedral
set X. Let X∗ be the solution set of VI(X,H). If the VI(X,H) possesses the minimum principle sufficiency
(MPS) property, then there exists a positive number α such that (x − x∗)TH(x∗) ≥ α dist(x,X∗), ∀x ∈
X, ∀x∗ ∈ X∗, where dist(x,X∗) , minx∗∈X∗ ‖x − x∗‖. We say that the VI(X,H) possesses the MPS
property if Γ(x∗) = X∗ for every x∗ in X∗, where Γ(x) = arg maxy∈X(x− y)TH(x).
By leveraging this property, we may estimate the convergence rate by using averaging as in Theorem 2.
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Theorem 7 (Rate estimates under monotonicity of F ). Suppose (A1-4) and (A3) hold. Suppose
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ M2x , E[‖F (xk; θk) + wk‖2] ≤ M2 and E[‖G(θk) + vk‖2] ≤ M2θ for all xk ∈ X and θk ∈ Θ.
Suppose X is a compact polyhedral set, the solution set X∗ of VI(X,E[F (•; θ∗, ξ)]) is nonempty, and x∗
is a point in X∗. Suppose VI(X,E[F (•; θ∗, ξ)]) possesses the MPS property. Let {xk, θk} be computed via
Algorithm 2. For 1 ≤ i, t ≤ k, we define vt , γx,t∑k
s=i γx,s
, x˜i,k ,
∑k
t=i vtx
t and DX , maxx∈X ‖x − x1‖.
Suppose for 1 ≤ t ≤ k
γx =
√
4D2X + L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln k)
(M2 +M2x)k
,
where Qθ(λθ) , max
{
λ2θM
2
θ (2µθλθ − 1)−1,E[‖θ1 − θ∗‖2]
}
, and γθ,k = λθ/k with λθ > 1/(2µθ). Then there
exists a positive number α such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
E [α dist(x˜i,k, X∗)] ≤ Ci,k
√
Bk
k
,
where Ci,k =
k
k−i+1 and Bk = (4D
2
X + L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln k))(M
2 +M2x).
Proof. By using the same notation in Theorem 2 except that we replace ∇xf and ∇θg by F and G, respec-
tively, we have from (2.20) that
ak+1 ≤ ak + 1
2
γ2x,kM
2 − γx,kE[(xk − x∗)TF (xk; θ∗)]− γx,kE[(xk − x∗)T (F (xk; θk)− F (xk; θ∗))]. (2.45)
By Lemma 7, we have that there exists a positive number α such that
α dist(xk, X∗) ≤ (xk − x∗)TF (x∗; θ∗) = (xk − x∗)TF (xk; θ∗)− (xk − x∗)T (F (xk; θ∗)− F (x∗; θ∗))
≤ (xk − x∗)TF (xk; θ∗),
(2.46)
where the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of F (•; θ∗) in (•). Combining (2.45) and (2.46),
αγx,kE[dist(xk, X∗)] ≤ γx,kE[(xk − x∗)TF (xk; θ∗)]
≤ ak − ak+1 + 1
2
γ2x,kM
2 − γx,kE[(xk − x∗)T (F (xk; θk)− F (xk; θ∗))].
(2.47)
Next, we follow the same proof method in Theorem 2. We define vt , γx,t∑k
s=i γx,s
and DX , max
x∈X
‖x− x1‖. It
follows from (2.24) and (2.47) that
E
[
α
k∑
t=i
vtdist(x
t, X∗)
]
≤ ai +
1
2
∑k
t=i γ
2
x,t(M
2 +M2x) +
1
2L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln k)∑k
t=i γx,t
. (2.48)
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Next, we consider points given by x˜i,k ,
∑k
t=i vtx
t. Since F (x; θ∗) is monotone in x, we have that X∗ is
convex, which implies that dist(x,X∗) is convex in x. So, we get dist(x˜i,k, X∗) ≤
∑k
t=i vtdist(x
t, X∗). It
follows from (2.25) and (2.48) that for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
E [α dist(x˜i,k, X∗)] ≤
4D2X +
∑k
t=i γ
2
x,t(M
2 +M2x) + L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln k)
2
∑k
t=i γx,t
. (2.49)
Suppose γx,t = γx for t = 1, . . . , k. If we follow the same proof method in Theorem 2, then we can get from
(2.27) and (2.49) that
E [α dist(x˜i,k, X∗)] ≤ Ci,k
√
Bk
k
.
The following corollary is a special case of Theorem 7, an avenue that has been adopted in [41].
Corollary 2 (Rate estimates under monotonicity of F ). Suppose (A1-4) and (A3) hold. Suppose
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ M2x , E[‖F (xk; θk) + wk‖2] ≤ M2 and E[‖G(θk) + vk‖2] ≤ M2θ for all xk ∈ X and θk ∈ Θ.
Suppose X is a compact polyhedral set, the solution set X∗ of VI(X,E[F (•; θ∗, ξ)]) is nonempty, and x∗
is a point in X∗. Suppose VI(X,E[F (•; θ∗, ξ)]) possesses the MPS property. Let {xk, θk} be computed via
Algorithm 2. For k/2 ≤ t ≤ k, we define vt , γx,t∑k
s=k/2 γx,s
, x˜k/2,k ,
∑k
t=k/2 vtx
t and DX , maxx∈X ‖x−x1‖.
Suppose for 1 ≤ t ≤ k
γx =
√
4D2X + L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln 2)
(M2 +M2x)k
,
where Qθ(λθ) , max
{
λ2θM
2
θ (2µθλθ − 1)−1,E[‖θ1 − θ∗‖2]
}
, and γθ,k = λθ/k with λθ > 1/(2µθ). Then there
exists a positive number α such that
E
[
α dist(x˜k/2,k, X
∗)
] ≤ 2√B
k
,
where B = (4D2X + L
2
θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln 2))(M
2 +M2x).
Proof. When i = k/2 where k is a positive even number, then by utilizing the same approach as in Corollary
1, inequality (2.49) becomes the following:
E
[
α dist(x˜k/2,k, X
∗)
] ≤ 4D2X +∑kt=k/2 γ2x,t(M2 +M2x) + L2θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln 2)
2
∑k
t=k/2 γx,t
. (2.50)
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Suppose γx,t = γx for t = 1, . . . , k. By utilizing the same techniques as in Theorem 7, then we obtain the
following bound:
E
[
α dist(x˜k/2,k, X
∗)
] ≤ 2√B
k
,
where B , (4D2X + L2θQθ(λθ)(1 + ln 2))(M2 +M2x).
Next, we present a constant steplength error bound.
Proposition 5 (Constant steplength error bound). Suppose (A3) holds. Suppose γθ,k := γθ and γx,k :=
γx. Suppose E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤M2x and E[F (xk; θk) +wk‖2] ≤M2 for all xk ∈ X. Suppose Ak , 12‖xk − x∗‖2
and ak , E[Ak]. Suppose X is a compact polyhedral set, the solution set X∗ of VI(X,E[F (•; θ∗, ξ)]) is
nonempty, and x∗ is a point in X∗. Suppose VI(X,E[F (•; θ∗, ξ)]) possesses the MPS property. Let {xk, θk}
be computed via Algorithm 1.
(i) Suppose (A1-3) holds. Then, the following holds:
lim sup
k→∞
ak ≤ 1
2µx
γxM
2 +
1
2
1
µ2x
L2θ
γθν
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
;
(ii) Suppose (A1-4) holds. Then, there exists a positive number α such that:
lim sup
k→∞
E[dist(xk, X∗)] ≤ 1
α
[
1
2
γxM
2 +
1
2
γ1−τx M
2
x +
1
2
γτ−1x L
2
θ
γθν
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
]
,
where 0 < τ < 1.
Proof. If we replace ∇xf and ∇θg by F and G in Proposition 3, we obtain that
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖θk − θ∗‖2] ≤ γθν
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
,
and the following can be derived based on the properties of F :
(i) F is strongly monotone:
lim sup
k→∞
ak ≤ 1
2µx
γxM
2 +
1
2
1
µ2x
L2θ
γθν
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
;
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(ii) f is convex: From (2.47), for γx,k := γx, we have that there exists a positive number α such that:
αγxE[dist(xk, X∗)] ≤ γxE[(xk − x∗)TF (xk; θ∗)]
≤ ak − ak+1 + 1
2
γ2xM
2 − γxE[(xk − x∗)T (F (xk; θk)− F (xk; θ∗))]
≤ ak − ak+1 + 1
2
γ2xM
2 +
1
2
γ2−τx E[‖xk − x∗‖2] +
1
2
γτxE[‖F (xk; θk)− F (xk; θ∗)‖2]
≤ ak − ak+1 + 1
2
γ2xM
2 +
1
2
γ2−τx M
2
x +
1
2
γτxL
2
θE[‖θk − θ∗‖2],
where 0 < τ < 1. It follows that
αγxE[dist(xk, X∗)] ≤ lim sup
k→∞
ak − lim sup
k→∞
ak+1 +
1
2
γ2xM
2 +
1
2
γ2−τx M
2
x +
1
2
γτxL
2
θ lim sup
k→∞
E[‖θk − θ∗‖2]
≤ 1
2
γ2xM
2 +
1
2
γ2−τx M
2
x +
1
2
γτxL
2
θ
γθν
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
.
It follows that
lim sup
k→∞
E[dist(xk, X∗)] ≤ 1
α
[
1
2
γxM
2 +
1
2
γ1−τx M
2
x +
1
2
γτ−1x L
2
θ
γθν
2
θ
2µθ − γθC2θ
]
.
2.4 Numerical results
In this section, we apply the developed algorithms on a class of misspecified economic dispatch problems
described in Section 2.4.1. In Section 2.4.2, we apply the proposed schemes for purposes of learning optimal
solutions and the misspecified parameters. Note that the simulations were carried out on Tomlab 7.4. The
complementarity solver PATH [53] was utilized for obtaining solutions to these problems which subsequently
formed the basis for comparison.
2.4.1 Problem description
We consider a setting where there are N firms competing over a W -node network. Firm f may produce and
sell its good at node i, where f = 1, . . . , N and i = 1, . . . ,W . We assume that for a given firm f , the cost of
generating xfi units of power at node i is random and is given by cfi(xfi) = dfix
2
fi +hfixfi + ξfi, where dfi
and hfi are positive parameters, and ξfi is a random variable with mean zero for all f and i. Furthermore,
the generation level associated with firm f is bounded by its production capacity, which is denoted by capfi.
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The aggregate sales of all firms at node i has to satisfy the demand Di at node i. A given firm can produce
at any node and then sell at different nodes, provided that the aggregate production at all nodes matches
the aggregate sales at all nodes for each firm. For simplicity, we assume that there is no limit of sales at any
node. Then, the resulting problem faced by the grid operator can be stated as follows:
min
xfi≥0
E
 N∑
f=1
W∑
i=1
cfi(xfi)

subject to xfi ≤ capfi, for all f, i
N∑
f=1
xfi = Di.
(2.51)
The resulting optimal solution is given by x∗. Suppose firm f generates yfi units of power at node i. We
use cfi(yfi) = dfi(yfi)
2 +hfiyfi + ξfi to denote the cost associated with firm f at node i. The operator will
solve the following (regularized) problem to estimate cfi and dfi:
min
{dfi,hf,i}∈Θ
E
[
(dfi(yfi)
2 + hfiyfi − cfi(yfi))2 + µθd2fi + µθh2fi
]
. (2.52)
The resulting optimal solution is given by θ∗. We assume that yfi is distributed as per a uniform distribution
and is specified by yfi ∼ U [0, capfi], while that the noise ξfi is distributed as per a uniform distribution and
is specified by ξfi ∼ U [−θ∗fi/2, θ∗fi/2].
2.4.2 Results
In this subsection, we employ Algorithm 1 proposed in Section 2.2 for learning parameters and computing
optimal solutions. We will examine the behavior and error bounds of the algorithm.
Behavior of the algorithm
In this part, we consider a special case when N = 5 and W = 5. Suppose, the noise ξ is distributed as per
a uniform distribution and is specified by ξ ∼ U [−θ∗/2, θ∗/2]. Suppose the steplength sequences {γk,x} and
{γk,θ} are chosen according to Proportion 2: γk,x = 1/k and γk,θ = 40/k. Figure 2.1(a) illustrates the scaled
error of the learning scheme when the number of steps increases.
Error bounds
In this part, we examine the errors of the algorithm and compare them with the theoretical error bounds
proposed in Section 2.2. Suppose, the noise ξ is distributed as per a uniform distribution and is specified by
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Figure 2.1: Computing x∗ and learning θ∗ (ξ ∼ U [−θ∗/2, θ∗/2], N = 5, W = 5)
ξ ∼ U [−θ∗/2, θ∗/2].
(a) In the strongly convex regime, suppose the steplength sequences {γk,x} and {γk,θ} are chosen according
to Proportion 2: γk,x = 1/k and γk,θ = 40/k. We use ERR to denote the theoretical error provided in
Proportion 2. The algorithm was terminated at K = 10000. Table 2.1 (L) shows the scaled errors of
the learning scheme.
(b) In the merely convex regime, suppose the steplength γx and the steplength sequence {γk,θ} are chosen
according to Theorem 2: γx is chosen by Table 2.1 (R) and γk,θ = 40/k. We use ERR to denote the
theoretical error provided in Theorem 2 while z∗ denotes f(x∗; θ∗). The algorithm was terminated at
K = 10000 and Table 2.1(R) shows the scaled errors of the learning scheme.
(c) Suppose the steplength sequences {γk,x} and {γk,θ} are chosen according to Theorem 4: γk,x = k−α
and γk,θ = 40/k. We employ ERR to denote the theoretical error provided in Theorem 4 while z
∗
denotes f(x∗; θ∗). The algorithm was terminated after K = 10000 iterations. Figure 2.1(b) illustrates
the scaled regret and scaled theoretical error of the learning scheme when the number of steps increases
(α = β = 0.5). Table 2.2 shows the scaled theoretical error of the learning scheme for different chosen
γk,x = k
−α with α = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 when β = 0.5. We see that when α changes, error bounds
change marginally primarily because the last term in Theorem 4 dominates the bound.
Table 2.1: Learning x∗ and θ∗ in a strongly convex (L) and convex (R) regime: ξ ∼ U [−θ∗/2, θ∗/2]
N W
E[‖xK−x∗‖]
1+‖x∗‖
ERR
1+‖x∗‖
‖E[θK−θ∗‖]
1+‖θ∗‖
ERR
1+‖θ∗‖
10 2 7.3×10−3 9.2×109 4.8×10−2 3.7×104
10 4 3.7×10−2 2.1×1010 4.9×10−2 3.1×104
10 6 3.8×10−2 7.8×1010 4.7×10−2 8.3×104
10 8 1.7×10−2 9.1×1010 4.8×10−2 8.5×104
10 10 2.4×10−2 1.2×1011 4.3×10−2 8.6×104
N W
E[f(x˜1,K ;θK )−z∗]
1+‖z∗‖
ERR
1+‖x∗‖ γx
10 2 1.9×10−1 2.5×105 72
10 4 6.5×10−2 1.1×105 93
10 6 2.7×10−1 2.6×105 127
10 8 1.3×10−1 1.7×105 131
10 10 1.4×10−1 2.6×105 133
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Table 2.2: Investigation of regret when learning x∗ and θ∗ in a stochastic convex regime: ξ ∼ U [−θ∗/2, θ∗/2],
N = 5, W = 5
α
RK
K‖z∗‖
ERR
‖z∗‖
0.5 4.8×10−2 3.1×108
0.6 3.3×10−2 3.1×108
0.7 2.3×10−2 3.1×108
0.8 1.8×10−2 3.1×108
0.9 1.5×10−2 3.1×103
2.5 Concluding remarks
Traditionally, much of the field of optimization has been defined by problems in which the functions and sets
are known to the decision-maker. However, as problems grow in their reliance on data, such knowledge cannot
be taken for granted. We consider one such instance of such problems where functions may be misspecified
and the associated vector may be learnt through the parallel solution of a suitably defined problem. It
is worth emphasizing the problem in the full space of learning and optimization variables is a challenging
(non-monotone) stochastic variational problem for which no first-order methods are currently available. Yet,
by leveraging the structure of the problem, we show that such problems can indeed be efficiently solved.
We consider a problem of solving a stochastic optimization problem in which the objective is parameter-
ized by a vector that can be learnt by solving a suitably defined learning problem, captured by a stochastic
optimization problem. In both strongly convex and merely convex regimes, we develop a set of coupled
stochastic approximation schemes which produces a sequence of iterates that are shown to converge to the
solution and unknown parameter in an almost sure sense. Additionally, we provide rate estimates for the
prescribed schemes in both strongly convex and convex regimes. Through an analysis of the rate of con-
vergence under a diminishing steplength setting, it is seen that the optimal rate of convergence is observed
in strongly convex problems while in convex regimes, we see a degradation introduced by learning from
O
(
1√
K
)
to O
(√
ln(K)√
K
)
. This degradation is seen to disappear if the averaging window is modified appro-
priately. Similar rate statements are also provided in a constant steplength regime. In fact, we may also cast
this problem as an online decision-making problem where a decision-maker sees a collection of misspecified
functions. In a stochastic regime, we observe that an upper bound on the average regret can be shown to
decay at a rate no worse than O
(
lnK√
K
)
for a suitably chosen steplength.
Unfortunately, the optimization-based model cannot accommodate settings where there is misspecifi-
cation in the constraints or, more generally, if the associated decision-making problem is an equilibrium
problem. Motivated by this gap, we consider a misspecified stochastic variational inequality problem and
propose analogous stochastic approximation schemes for computation and learning. To resolve the challenge
associated with merely monotone maps, we employ (Tikhonov) regularized counterparts for which almost-
sure convergence statements can be provided. Additionally, we provide rate statements for constant and
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diminishing steplength regimes, of which the latter requires imposing a suitable weak-sharpness assumption
on the original problem. Again, it is seen that while the schemes display the optimal rate of convergence
under strongly monotone regimes, a degradation in the rate is seen in the monotone regime.
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Chapter 3
Misspecified Stochastic Nash Games
3.1 Introduction
In networked engineered systems, a common challenge lies in designing distributed control architectures that
ensure the satisfaction of a system-wide criterion in environments complicated by nonlinearity, uncertainty,
and dynamics. Such control-theoretic problems take on a variety of forms and arise in a variety of networked
settings, including networks of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), traffic networks, wireline and wireless
communication networks, and energy systems, amongst others. These systems are often characterized by the
absence of a designated central entity that either has system-wide control or has access to global information.
Consequently, control is effected through distributed decision-making and local interactions that rely on
limited information. Game-theoretic approaches represent an avenue for designing such protocols. Game
theory has seen wide applicability in the social, economic, and engineered sciences in a largely descriptive
role. There has been immense recent interest in a prescriptive role [54] that considers designing a game whose
equilibria represent the solutions to the control problem of interest [55, 56]; consequently, the distributed
learning of Nash equilibria assumes immediate relevance in the management of networked systems. Learning
in Nash games has seen much study in the last several decades [57, 58, 59, 60]. In continuous strategy regimes,
convex static games find significance in engineered systems such as communication networks [61, 62, 63, 64]
and signal processing [65, 66].
An oft-used assumption in game-theoretic models requires that player payoffs are public knowledge,
allowing every player to correctly forecast the choices of his adversaries. As noted by Kirman [67], a firm’s
view of the game may be corrupted or misspecified in at least two distinct ways in a Cournot setting where
firms decide production levels given a price function: (i) a firm might have a correct description of the
price function but an incorrect estimate of its parameters; and (ii) it may have an incorrect structure of the
price function and incorrectly conclude that prediction errors are a consequence of misspecified parameters.
Kirman [67] considered such a learning process, and showed that by observing true demand, the suggested
learning process guarantees that the firm strategies converge to the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Further
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inspiration may be drawn from studies by Bischi [68, 69], Szidarovsky [70, 71], and others [72], where firms
competing in a deterministic Nash-Cournot game learn a parameter of the demand function while playing
the game repeatedly. Note that an inherent assumption of a low discount rate is imposed that discounts
the future effect of any player’s strategies. Analogous questions of optimization and estimation have also
been studied by Cooper et al. [38] who consider a joint process of forecasting and optimization in a regime
where the underlying model may be erroneous, demonstrating that the resulting revenues can systematically
reduce over time.
When designing protocols for practical engineered systems, particularly in the absence of a centralized
controller, the associated parameters of the utility functions may often be misspecified. For instance, in
power market models that enlist Nash-Cournot models [73, 74], the precise nature of the price function is
assumed to be given. Similarly, the expected capacity or availability of renewable generation assets is rarely
known a priori. Similarly, when developing distributed protocols for networked UAVs, the prescribed utility
functions may rely on agent-specific information that can only be learnt through observations. Faced by
such challenges, our goal lies in the development and analysis of general purpose algorithms that combine
computation of Nash equilibria with a learning phase to correct misspecification.
Motivation: This chapter is motivated by the absence of general-purpose distributed schemes with asymp-
totic convergence and rate guarantees for learning equilibria in the face of imperfect information. Such prob-
lems emerge from stochastic generalizations of problems arising in communication networks [62, 75, 63, 64],
signal processing [65, 66], and power markets [73]. Accordingly, we present two distributed learning schemes
in which agents learn their Nash strategy while correcting the misspecification in their payoffs:
(1) Stochastic gradient schemes for stochastic Nash games: In Section 3.2, we present a distributed
stochastic approximation framework in which every agent makes two projected gradient updates: Every
agent first updates its belief regarding the equilibrium strategy by using the sampled gradient of its payoff
function and subsequently updates its belief regarding the misspecified parameter through a similar project-
ed (stochastic) gradient update. The resulting sequence of equilibrium and parameter estimates are shown
to converge to their true counterparts in an almost sure sense. Notably, we show that the mean-squared
error of the equilibrium estimates converges to zero at the optimal rate O(1/K) despite the presence of
misspecification.
(2) Iterative fixed-point schemes for stochastic Nash-Cournot games: In Section 3.3, we consider a
Cournot regime where aggregate output is unobservable and one parameter of the demand function is mis-
specified. Under common-knowledge, agents develop an estimate of aggregate output and the misspecified
price function parameter by observing noisy prices. These estimates allow developing an iterative fixed-point
scheme that produces iterates that are shown to converge to the Nash-Cournot equilibrium in an almost-sure
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sense. Additionally, firms learn the true parameter in an almost-sure sense. The result can be extended to
nonlinear price functions.
Remark: We make two remarks before proceeding. (a) First, in (1), the learning problem is constructed
independently of the computational problem through a set of observations while in (2), the learning is
affected by the computational step (akin to multi-armed bandit problems). (b) Second, we comment on the
sequential two-stage framework for resolving misspecification:
Step 1. Learn θ∗ Step 2. Compute x∗(θ∗),
where θ∗ is to be learnt and x∗(θ∗) is the (stochastic) Nash equilibrium, given θ∗. Unfortunately, such an
approach is complicated by several challenges. First, Step 1. needs to be completed in a finite number of
iterations, practically impossible for stochastic learning problems. Second, premature termination of Step 1.
leads to an erroneous estimate θˆ leading to an incorrect Nash equilibrium xˆ. In fact, in stochastic regimes,
one often cannot prescribe the amount of learning effort required in a priori sense. Preliminary numerics
reveal that sequential schemes may perform orders of magnitude worse when compared with iterative fixed-
point schemes (see Table 3.3). Third, oﬄine or a priori observations may be unavailable as required by Step
1.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we define and resolve a misspecified stochastic Nash
game and present a joint set of stochastic approximation schemes that jointly allow for learning equilibria
and resolving misspecification. In Section 3.3, we develop iterative fixed-point schemes in Cournot settings
where aggregate output is unobservable. Empirical studies and conclusions are provided in Sections 3.4 and
3.5, respectively.
3.2 Gradient-based schemes for convex Nash games
3.2.1 Problem description, assumptions and background
We consider an N−person stochastic Nash game in which the ith player solves Opt(x−i):
min
xi∈Ki
fi(x; θ
∗) , E[fi(x; θ∗, ξ)] (Opt(x−i))
where Ki ⊆ Rni , θ∗ ∈ Rm, ξ : Ω → Rd defined on a probability space (Ωx,Fx,Px), n =
∑N
i=1 ni, and
fi : Rn × Rm × Rd → R is a real-valued function in xi, x−i , (xj)Ni 6=j=1, and ξ. The associated Nash
equilibrium is given by a tuple x∗ = (x∗i )
N
i=1 where x
∗
i ∈ SOL(Opt(x∗−i)) for i = 1, . . . , N, SOL(Opt(x∗−i))
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denotes the solution of Opt(x−i) and under suitable convexity requirements (see (A10) below), x∗ is a
solution to a stochastic variational inequality problem VI(K,F (•; θ∗)) where K and F : K × Θ → Rn are
defined as follows:
K ,
N∏
i=1
Ki and F (x; θ) ,
(
E[∇xifi(x; θ, ξ)]
)N
i=1
, (3.1)
respectively. It may be recalled that VI(K,F ) requires an x ∈ K satisfying
(y − x)TF (x; θ∗) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ K. (3.2)
Our overall goal lies in computing equilibria when θ∗ is unavailable or misspecified.
Learning scheme In this section, we consider the estimation of θ∗ through the solution of a suitably
defined stochastic convex learning problem [1]:
min
θ∈Θ
g(θ) , E[g(θ; η)], (3.3)
where Θ ⊆ Rm is a closed and convex set, η : Z → Rp is a random variable defined on a probability
space (Λ,Fθ,Pθ), and g : Θ × Λ → R is a real-valued learning metric function (such as a regression metric
constructed from a set of observations). Consequently, θ∗ may be learnt through a stochastic gradient scheme
of the form:
θk+1i := ΠΘ
(
θki − αki∇θg(θki ; ηki )
)
, k ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N. (3.4)
We emphasize that this learning problem is unrelated to the computational process and is a built from a set
of independently collected observations.
Distributed computational scheme We consider a distributed stochastic approximation scheme where
the ith agent employs its belief regarding θ∗ to take a (stochastic) gradient step:
xk+1i := ΠKi
(
xki − γki ∇xifi(xk; θk, ξk)
)
, k ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N, (3.5)
where γki and ∇xifi(xk; θk, ξk) denotes the steplength and sampled gradient used by player i at step k
and ΠX(u) denotes the Euclidean projection of u onto X. While a fully rational agent would always take
a best response step, in stochastic settings, the complexity of this step might be significant. In bounded
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rational regimes where computational constraints are imposed, an alternative lies in computing other steps
(such as the gradient-response) (cf. [76, 77]) (cf. research in communication networks [61] and cognitive
radio games [78]. An alternate motivation arises from distributed control/optimization settings where a
“game” is designed whose equilibrium is a desirable solution to a suitably defined control problem. Here,
a distributed protocol for computing an equilibrium can be designed and gradient-based approaches can be
adopted (cf. [54, 55, 56]). We propose a game-theoretic extension of that developed in [79]. We may specify
our joint simulation-based scheme for learning and computation as follows:
Algorithm 4 (Gradient response and learning). Step 0. Given θ0i ∈ Θ, x0 ∈ K, {γki , αki } > 0 , for
i = 1, . . . , N , and k = 0.
Step 1:
xk+1i := ΠKi
(
xki − γki ∇xifi(xk; θki , ξki )
)
, k ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N (Computation)
θk+1i := ΠΘ
(
θki − αki∇θg(θki ; ηki )
)
, k ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N. (Learning)
Step 2: if k > K¯, stop; else k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
We now present the main assumptions employed in deriving convergence properties of Algorithm 4. (A1)
enforces convexity assumptions that allow for deriving sufficient equilibrium conditions as VI(X,F ) while
the monotonicity requirements on F allow for claiming the existence of a unique equilibrium. Lipschitzian
requirements of F aid in deriving subsequent convergence and rate statements. Furthermore, a breadth of
learning problems (such as regression, classification etc. [1]) are convex. The requirements imposed by (A11)
are standard in developing distributed protocols while (A12) imposes assumptions on the conditional first
and second moments common in stochastic approximation literature [80, 43, 81].
Assumption 10 (A10). For i = 1, . . . , N , suppose the function fi(x; θ) is convex and continuously differ-
entiable function in xi for every x−i ∈
∏
j 6=iKj and every θ ∈ Θ. Furthermore, suppose Θ is a closed,
convex, and bounded set and for i = 1, . . . , N , Ki ⊆ Rni is a nonempty, closed, convex and bounded set.
Furthermore, suppose the following hold:(a) For every θ ∈ Θ, F (x; θ) is both strongly monotone and Lips-
chitz continuous in x with constants µx and Lx; for every θ, (F (x; θ)− F (y; θ))T (x− y) ≥ µx‖x− y‖2, and
‖F (x; θ)−F (y; θ)‖ ≤ Lx‖x−y‖; (b) For every x ∈ K, F (x; θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ with constant Lθ;
(c) The function g(θ) is strongly convex and continuously differentiable with Lipschitz continuous gradients
in θ with convexity constant µθ and Lipschitz constant Cθ, respectively.
Note that monotone Nash games include stable Nash games, a class of games for which it has been
shown that a range of evolutionary dynamics allow for convergence to Nash equilibria [82]. In fact, in recent
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work [83], a notion of passivity has been developed.
Assumption 11 (A11). For i = 1, . . . , N , the ith agent knows only his objective fi and strategy set Ki.
Furthermore, the vector x is assumed to be observable.
We define a new probability space (Z,F ,P), where Z , Ω × Λ, F , Fx × Fθ and P , Px × Pθ. For
i = 1, . . . , N , suppose wki , ∇xifi(xk; θki , ξk) −∇xifi(xk; θki ) and vki , ∇θg(θki ; ηk) −∇θg(θki ). Fk denotes
the sigma-field generated by (x0, θ0) and errors (wl, vl) for l = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1, i.e., F0 = σ
{
(x0, θ0)
}
and
Fk = σ
{
(x0, θ0),
(
(wl, vl), l = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1)} for k ≥ 1.
Assumption 12 (A12). (a) Unbiasedness: E[wk | Fk] = 0 and E[vki | Fk] = 0 a.s. for all k and i;
(b)Bounded second moments: E[‖wk‖2 | Fk] ≤ ν2x and E[‖vki ‖2 | Fk] ≤ ν2θ a.s. for all k, i.
To construct distributed schemes requiring no coordination in terms of setting parameters, we allow
each agent to independently set steplengths and as long as a suitable relationship between these steplengths
holds, convergence follows. Specifically, the ith agent employs a diminishing steplength sequence given by
γki . Furthermore, we define γ
k
min , min1≤i≤N{γki } and γkmax , max1≤i≤N{γki } for all k. Similarly, we define
αkmin , min1≤i≤N{αki } and αkmax , max1≤i≤N{αki } for all k. Then, we can make the following assumptions
on the steplengths of the algorithm.
Assumption 13 (Steplength requirements, A13). Let {γki } and {αki } be chosen such that: (a)
∑∞
k=1 γ
k
min =
∞, ∑∞k=1(γkmax)2 < ∞, ∑∞k=1(αkmax)2 < ∞; (b) limk→∞ γkmax−γkminγkmax = 0; (c) αkmin ≥ γkmaxL2θ/(µxµθ) for
sufficiently large k, limk→∞
(αkmax)
2
γkmax
= 0.
Notice that (a)
∑∞
k=1 γ
k
min = ∞ and (c) αkmin ≥ γkmaxL2θ/(µxµθ) for sufficiently large k implies that∑∞
k=1 α
k
min =∞.
3.2.2 Analysis
We begin with a contraction statement for the sequence of iterates produced by Algorithm 4.
Lemma 8. Suppose (A10), (A11), (A12) and (A13) hold. Let {xk, θk} be computed via Algorithm 4. For
any k ≥ 0, E [‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ ζk‖xk−x∗‖2+βk, where ζk = 1−γkmaxµx+2(γkmax−γkmin)Lx+2(γkmax)2L2x
and βk = (2(γ
k
max)
2L2θ + γ
k
maxL
2
θ/µx)
∑N
i=1 ‖θki − θ∗‖2 + (γkmax)2ν2x.
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Proof. Since x∗i = ΠKi(x
∗
i − γki Fi(x∗; θ∗)), by the nonexpansivity of the Euclidean projector:
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤
N∑
i=1
(‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + (γki )2‖Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗)‖2 + (γki )2‖wki ‖2)
− 2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗))
− 2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )Twki + 2
N∑
i=1
(γki )
2(Fi(x
k; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗))Twki . (3.6)
RHS of (3.6) ≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 + (γkmax)2
N∑
i=1
‖Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
term1
+(γkmax)
2‖wk‖2
−2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
term2
−2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
term3
− 2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )Twki + 2
N∑
i=1
(γki )
2(Fi(x
k; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗))Twki . (3.7)
By (A10), term 1 in (3.7) may be bounded by leveraging the Lipschitz continuity of F (x; θ):
‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2(γkmax)2
N∑
i=1
‖Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗)‖2 + 2(γkmax)2
N∑
i=1
‖Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗)‖2
≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2(γkmax)2
N∑
i=1
‖F (xk; θki )− F (xk; θ∗)‖2 + 2(γkmax)2‖F (xk; θ∗)− F (x∗; θ∗)‖2
≤ (1 + 2(γkmax)2L2x)‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2(γkmax)2L2θ
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2. (3.8)
By (A10), term 2 in (3.7) can be bounded by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, Ho¨lder’s inequality and the
Lipschitz continuity of F (x; θ):
− 2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗)) ≤ 2γkmax
N∑
i=1
‖xki − x∗i ‖‖Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗)‖
≤ 2γkmax‖xk − x∗‖
√√√√ N∑
i=1
‖Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗)‖2 ≤ 2γkmax‖xk − x∗‖
√√√√ N∑
i=1
‖F (xk; θki )− F (xk; θ∗)‖2
≤ 2γkmaxLθ‖xk − x∗‖
√√√√ N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 ≤ γkmaxµx‖xk − x∗‖2 + γkmax
L2θ
µx
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2, (3.9)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that 2ab ≤ a2 + b2. Term 3 in (3.7) can be bounded by the
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Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and γki ≤ γkmax for all i:
− 2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗)) = −2
N∑
i=1
γkmax(x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗))
− 2
N∑
i=1
(γki − γkmax)(xki − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗))
≤ −2γkmax
N∑
i=1
(xki − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗)) + 2(γkmax − γkmin)
N∑
i=1
‖xki − x∗i ‖‖Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗)‖.
Proceeding further, we may leverage Ho¨lder’s inequality, the Lipschitz continuity of F (x; θ) and (A10), to
obtain the following sequence of inequalities:
− 2γkmax
N∑
i=1
(xki − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗)) + 2(γkmax − γkmin)
N∑
i=1
‖xki − x∗i ‖‖Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗)‖
≤ −2γkmax(xk − x∗)T (F (xk; θ∗)− F (x∗; θ∗)) + 2(γkmax − γkmin)‖xk − x∗‖‖F (xk; θ∗)− F (x∗; θ∗)‖
≤ −2γkmaxµx‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx‖xk − x∗‖2. (3.10)
Combining (3.6) with (3.7), (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10), we obtain
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ (1 + 2(γkmax)2L2x)‖xk − x∗‖2 − γkmaxµx‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx‖xk − x∗‖2
+ 2(γkmax)
2L2θ
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 + γkmaxL2θ/µx
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 + (γkmax)2‖wk‖2
− 2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )Twki + 2
N∑
i=1
(γki )
2(Fi(x
k; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗))Twki
=
(
1− γkmaxµx + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx + 2(γkmax)2L2x
) ‖xk − x∗‖2
+ (2(γkmax)
2L2θ + γ
k
maxL
2
θ/µx)
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 + (γkmax)2‖wk‖2
− 2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )Twki + 2
N∑
i=1
(γki )
2(Fi(x
k; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗))Twki .
By taking conditional expectations and by recalling that E[wk | Fk] = 0 and E[‖wk‖2 | Fk] ≤ ν2x, we obtain
that E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ ζk‖xk − x∗‖2 + βk, where ζk = 1 − γkmaxµx + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx + 2(γkmax)2L2x
and βk = (2(γ
k
max)
2L2θ + γ
k
maxL
2
θ/µx)
∑N
i=1 ‖θki − θ∗‖2 + (γkmax)2ν2x.
We may now prove our main a.s. convergence result for the sequences {xk} and {θk}.
Theorem 8. Suppose (A10), (A11), (A12) and (A13) hold. Let {xk, θk} be computed via Algorithm 4.
Then, xk
a.s.−→ x∗ and θki a.s.−→ θ∗ as k →∞ for all i.
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Proof. From Lemma 8, the following holds for every k:
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ (1− γkmaxµx + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx + 2(γkmax)2L2x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, ζk
‖xk − x∗‖2
+ (2(γkmax)
2L2θ + γ
k
maxL
2
θ/µx)
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 + (γkmax)2ν2x︸ ︷︷ ︸
, βk
.
(3.11)
By invoking the fixed-point property given by θ∗ = ΠΘ(θ∗ − αki∇θg(θ∗)) (see [20]) and the non-expansivity
of the Euclidean projector, we may derive the following bound on ‖θk+1i − θ∗‖2:
‖θk+1i − θ∗‖2 ≤ ‖θki − θ∗i − αki (∇θg(θki )−∇θg(θ∗))− αki vki ‖2
= ‖θki − θ∗i − αki (∇θg(θki )−∇θg(θ∗))‖2 + (αki )2‖vki ‖2 − 2αki (θki − θ∗i − αki (∇θg(θki )−∇θg(θ∗)))T vki .
By taking conditional expectations, recalling that E[vki | Fk] = 0 and using Lemma 4, we obtain the following
bound:
E[‖θk+1i − θ∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ ‖θki − θ∗ − αki (∇θg(θki )−∇θg(θ∗))‖2 + (αki )2E[‖vki ‖2 | Fk]
≤ (1− 2αki µθ + (αki )2C2θ )‖θki − θ∗‖2 + (αki )2ν2θ
≤ (1− 2αkminµθ + (αkmax)2C2θ )‖θki − θ∗‖2 + (αkmax)2ν2θ .
(3.12)
Next, by adding (3.11) and (3.12) and by invoking (A13), we obtain the following bound.
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk]+ E[ N∑
i=1
‖θk+1i − θ∗‖2 | Fk
]
≤ (1− γkmaxµx + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx + 2(γkmax)2L2x) ‖xk − x∗‖2
+ (1− 2αkminµθ + (αkmax)2C2θ + 2(γkmax)2L2θ + γkmaxL2θ/µx)
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 + (γkmax)2ν2x +N(αkmax)2ν2θ
≤ (1− γkmaxµx + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx + 2(αkmax)2L2xµ2xµ2θ/L4θ)‖xk − x∗‖2
+ (1− γkmaxL2θ/µx + (αkmax)2C2θ + 2(αkmax)2µ2xµ2θ/L2θ)
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 + (γkmax)2ν2x +N(αkmax)2ν2θ
≤ (1− υkγkmax + β(αkmax)2)
(
‖xk − x∗‖2 +
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2
)
+ δk,
where the second inequality results from invoking A13(c) through which −µθαkmin ≤ −γkmaxL2θ/µx and υk =
min{µx − 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx/γkmax, L2θ/µx}, β = max{2L2xµ2xµ2θ/L4θ, C2θ + 2µ2xµ2θ/L2θ}, and δk = (γkmax)2ν2x +
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N(αkmax)
2ν2θ . To show the non-summability of (υkγ
k
max − β(αkmax)2), we consider two cases: (i) If µx ≤
L2θ/µx then υk = µx − 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx/γkmax and for k > K, υk ≥ µx −  where  > 0. Consequently,∑
k>K υkγ
k
max ≥
∑
k>K(µx − )γkmax = ∞; (ii) Alternately, if µx > L2θ/µx, then for k > K, υk = L2θ/µx
and
∑
k>K υkγ
k
max =
∑
k>K L
2
θ/µxγ
k
max =∞. Since αkmax is square summable from (A13), we conclude that∑∞
k=0(υkγ
k
max − β(αkmax)2) =∞. In addition, we have that
lim
k→∞
δk
υkγkmax − β(αkmax)2
= lim
k→∞
(γkmax)
2ν2x +N(α
k
max)
2ν2θ
υkγkmax − β(αkmax)2
= lim
k→∞
(γkmax)ν
2
x +N
(αkmax)
2
γkmax
ν2θ
υk − β(αkmax)2/γkmax
= 0,
where the last equality results from noting that limk→∞ γkmax = 0, limk→∞(α
k
max)
2/γkmax = 0 and limk→∞ υk =
c > 0. Then, by invoking the super-martingale convergence theorem (Lemma 2), we have that ‖xk − x∗‖2 +∑N
i=1 ‖θki − θ∗‖2 → 0 a.s. as k →∞, which implies that xk → x∗ and θki → θ∗ a.s. as k →∞ for all i.
A natural concern is whether the rule that relates the steplengths can be implemented in a distributed
fashion without coordination. We propose a rule, first suggested by [49], in which every agent chooses a
positive integer and the required coordination statement holds. We view this as a protocol that may be
employed for developing distributed schemes. The next result ensures that for such a choice, the required
assumptions hold [49].
Lemma 9 (Choice of steplength sequences). Let {γki } and {αki } be chosen such that γki = 1(k+Ni)α and αki =
1
(k+Mi)β
where Ni and Mi are positive integers and
1
2 < β < α < 1. Then,
∑∞
k=1 γ
k
min =∞,
∑∞
k=1(γ
k
max)
2 <
∞, ∑∞k=1(αkmax)2 < ∞ and limk→∞ γkmax−γkminγkmax = 0, limk→∞ (αkmax)2γkmax = 0, αkmin ≥ γkmaxL2θ/(µxµθ) for suffi-
ciently large k.
Finally, we conclude this section with a non-asymptotic error bound that demonstrates that the joint
scheme demonstrates the optimal rate of convergence of O(1/K) in mean-squared error.
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Theorem 9. Suppose (A10), (A11) and (A12) hold. Suppose γki = λx,i/k and α
k
i = λθ,i/k. Let
E[‖Fi(xk; θki ) + wki ‖2] ≤ M2/N and E[‖∇θg(θki ) + vki ‖2] ≤ M2θ for all xk ∈ K and θki ∈ Θ. Let {xk, θk} be
computed via Algorithm 4. We define λx,min , min
1≤i≤N
{λx,i}, λx,max , max
1≤i≤N
{λx,i}, λθ,min , min
1≤i≤N
{λθ,i}
and λθ,max , max
1≤i≤N
{λθ,i}. Suppose 2µθλθ,min > 1 and µxλx,max − 2(λx,max − λx,min)Lx > 1. Then, the
following hold after K iterations:
E[‖θKi − θ∗‖2] ≤
Qθ(λθ)
K
and E[‖xK − x∗‖2] ≤ Qx,θ(λx, λθ)
K
,
where Qθ(λθ) , max
{
λ2θ,maxM
2
θ
(2µθλθ,min − 1) ,maxi E[‖θ
0
i − θ∗‖2]
}
and
Qx,θ(λx, λθ) , max
{
λ2x,maxM
2 + λ2x,maxL
2
θNQθ(λθ)
(µxλx,max − 2(λx,max − λx,min)Lx − 1) ,E[‖x
0 − x∗‖2]
}
.
Proof. Suppose Ak , 12‖xk − x∗‖2 and ak , E[Ak]. Then, Ak+1 may be bounded as follows by using the
non-expansivity of the Euclidean projector:
Ak+1 ≤ 1
2
N∑
i=1
‖xki − x∗i − γki (Fi(xk; θki ) + wki ))‖2
= Ak +
1
2
N∑
i=1
(γki )
2‖Fi(xk; θki ) + wki ‖2 −
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θki ) + wki ).
(3.13)
Note that E[(xki − x∗i )Twki ] = 0. By taking expectations on both sides of (3.13) and by invoking the bounds
E[‖Fi(xk; θki ) + wki ‖2] ≤M2/N and E[‖∇θg(θki ) + vki ‖2] ≤M2θ , it follows that
ak+1 ≤ ak + 1
2
(γkmax)
2M2 −
N∑
i=1
γki E[(xki − x∗i )TFi(xk; θki )]. (3.14)
By (3.9) and (3.10), the last term (including the negative sign) in (3.14) can be bounded by
−
N∑
i=1
γki E[(xki − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗))]
−
N∑
i=1
γki E[(xki − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗))]−
N∑
i=1
γki E[(xki − x∗i )TFi(x∗; θ∗)]
≤ −
N∑
i=1
γki E[(xki − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗))]−
N∑
i=1
γki E[(xki − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗))]
≤ γkmaxµxak + γkmaxL2θ/(2µx)
N∑
i=1
E[‖θki − θ∗‖2]− 2γkmaxµxak + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lxak. (3.15)
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Combining (3.14) and (3.15), we get
ak+1 ≤ (1− γkmaxµx + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx)ak +
1
2
(γkmax)
2M2 + γkmaxL
2
θ/(2µx)
N∑
i=1
E[‖θki − θ∗‖2].
Suppose αki = λθ,i/k for all i. Since the function g(θ) is strongly convex, we can use the standard rate
estimate (cf. inequality (5.292) in [42]) to get the following
E[‖θki − θ∗‖2] ≤
Qθ(λθ)
k
, (3.16)
where Qθ(λθ) , max
{
λ2θ,maxM
2
θ (2µθλθ,min − 1)−1,maxi E[‖θ0i − θ∗‖2]
}
with λθ,min > 1/(2µθ). Suppose
γki = λx,i/k, allowing us to claim the following:
ak+1 ≤
(
1− µxλx,max − 2(λx,max − λx,min)Lx
k
)
ak +
λ2x,max
2k2
(
M2 +
L2θNQθ(λθ)
λx,maxµx
)
,
By assuming that µxλx,max− 2(λx,max−λx,min)Lx > 1, the result follows by observing that E[‖xk−x∗‖2] ≤
Qx,θ(λx,λθ)
k , where
Qx,θ(λx, λθ) , max
{
λ2x,maxM
2 + λ2x,maxL
2
θNQθ(λθ)
(µxλx,max − 2(λx,max − λx,min)Lx − 1) ,E[‖x
0 − x∗‖2]
}
.
Remark: Surprisingly, misspecification does not lead to a degeneration in the rate of convergence of the
mean-squared error but does lead to a worsening of the constant. In addition, the lack of consistency across
steplengths leads to a further growth in this constant. In fact, if θ0i = θ
∗ for every i, we obtain a rate close
to that seen for perfectly specified stochastic Nash games.
3.3 Iterative fixed-point schemes for misspecified Nash-Cournot
games
Inspired by the analysis of misspecified Nash-Cournot games [68, 84, 69, 71, 70], we develop an iterative
fixed-point scheme. We introduce the problem in Section 3.3.1 and describe and analyze the algorithm in
Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, respectively. We conclude with an extension to nonlinear prices in Section 3.3.4.
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3.3.1 Problem description, assumptions and background
We consider a Nash-Cournot game wherein fi(x) , ci(xi) − p(X; a∗, b∗)xi, where X ,
∑N
i=1 xi, xi and
ci(xi) denotes the scalar output and cost function associated with firm i, θ
∗ denotes the true value of the
misspecified parameter of the price function while Ki denotes the strategy set of firm i. Suppose the price
function p(X; a∗, b∗) is defined as
p(X; a∗, b∗) , (a∗ − b∗X) , (3.17)
Note that a∗ represents the “choke price” at which demand plummets to zero, while b∗ represents the price
elasticity of demand. Inspired by [69, 84], we assume that either a∗ or b∗ is unknown and firm i’s belief of
this unknown parameter is denoted by θi. A natural extension is where both parameters are unknown and
this will require two or more observations at each epoch, rather than a single observation of noisy prices.
Case 1 (Learning a∗): We assume that firms know b∗ but are unaware of a∗ (θ∗ = a∗); the ith firm harbors
a belief on a∗ denoted by θi and estimates the aggregate output X by Xi, then the ith firm’s price estimate
and the true noise-corrupted prices are defined as follows:
p(Xi; θi, 0) , θi − b∗Xi (Estimate) and p(X; θ∗, ξ) , (θ∗ + ξ)− b∗X. (True price). (3.18)
Case 2 (Learning b∗): Distinct from Case 1, firms know a∗ and estimate b∗ as θi (θ∗ = b∗) while the true
price is corrupted by noise scaled by the aggregate output. Firm i’s price estimate and the true prices are
defined as follows:
p(Xi; θi, 0) , a∗ − θiXi (Estimate) and p(X; θ∗, ξ) , a∗ − (θ∗ + ξ)X. (True price). (3.19)
The next assumption formalizes these two cases.
Assumption 14 (A14). Either (A14a) or (A14b) holds:
(A14a) Firms know b∗ but not a∗ (θ∗ = a∗) and the price is defined by (3.18).
(A14b) Firms know a∗ but not b∗ (θ∗ = b∗) and the price is defined by (3.19).
Furthermore, the random variable ξ is defined by ξ : Λ → R, (Λ,Fθ,Pθ) is the associated probability space
and ξ1, . . . , ξk are i.i.d. random variables with mean zero for all k.
Our assumption on costs is a special case of (A10).
Assumption 15 (A15). The cost function ci(xi) is a convex and continuously differentiable function in
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xi over Ki with Lipschitz continuous gradients with constant Mi. Furthermore, K1, . . . ,KN ,Θ are closed,
convex, and bounded sets.
As forwarded by [85], the notion of “common knowledge” in game theory extends beyond agents having
access to information; specifically, two agents are assumed to have common knowledge of an event, if both
agents know the event, agent 1 knows that agent 2 knows it, agent 2 knows that agent 1 knows it, agent
1 knows that agent 2 knows that agent 1 knows it and so on. We also assume that firms cannot observe
aggregate output and firms employ a belief of aggregate output, relying on the knowledge of the cost functions
and strategy sets of their competitors. Such a knowledge is assured through a common knowledge assumption.
Collectively, these two assumptions are captured by (A16). An assumption often employed in games is that
of common knowledge, whereby firms are aware of the costs functions and strategy sets of their competitors
(see [57]). Formally, this assumption is given by the following:
Assumption 16 (A16). The common knowledge assumption holds with regard to ci(xi) and Ki for i =
1, . . . , N. Furthermore, aggregate output is unobservable.
Several motivating examples exist in the literature detailing common knowledge; these include instances
provided by [86] (the barbecue problem) and [87] (the department store problem), amongst others. While
our results are agnostic to applications, it is worth emphasizing that such assumptions often hold when
agents need to make their assets and costs public through suitable filings, such as in utility-based regulation
(power, gas, water, etc.). This is often the case in regulatory settings (cf. [88, Pg. 78-79]). Common knowledge
assumptions immediately hold when a game is designed [54, 55, 56] and agents can be endowed with the
requisite knowledge. A select number of results will rely on boundedness of strategy sets, as specified by
(A17).
Assumption 17 (A17). Suppose the estimator set Θ is a compact convex set in R+ given by [δ,∆] and
0 < δ < θ∗ + ξk < ∆ for all k. Furthermore, suppose the sets K1, . . . ,KN are bounded.
3.3.2 Description and definition of algorithm
Our goal lies in developing schemes for learning equilibria and misspecified parameters. Unfortunately,
since neither the aggregate output nor θ∗ are observable, gradient/best-response schemes cannot be directly
implemented. However, under (A16), every firm knows the cost functions and strategy sets of its competitors,
allowing for computing the best response of all firms, based on an estimate of θ∗ and the aggregate. By using
the discrepancy between estimated and observed prices, each firm may construct improved estimates of the
misspecified parameter. This model, while aligned, with that suggested by [69, 84] enjoys distinctions at
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several levels; specifically, we allow for constrained problems with nonlinear cost functions with noisy price
observations arising from possibly nonlinear price functions. Throughout this section, let xki = (x
k
i1, · · · , xkiN )
for i = 1, · · · , N and Xki =
∑k
j=1 x
k
ij where x
k
ij denotes firm i’s conjecture of firm j’s output at the kth
period and Xki denote firm i’s estimate of aggregate output. Note that X
k
i is maintained as strictly positive
by assuming that at least one of the strategy sets requires strictly positive output while the true aggregate
Xk is given by Xk ,
∑N
j=1 x
k
jj . The proposed algorithm relies on simultaneous updates of x
k+1
i and θ
k+1
i .
Before proceeding, we define θ̂k+1i , ϑ
k+1
i , and ϑ¯
k+1
i :
Definition of ϑki , ϑ¯
k
i and θ̂
k
i : The variable ϑ
k
i is defined as follows:
under (A14a) : p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) = (θ∗ + ξk)− b∗Xk, ϑki , p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) + b∗Xki , (3.20)
under (A14b) : p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) = a∗ − (θ∗ + ξk)Xk, ϑki , (a∗ − p(Xk; θ∗, ξk))/Xki . (3.21)
Consequently, ϑ¯ki after k steps is given by
ϑ¯ki =
(k − 1)ϑ¯k−1i + ϑki
k
. (3.22)
Subsequently, we show that ϑ¯ki is the sample average of θ
∗ + ξ1, . . . , θ∗ + ξk after k steps.
θ̂k+1i , as a function θ
k+1
i , is defined as follows:
θ̂k+1i (θ
k+1
i ) ,
1
k + 1
θk+1i +
k
k + 1
ϑ¯ki . (3.23)
(a) Update of xk+1i1 , . . . , x
k+1
iN : Under (A16), firm i can compute the Nash equilibrium, contingent on its
choice of θk+1i , and is a fixed-point of the best-response map:
xk+1ij ∈ argmin
xj∈Kj
[
cj(x
k+1
ij )− p(Xk+1i ; θ̂k+1i (θk+1i ), 0)xk+1ij +
1
2
k‖xk+1ij ‖2
]
, j = 1, . . . , N.
(BRxij(x
k+1
i,−j , θ
k+1
i ))
(b) Update of θk+1i : Firm i defines the difference between the price observed at the kth step p(X
k; θ∗, ξk)
and its estimate p(Xk+1i ; θ̂
k+1
i , 0) as p˜
k+1
i (θ
k+1
i , X
k+1
i ):
p˜k+1i (θ
k+1
i , X
k+1
i ) :=

p(Xk+1i ; θˆ
k+1
i (θ
k+1
i ), 0)− p(Xk; θ∗, ξk), under (A14a)
p(Xk; θ∗, ξk)− p(Xk+1i ; θˆk+1i (θk+1i ), 0). under (A14b)
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Then suppose tk+1i (X
k+1
i ) denotes a unique solution to
p˜k+1i (θ
k+1
i , X
k+1
i ) + 
kθk+1i = 0
implying that
tk+1i (X
k+1
i ) =

[(k + 1)(p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) + b∗Xk+1i )− kϑ¯ki ]/(1 + (k + 1)k), under (A14a)
[(k + 1)(a∗ − p(Xk; θ∗, ξk))− kϑ¯kiXk+1i ]/(Xk+1i + (k + 1)k), under (A14b)
(3.24)
Suppose δ and ∆ are lower and upper bounds of Θ, respectively. We can update θk+1i as follows:
θk+1i =

δ, if tk+1i (X
k+1
i ) < δ
tk+1i (X
k+1
i ), if δ ≤ tk+1i (Xk+1i ) ≤ ∆
∆. if tk+1i (X
k+1
i ) > ∆
(BRθi (X
k+1
i ))
Algorithm 5 (Iterative fixed-point and learning). Step 0. Given a sequence {k} ↓ 0, and γx, γθ.
k = 0;
∑N
j=1 x
0
jj = X
0; p(X0; θ∗, ξ0) := a∗ − b∗X0; 0 > 0; ϑ¯0i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N .
Step 1. For i = 1, . . . , N , if Xk+1i =
∑N
j=1 x
k+1
ij , then {xk+1i1 , . . . , xk+1iN , θk+1i } is a solution to the following
system:
xk+1ij solves BR
x
ij(x
k+1
i,−j , θ
k+1
i ), j = 1, . . . , N
θk+1i solves BR
θ
i (X
k+1
i ).
(3.25)
Step 2. For i = 1, . . . , N , ϑ¯k+1i is updated as follows:
ϑ¯k+1i =
kϑ¯ki + ϑ
k+1
i
k + 1
. (3.26)
Step 3. If k > K¯, stop; else k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
3.3.3 Analysis of noise-corrupted iterative fixed-point schemes
In this subsection, we analyze our iterative fixed-point scheme and partition the discussion as follows: (i)
First, we provide a brief discussion as to why the update specified by (3.25) can be succinctly captured by
the solution to a single variational equality problem; (ii) Second, we provide a brief sketch of the results to
follows; and (iii) We provide the convergence theory.
(i) Equivalence of (3.25) to a fixed-point problem: First, any best response of a convex optimization
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problem is equivalent to a solution of a suitable variational inequality problem [20]:
[
y∗i ∈ argmin
yi∈Yi
di(yi)
]
⇔ [y∗i solves VI(Yi,∇yidi)] ,
where di is a convex function in yi over a convex set Yi. In fact, given a collection of functions di(yi; y−i) that
are convex in yi over convex sets Yi for all y−i with y−i , (yj)i 6=j , the coupled best response is equivalent
to the solution of a single variational inequality problem [27]:

[
y∗1 ∈ argmin
y1∈Y1
d1(y1, y−1)
]
⇔ [y∗1 solves VI(Y1,∇y1d1(•, y∗−1))]
...[
y∗N ∈ argmin
yN∈YN
dN (yN , y−N )
]
⇔ [y∗N solves VI(YN ,∇yNdN (•, y∗−N ))]

⇔ y∗ solves VI(Y, F ),
where Y ,∏Ni=1 Yi and F (y) = (∇yidi(yi, y−i))Ni=1. Finally, any solution to a variational inequality problem
is a fixed point of a suitably defined problem where γ is a positive scalar:
[y∗ solves VI(Y, F )]⇔ [y∗ = ΠY(y∗ − γF (y∗))] .
By using this avenue, the problem (BRxij(x
k+1
i,−j , θ
k+1
i )) is the set of coupled fixed-point problems:
xk+1ij = ΠKj
(
xk+1ij − γ
(
∇xijfj(xk+1i ; θ̂k+1i (θk+1i )) + kxk+1ij
))
, j = 1, . . . , N, (3.27)
where fj(x
k+1
i ; θ̂
k+1
i (θ
k+1
i )) = cj(x
k+1
ij ) − p(Xk+1i ; θ̂k+1i (θk+1i ))xk+1ij . Similarly, (BRθi (Xk+1i )) can be stated
as the following fixed-point problem:
θk+1i = ΠΘ
(
θk+1i − γ
(
p˜k+1i (θ
k+1
i , X
k+1
i ) + 
kθk+1i
))
. (3.28)
Before proceeding, we shed some light on this equivalence. Suppose the root of p˜k+1i (θ
k+1
i , X
k+1
i )+
kθk+1i = 0
is denoted by tk+1i . Then from (3.28), this implies that t
k+1
i = ΠΘ
(
tk+1i
)
. Consequently, if tk+1i ∈ Θ , [δ,∆],
then θk+1i = t
k+1
i while θ
k+1
i = δ( or ∆), if t
k+1
i < δ( or > ∆). But this is equivalent to (BR
θ
i (X
k+1
i )).
We define zk+1i , (xk+1i1 , . . . , xk+1iN , θk+1i ). Then, zk+1i solves the coupled fixed-point problem (3.27) –
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(3.28) if and only if zk+1i solves VI(Z, F k+1) where
Z ,
N∏
i=1
Ki ×Θ and F k+1(zk+1i ) =

∇xi1f1(xk+1i ; θ̂k+1i (θk+1i ))
...
∇xiN fN (xk+1i ; θ̂k+1i (θk+1i ))
p˜k+1i (θ
k+1
i , X
k+1
i )

+ kzk+1i .
In sum, the coupled best response scheme (3.25) is equivalent to the coupled fixed-point problem (3.27)
– (3.28), which is also equivalent to the variational inequality problem VI(Z, F k+1).
(ii) Sketch of results: We first show that the coupled best response scheme given by (3.25) always admits
a unique solution (Prop. 6). Theorem 10 shows that the sequence {xki , θ̂ki } → {x∗, θ∗} as k → ∞ in an a.s.
sense. This proof relies on showing that θ̂ki → θ∗ as k →∞ in an a.s. sense. Then, if the solution xk+1i (θ̂k+1i )
is a continuous function in θ̂k+1i (Prop. 8), we may conclude that limk→∞ x
k+1
i (θ̂
k+1
i ) = x
k+1
i (θ
∗) = x∗, where
the last equality follows from noting that
Proposition 6. Suppose (A14), (A15) and (A16) hold. If k ≥ 0 and k > 0, and given p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) and
{ϑ¯ki }Ni=1, the following hold:
(a) Under (A14a), the solution to (3.25) is a singleton.
(b) Under (A14b), the solution to (3.25) is a singleton.
Proof. It suffices to show that given p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) and {ϑ¯ki }Ni=1, the variational inequality VI(Z, F k+1) has
a unique solution for each i. Now, for simplicity, we ignore the superscript k for all variables. Given p, ϑ¯i,
i and k, let H(zi) denote the Jacobian matrix ∇F (zi) of F at zi ∈ Z. We will proceed to show that H(zi)
is a P-matrix for all zi ∈ Z˜ in part (a) and a P0-matrix for all zi ∈ Z˜ in part (b) where Z ⊂ Z˜ and Z˜
is a rectangle. Then, by invoking Proposition 3.5.9 in [20], the associated mapping F is P-mapping on Z˜
in part (a) and a P0-mapping on Z˜ in part (b). Consequently, by Theorem 3.5.15 in [20], the regularized
variational inequality VI(Z, F k+1) has a unique solution in both parts (a) and (b). Specifically, we employ
a rectangular Z˜ defined as Z˜ , [0,∞)N ×Θ, where Θ is a compact set in (0,∞). (a) Given zi ∈ Z˜, let Hi
denote H(zi). Then,
Hi =
 Ai B
C D
 , (3.29)
where Ai = b
∗(I + eeT ) +Ei, B = − 1k+1e, C = −b∗eT , D = 1k+1 , e denotes the column of ones in RN , Ei is
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an N ×N diagonal matrix with c′′j (xij) as its jth diagonal entry. Since, the nonnegativity of c′′j (xij) follows
from the convexity of costs, Ei is a nonnegative diagonal matrix and is therefore positive semidefinite. Recall
that the sum of a diagonal positive semidefinite matrix and a P-matrix is a P-matrix and it suffices to show
that Hi is a P-matrix when Ei = 0. This amounts to showing that the principal minors of H are positive.
Since Ai and D are P-matrices, we only consider the principal submatrix Hα of Hi, where α ⊆ {1, . . . , N}
is a nonempty index set and Hα is given by Hα ,
 Aα Bα
Cα D
 , where Aα = b∗(Inα + enα(enα)T ), Bα =
− 1k+1enα , Cα = −b∗(enα)T , and Inα and enα denote the identity matrix and the column of ones in Rnα×nα
and Rnα , respectively, with nα = |α|. Since A−1α = 1b∗
(
Inα − 1nα+1enα(enα)T
)
, we have
CαA
−1
α Bα =
1
k + 1
(enα)T
(
Inα −
1
nα + 1
enα(enα)T
)
enα
=
1
k + 1
(
nα − n
2
α
nα + 1
)
=
1
k + 1
(
nα
nα + 1
)
.
It follows that D − CαA−1α Bα = 1k+1 − 1k+1
(
nα
nα+1
)
= 1k+1
(
1
nα+1
)
> 0. Since det(Aα) > 0, we have
det(Hα) = det(Aα) det
(
D − CαA−1α Bα
)
> 0 for all α ⊆ {1, . . . , N} with α 6= ∅. Therefore, H is a P-matrix.
(b) Analogous to our approach for (a), we consider a matrix Hi, given by Hi = ∇F (zi). Then,
Hi =
 Ai Bi
Ci Di
 , (3.30)
where Ai = bˆi(I + ee
T ) + Ei, Bi =
1
k+1 (xi + (e
Txi)e), Ci = bˆie
T , and Di =
1
k+1 (e
Txi), where bˆi =
1
k+1bi +
k
k+1 b¯i, xi = (xi1, . . . , xiN )
T , e denotes the column of ones in RN , and Ei is an N × N diagonal
matrix with c′′j (xij) as its jth diagonal entry. Recall that the sum of a diagonal positive semidefinite matrix
and a P0-matrix is a P0-matrix. As in (a), it suffices to show that H is a P0-matrix when Ei = 0.
Since Ai and Di are P0-matrices, we restrict our attention to the principal submatrix Hα of Hi, where
α ⊆ {1, . . . , N} is a nonempty index set, and Hα is given by Hα ,
 Aα Bα
Cα Di
 , where Aα = bˆi(Inα +
enα(enα)T ), Bα =
1
k+1 (xα + (e
Txi)e
nα), Cα = bˆi(e
nα)T , and Inα and e
nα denote the identity matrix and the
column of ones in Rnα×nα and Rnα , respectively, with nα = |α|. Then, the following hold:
(1) If bˆi = 0, then Aα = 0 and Cα = 0, which implies det(Hα) = 0.
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(2) If bˆi > 0, then A
−1
α =
1
bˆi
(Inα − 1nα+1enα(enα)T ). So, we have
CαA
−1
α Bα =
1
k + 1
(enα)T
(
Inα −
1
nα + 1
enα(enα)T
)
(xα + (e
Txi)e
nα)
=
1
k + 1
((enα)T − nα
nα + 1
(
enα)T
)
(xα + (e
Txi)e
nα)
=
1
(k + 1)(nα + 1)
(
(enα)Txα + nα(e
Txi)
)
.
=⇒ Di − CαA−1α Bα =
1
k + 1
eTxi − 1
(k + 1)(nα + 1)
(
(enα)Txα + nα(e
Txi)
)
=
1
(k + 1)(nα + 1)
(
eTxi − (enα)Txα
) ≥ 0.
Since det(Aα) > 0, we have det(Hα) = det(Aα) det
(
Di − CαA−1α Bα
) ≥ 0.
Therefore, det(Hα) ≥ 0 for all nonempty α ⊆ {1, . . . , N}, implying that Hi is a P0-matrix.
Having shown that the coupled best response scheme has a unique solution, we proceed to show a
Lipschitzian property on the solution set of (3.25) with respect to the parameter θ (Prop. 8). Before that,
we provide some preliminary results. The strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the mapping F (x)
can be easily shown under (A15).
Lemma 10. Consider the mapping F (x) defined by (3.1) and suppose (A15) holds. Then F (x) is a strongly
monotone Lipschitz continuous mapping.
Proof. Let g(x) = (c′1(x1), . . . , c
′
N (xN ))
T and e = (1, . . . , 1)T . Then, we have F (x) = g(x)+b∗(x+Xe)−a∗e,
where X =
∑N
i=1 xi. Note that g(x) is monotone in x. Thus, we have for x, y ∈ K
(F (x)− F (y))T (x− y) = (g(x)− g(y))T (x− y) + b∗(x− y)T (x− y) + b∗(X − Y )eT (x− y)
≥ b∗(x− y)T (x− y) + b∗(X − Y )T (X − Y ) ≥ b∗‖x− y‖2.
This implies that F (x) is strongly monotone in x with constant b∗. Note that g(x) is Lipschitz continuous
on K with constant M , where M , maxi{Mi}. The Lipschitz continuity of F (x) is easily shown:
‖F (x)− F (y)‖ = ‖g(x)− g(y)‖+ b∗‖x− y‖+ b∗‖(X − Y )e‖
≤M‖x− y‖+ b∗‖x− y‖+ b∗‖eeT ‖‖x− y‖ = L‖x− y‖,
where L = M + b∗ + b∗‖eeT ‖. It follows that F (x) is Lipschitz continuous with constant L.
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This allows for claiming the existence and uniqueness of a Nash-Cournot equilibrium when the price
function is affine.
Proposition 7. Consider a Nash-Cournot game in which the ith player solves (Opt(x−i)) and the price is
determined by (3.17). Furthermore, suppose (A15) holds. Then, the associated Nash-Cournot game admits
a unique equilibrium.
Proof. From Lemma 10, the associated variational inequality VI(K,F ) has a strongly monotone mapping
F (x) over K. Consequently, VI(K,F ) admits a unique solution [20].
Now, we state the Lipschitzian property on the solution set of (3.25). This proof is inspired by a related
result presented by [89].
Proposition 8. Consider a VI(K,F (•; θ)) where F (x; θ) is strongly monotone in x over K for all θ ∈ Θ,
Lipschitz continuous in x for all θ ∈ Θ and Lipschitz continuous in θ for all x ∈ K. Then, the following
hold: (a) If x(θ) denotes the solution of VI(K,F (•; θ)), then x(θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ for all θ ∈ Θ.
(b) Given an  > 0, if x(θ, ) denotes the solution of VI(K,F (•; θ) + I), then x(θ, ) is Lipschitz continuous
in θ and .
Proof. Consider θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ and let Fi(·) := F (·, θi), i = 1, 2. Let xi be a solution of VI(K,Fi) for i = 1, 2.
By the assumption of strong monotonicity on the map, we have that
(x1 − x2)T (F1(x1)− F1(x2)) ≥ c‖x2 − x1‖2, (3.31)
for some constant c > 0 (assumed to be independent of θ1). Since x1 is a solution of VI(K,F1), it follows
that (x2 − x1)TF1(x1) ≥ 0, which together with (3.31) implies
(x2 − x1)TF1(x2) ≥ c‖x2 − x1‖2. (3.32)
We may express (3.32) as (x2 − x1)T (F1(x2)−F2(x2) +F2(x2)) ≥ c‖x2 − x1‖2. Now since x2 is the solution
of VI(K,F2), it follows that (x2 − x1)TF2(x2) ≤ 0. Consequently we obtain
‖x2 − x1‖‖F1(x2)− F2(x2)‖ ≥ (x2 − x1)T (F1(x2)− F2(x2)) ≥ c‖x2 − x1‖2. (3.33)
By Lipschitz continuity of F (x, θ) (assuming it is uniform in x), we have that ‖F1(x2, θ1) − F2(x2, θ2)‖ ≤
Lθ‖θ2−θ1‖, and hence by (3.33) Lθ‖x2−x1‖‖θ2−θ1‖ ≥ c‖x2−x1‖2. It follows that ‖x2−x1‖ ≤ Lθc−1‖θ2−θ1‖.
To show (b), let x(θi, j) be the solution of VI(K,Gij(·)), where Gij(·) = F (·, θi) + jI. We begin by
applying the triangle inequality to obtain that ‖x(θ1, 1)− x(θ2, 2)‖ ≤ ‖x(θ1, 1)− x(θ2, 1)‖+ ‖x(θ2, 1)−
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x(θ2, 2)‖. Since Gi1 is strongly monotone in x with constant c + 1 and Lipschitz continuous in θ with
constant Lθ, respectively, we have that the first term is bounded by Lθ(c+ 1)
−1‖θ2 − θ1‖ as a result from
part (a). Before proceeding, the Lipschitz continuity of F (x; θ) + I with respect to  can be obtained as
‖(F (x; θ) + 2x)− (F (x; θ) + 1x)‖ ≤ ‖x‖‖1 − 2‖ ≤ D‖1 − 2‖.
Since G2j is strongly monotone in x with constant c + j and Lipschitz continuous in  with constant D,
respectively, we have that the second term is bounded by D(c + 1)
−1‖2 − 1‖ as a result from part (a).
Consequently, we obtain that
‖x(θ1, 1)− x(θ2, 2)‖ ≤ Lθ(c+ 1)−1‖θ2 − θ1‖+D(c+ 1)−1‖2 − 1‖.
The Lipschitz continuity of x(θ, ) with respect to its parameters follows.
Notice that the solution xk+1i to the problem (BR
x
ij(x
k+1
i,−j , θ
k+1
i )) is the solution to the variational in-
equality problem VI(
∏N
i=1Ki, F
k+1
x (•; θ̂k+1i ) + kI) where F k+1x (xk+1i ; θ̂k+1i ) =
(
∇xijfj(xk+1i ; θ̂k+1i )
)N
j=1
.
Based on Lemma 10 and Prop. 8, xk+1i = x
k+1
i (θ̂
k+1
i , 
k) is a continuous function of (θ̂k+1i , 
k).
We may now show that the iterative fixed-point scheme produces a sequence of iterates that converge
almost surely to the true equilibrium and allow for learning the true parameter.
Theorem 10 (Global convergence of iterative fixed-point scheme). Suppose (A14), (A15), (A16) and (A17)
hold. Let {xki , θˆki } be computed via Algorithm 5 for i = 1, . . . , N . Then θˆki → θ∗ and xki → x∗ almost surely
for i = 1, . . . , N , where x∗ is a solution of the variational inequality (3.2).
Proof. Suppose k ≥ 0. At the kth iteration, p˜ki is a function of θˆk+1i , which is a function of ϑ¯ki . Consequently,
the fixed-point problem (3.25) is a function of ϑ¯ki ; at the outset, ϑ¯
0
i is zero for i = 1, . . . , N and every agent is
faced by (3.25) with the same parametrization. Since (3.25) has a unique solution (Prop. 6), it follows that
xi,• = xj,• for i 6= j and xkij = xkjj . Therefore, Given p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) and {ϑ¯ki }Ni=1,the solution (xk+1i , θk+1i ) to
(3.25) satisfies xk+1ij = x
k+1
jj for all i, j. Thus, for all k ≥ 0 and all i, we have that
p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) =

(a∗ + ξk)− b∗∑Nj=1 xkjj = (a∗ + ξk)− b∗∑Nj=1 xkij , under (A14a),
a∗ − (θ∗ + ξk)∑Nj=1 xkjj = a∗ − (θ∗ + ξk)∑Nj=1 xkij , under (A14b).
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Since for all k ≥ 0 and all i,
ϑki =

p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) + b∗Xki , under (A14a),
(a∗ − p(Xk; θ∗, ξk))/Xki , under (A14b).
we have ϑki = θ
∗ + ξk for all i. As a result, after k iterative fixed-point steps, we obtain k samples {θ∗ +
ξ1, . . . , θ∗ + ξk} of the estimated parameter. Since for all k ≥ 0 and all i, ϑ¯ki = (k−1)ϑ¯
k−1
i +ϑ
k
i
k , the sample
mean of the estimated parameter is given by ϑ¯ki , i.e., ϑ¯
k
i =
∑k
l=1(θ
∗+ξl)
k . Therefore, ϑ¯
k
i → θ∗ a.s. as k →∞,
which implies by the boundedness of {θki } that for all i
θ̂k+1i =
1
k + 1
θk+1i +
k
k + 1
ϑ¯ki → θ∗ a.s. as k →∞,
by the strong law of large numbers. By Proposition 8, xk+1i = x
k+1
i (θ̂
k+1
i , 
k) is a continuous function of
(θ̂k+1i , 
k), and xk+1i (θ
∗, 0) = x∗. Therefore, xk+1i → x∗ a.s. as k →∞.
Remark: We emphasize that this scheme requires each agent to effectively solve a suitably defined variational
inequality problem, similar to the centralized problem seen in [69, 84]. Such schemes more closely tied to
best-response schemes than the gradient-based approaches presented in the previous section. Yet, it is worth
emphasizing that the computational complexity of the best-response step is of the same order as that of
solving a strongly convex optimization problem, which is the problem that arises in computing a projected
gradient step [27].
3.3.4 Extension to nonlinear price functions
We now consider a generalization to nonlinear prices defined as follows:
p(X; θ∗, ξ) ,

a∗ − b∗Xσ + ξ,
a∗ − (b∗ + ξ)Xσ.
(3.34)
This nonlinear price function has been examined by [49] where a discussion of the strict monotonicity of the
associated mapping is presented (Lemma 11(a)). Specifically, the equilibrium of the Nash-Cournot game are
captured by VI(K,F ) where F (x) is defined as
F (x) ,
(
c′i(xi)− (a∗ − b∗Xσ) + σb∗Xσ−1xi
)N
i=1
. (3.35)
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In the next result, the mapping F (x) is strongly monotone for all x ∈ K if ∇F (x) is a diagonally dominant
matrix for all x ∈ K.
Lemma 11. Consider the mapping F (x) defined in (3.35). Suppose (A15) holds, N < 3σ−1σ−1 and σ > 1.
Then the following hold:
(a) F (x) is a strictly monotone mapping over K;
(b) Suppose X ≥ η for some η > 0, then F (x) is a strongly monotone mapping over K.
Proof. (a) Strict monotonicity of F (x) is implied by the positive definiteness of the Jacobian ∇F (x). This
is given by ∇F (x) = J1 + J2 + J3, where J2 = 2b∗σXσ−1eeT and
J1 =

c′′1(x1)
. . .
c′′N (xN )
 and , J3 = b∗σ(σ − 1)Xσ−2

X
σ−1 + x1 . . . x1
...
. . .
...
xN . . .
X
σ−1 + xN
 .
Since ci(xi) is a convex function in xi for all i, J1 is a positive semidefinite matrix. J2, compactly stated
as 2b∗σXσ−1eeT , is also a positive semidefinite matrix. As a consequence, positive definiteness of ∇F (x)
follows from the diagonal dominance of the following matrix:
b∗σ(σ − 1)Xσ−2

X
σ−1 + x1 . . .
1
2 (x1 + xN )
...
. . .
...
1
2 (xN + x1) . . .
X
σ−1 + xN
 .
By a minor rearrangement, it suffices to show the diagonal dominance of the following:
b∗σ(σ − 1)Xσ−2

X−1
σ−1 + (1 +
1
(σ−1) )x1 . . .
1
2 (x1 + xN )
...
. . .
...
1
2 (xN + x1) . . .
X−N
σ−1 + (1 +
1
(σ−1) )xN
 ,
where X−j ,
∑
i 6=j xi. The result follows by noting that
(
1 +
1
(σ − 1)
)
>
(N − 1)
2
or
2σ
σ − 1 > N − 1 or N <
3σ − 1
σ − 1 .
(b) For x, y ∈ K, (x− y)T (F (x)− F (y)) = ∫ 1
0
(x− y)T∇F (y + α(x− y))(x− y)dα. Let x˜ = y + α(x− y) an
X˜ =
∑N
i=1 x˜i. Akin to ∇F (x), ∇F (y + α(x− y)) = J˜1 + J˜2 + J˜3, where J˜1 and J˜2 are positive semidefinite,
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and J˜3 = b
∗σ(σ − 1)X˜σ−2J˜4, where
J˜4 =

X˜−1
σ−1 + (1 +
1
(σ−1) )x˜1 . . .
1
2 (x˜1 + x˜N )
...
. . .
...
1
2 (x˜N + x˜1) . . .
X˜−N
σ−1 + (1 +
1
(σ−1) )x˜N

=

X˜−1
σ−1 +
N−1
2 x˜1 . . .
1
2 (x˜1 + x˜N )
...
. . .
...
1
2 (x˜N + x˜1) . . .
X˜−N
σ−1 +
N−1
2 x˜N
+
(
σ
σ − 1 −
N − 1
2
)
IN , J˜5 + ρIN ,
where J˜5 is a positive semidefinite matrix and ρ = (1 +
1
σ−1 − N−12 ) > 0. Therefore,
(x− y)T (F (x)− F (y)) ≥
∫ 1
0
(x− y)T J˜3(x− y)dα
≥ b∗σ(σ − 1)
∫ 1
0
(x− y)T X˜σ−2J˜4(x− y)dα
≥ b∗σ(σ − 1)ησ−2
∫ 1
0
(x− y)T (J˜5 + ρIN )(x− y)dα
≥ b∗σ(σ − 1)ησ−2ρ‖x− y‖2,
implying the strong monotonicity of F .
Directly deriving a Lipschitzian statement on F (x; θ) in terms of θ is not easy when the price function
has the prescribed nonlinear form; instead, by noting that ∇F (x) is bounded when x is bounded, allows for
proving such a statement. Next, we provide a corollary of Proposition 8 where such a property is derived.
Corollary 3. Consider a VI(K,F (•; θ)) where F (x; θ) is strongly monotone in x over K for all θ ∈ Θ, and
Lipschitz continuous in θ for all x ∈ K. Also, there is a constant R > 0, such that ‖∇F (x; θ)‖ ≤ R for
all x ∈ K and θ ∈ Θ. Given an  > 0, if x(θ, ) denotes the solution of VI(K,F (•; θ) + I), then x(θ, ) is
Lipschitz continuous in θ and .
Proof. By Proposition 8, it suffices to show that F (x; θ) is Lipschitz continuous in x for all θ ∈ Θ. For θ ∈ Θ,
and x, y ∈ K, we have that
‖F (x; θ)− F (y; θ)‖ =
∥∥∥∥∫ 1
0
∇F (y + α(x− y); θ)(x− y)dα
∥∥∥∥ for some α ∈ (0, 1)
≤
∫ 1
0
‖∇F (y + α(x− y); θ)‖ ‖x− y‖dα ≤
∫ 1
0
r‖x− y‖dα = r‖x− y‖,
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which implies the Lipschitz continuity in x of the mapping F .
Proposition 9. Suppose (A14a) holds. Consider the mapping F (x) defined in (3.35) and suppose (A15)
and (A17) hold. Suppose X ≥ η for some η > 0 and all x ∈ K, where X = ∑Ni=1 xi. If N < 3σ−1σ−1 and
σ > 1, then the following hold:
(a) If x(θ) denotes the solution of VI(K,F (.; θ)), then x(θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ for all θ ∈ Θ.
(b) Given an  > 0, if x(θ, ) denotes the solution of VI(K,F (.; θ)+I), then x(θ, ) is Lipschitz continuous
in θ and .
Proof. By Lemma 11, F (x; θ) is a strongly monotone mapping over K for all θ ∈ Θ. By definition of F ,
F (x; θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ for all x ∈ K. By definition of ∇F and boundedness of x ∈ K, ∇F (x; θ)
is bounded for x ∈ K and θ ∈ Θ. Then, the conclusion follows from Corollary 3.
We may now show that the fixed-point problem yields a unique solution.
Proposition 10. Suppose (A15) and (A16) hold. Let the price be given by (3.34). If N < 3σ−1σ−1 and σ > 1,
then given pk(ξk) and {θ¯ki }Ni=1, the solution to (3.25) is a singleton.
Proof. Given p, θ¯i, i and k, let H(zi) denote the Jacobian matrix ∇F (zi) of the mapping F at zi ∈ Z˜. Then,
as in Proposition 6, it suffices to show that H(zi) is a P-matrix for all zi ∈ Z˜. Given zi ∈ Z˜, let H = H(zi).
Then,
H = H(zi) =
 Ai B
Ci D
 , (3.36)
where Ai = σb
∗(Xi)σ−2
[
Xi(I + ee
T ) + (σ − 1)xieT
]
+Ei, B = − 1k+1e, Ci = −σb∗(Xi)σ−1eT , and D = 1k+1 ,
where Xi =
∑N
j=1 xij , xi = (x11, . . . , x1N )
T , and Ei is an N × N diagonal matrix with c′′j (xij) as its jth
diagonal entry. It suffices to show that H is a P-matrix when Ei = 0.
If N < 3σ−1σ−1 , then Ai is positive semidefinite by Lemma 11. Therefore, we only consider the principal
submatrix Hα of H, where α ⊆ {1, . . . , N} is a nonempty index set, and Hα ,
 Aα Bα
Cα D
 , where Aα =
σb∗(Xi)σ−1
[
Inα + e
nα(enα)T
]
+ σ(σ − 1)b∗(Xi)σ−2xα(enα)T , Bα = − 1k+1enα , Cα = −σb∗(Xi)σ−1(enα)T ,
and Inα and e
nα denote the identity matrix and the column of ones in Rnα×nα and Rnα , respectively, with
nα = |α|. Since
BαD
−1Cα =
1
k + 1
enα(k + 1)σb∗(Xi)σ−1(enα)T = σb∗(Xi)σ−1enα(enα)T ,
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it follows that Aα−BαD−1Cα = σb∗(Xi)σ−1Inα +σ(σ−1)b∗(Xi)σ−2xα(enα)T , which is a sum of a diagonal
positive definite matrix and a P0-matrix, and thus is a P-matrix. Therefore, det(Hα) = det(D) det(Aα −
BαD
−1Cα) > 0 for all α ⊆ {1, . . . , N} with α 6= ∅, which implies that H is a P-matrix.
By leveraging Propositions 9 and 10, the convergence of the iterative fixed-point scheme can be claimed
under the caveat that the aggregate output is always bounded away from zero, as stated by the next result,
whose proof is similar to Theorem 10 and is omitted.
Corollary 4. Suppose (A15), (A16) and (A17) hold. Suppose X ≥ η for some η > 0 and all x ∈ K, where
X =
∑N
i=1 xi. Let {xki , θˆki } be computed via Algorithm 5 for i = 1, . . . , N . Suppose a unique solution to the
fixed-point problem (3.25) can be obtained, given pk(ξk) and {θ¯ki }Ni=1 for each k ≥ 0. Then, θˆki → θ∗ almost
surely for i = 1, . . . , N and xki → x∗ almost surely for i = 1, . . . , N , where x∗ is a solution of the variational
inequality (3.2).
We conclude this section with an observation. If one used a more widely used estimation technique such
as a least-squares estimation then it remains unclear if almost-sure convergence statements can always be
claimed since least-squares estimators generally converge in a weaker-sense while stronger statements may
be available for linear regression (see [90]). In effect, a scheme that combines a least-squares estimation
technique with a strategy update, while convergent, may not possess desirable almost-sure convergence
properties. While, we examine nonlinear Nash-Cournot games in this section, we also show that such
claims hold for more general aggregative Nash games. However, it should be emphasized that extending
this avenue to Nash games where the associated variational map is non-monotone may lead to challenges.
In particular, what are perfectly reasonable schemes for a subclass of Nash games may not be supported
by similar asymptotic guarantees when the structural properties of the problem do not satisfy some key
requirements.
3.4 Numerical results
In this section, we apply the developed algorithms on a class of networked Nash-Cournot games described
in Section 3.4.1. In Section 3.4.2, we apply the distributed gradient-based schemes for purposes of learning
equilibria and the misspecified parameters when aggregate output is observable, while in Section 3.4.2, we
apply the proposed iterative fixed-point schemes when aggregate output is unobservable. Note that the
simulations were carried out on Matlab R2009a on a laptop with Intel Core 2 Duo CPU (2.40GHz) and
2GB memory. The complementarity solver PATH, developed by [53], was utilized for solving the variational
inequality problems that arose in implementing the algorithms.
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3.4.1 Problem description
We consider a setting where there are N firms competing over a W -node network. Firm f may produce
and sell its good at node i (denoted by gfi and sfi, respectively), where f = 1, . . . , N and i = 1, . . . ,W .
We assume that for a given firm f , the cost of generating gfi units of power at node i is linear and is given
by cfigfi. Furthermore, the generation level associated with firm f is bounded by its production capacity,
which is denoted by capfi. The aggregate sales of all firms at node i is denoted by Si, and the nodal price
of power at node i, assumed to be a linear function of Si, is defined as pi(Si) , a∗i − b∗iSi, where a∗i and b∗i
are node-specific positive price function parameters. A given firm can produce at any node and then sell at
different nodes, provided that the aggregate production at all nodes matches the aggregate sales at all nodes
for each firm. For simplicity, we assume that there is no transportation cost between any two nodes, and
that there is no limit of sales at any node. Then, the resulting problem faced by firm f can be stated as
(Firm(x−f )) max
sfi≥0, capfi≥gfi≥0
{
W∑
i=1
(pi(Si)sfi − cfigfi) :
W∑
i=1
(sfi − gfi) = 0
}
. (3.37)
The resulting Nash-Cournot equilibrium is given by {x∗f}Nf=1 where x∗f is a solution to (Firm(x∗−f )) for
f = 1, . . . , N . Prices are assumed to be corrupted by noise, in one of two ways:
pi(Si; ξi) = (a
∗
i + ξi)− b∗iSi, (3.38)
pi(Si; ξi) = a
∗
i − (b∗i + ξi)Si. (3.39)
Note that firm f either has to learn θ∗ , (a∗i )Wi=1 when prices are given by (3.38) or learn θ∗ , (b∗i )Wi=1 when
prices are given by (3.39). In the remainder of this section, let
a∗ , (a∗1, . . . , a∗W )T , b∗ , (b∗1, . . . , b∗W )T , θ∗ , (θ∗1 , . . . , θ∗W )T , ξ∗ , (ξ∗1 , . . . , ξ∗W )T and x , (xT1 , . . . , xTW )T
with xi , (s1i, s2i, . . . , sNi, g1i, g2i, . . . , gNi)T . Note that this problem is employed as a motivating example
since Cournot-based models have been used extensively in their analysis (cf. [73, 74]). Naturally, a range of
rationality assumptions can be imposed on firms in power markets, but given the sheer size of the problem
and the repeated nature of competition (in most power markets, firms compete as many as 5–6 times every
hour in the setting of prices) with relatively minor changes occuring in demand/availability over a short
period.
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3.4.2 Learning with observation of the aggregate output
In this subsection, we assume that every firm knows the aggregate output at each node, and employ the
learning schemes proposed in Section 3.2.1. Suppose, the nodal price function is given by (3.38) and suppose
Algorithm 4 (the gradient-based distributed learning scheme), proposed in Section 3.2.1, is employed for
learning parameters and computing equilibria. Suppose firms have generated a price at each node. We use
pi = a
∗
i + ξi − b∗iSi to denote the price. Each firm will solve the following (regularized) problem to estimate
a∗i and b
∗
i :
min
{ai,bi}∈Θ
E
[
(ai − biSi − pi)2 + λa2i + λb2i
]
. (3.40)
Suppose Si is as per a uniform distribution and is specified by Si ∼ U [0, a0i /b0i ], where a0i and b0i are initial
estimates of a∗i and b
∗
i . Suppose, the noise ξi is distributed as per a uniform distribution and is specified
by ξi ∼ U [−a∗/2, a∗/2]. Suppose the steplength sequence {γki } and {αki } are chosen according to Lemma
9: γki =
1
(k+Ni)α
and αki =
1
(k+Mi)β
, where α = 0.8 and β = 0.6 and Ni and Mi are randomly chosen from
an interval [1, 200]. The algorithm was terminated at k = 10000. Table 3.1 shows the scaled errors of the
learning scheme.
Table 3.1: Distributed gradient scheme
N W
Learning a∗ and b∗
‖xk−x∗‖
1+‖x∗‖
‖aˆk−a∗‖
1+‖a∗‖
‖bˆk−b∗‖
1+‖b∗‖
5 1 7.2×10−7 2.9×10−2 4.7×10−2
5 2 3.3×10−4 3.3×10−2 5.3×10−2
5 3 7.4×10−5 3.3×10−2 5.3×10−2
5 4 1.2×10−2 4.2×10−2 6.8×10−2
5 5 1.4×10−2 3.2×10−2 8.5×10−2
10 2 1.3×10−4 3.4×10−2 3.7×10−2
10 4 1.1×10−2 2.6×10−2 8.4×10−2
10 6 2.4×10−2 3.6×10−2 8.6×10−2
10 8 2.8×10−2 3.0×10−2 6.4×10−2
10 10 3.1×10−2 4.1×10−2 5.4×10−2
Table 3.2: Iterative fixed-point scheme
N W
Learning a∗ Learning b∗
maxf
‖xkf−x
∗‖
1+‖x∗‖ maxf
‖aˆkf−a
∗‖
1+‖a∗‖ maxf
‖xkf−x
∗‖
1+‖x∗‖ maxf
‖bˆkf−b
∗‖
1+‖b∗‖
5 1 6.0×10−3 5.4×10−3 2.3×10−3 1.5×10−3
5 2 1.9×10−3 1.6×10−3 9.1×10−4 7.7×10−4
5 3 1.4×10−3 2.7×10−3 7.8×10−4 1.4×10−3
5 4 7.8×10−3 2.8×10−3 2.0×10−3 1.0×10−3
5 5 1.0×10−3 2.5×10−3 1.2×10−2 2.2×10−3
10 2 2.0×10−3 1.9×10−3 1.2×10−3 1.2×10−3
10 4 1.1×10−2 4.2×10−3 1.5×10−2 9.4×10−4
10 6 1.8×10−3 0.8×10−3 3.0×10−4 1.5×10−3
10 8 2.0×10−3 2.7×10−3 1.3×10−3 8.5×10−4
10 10 1.1×10−3 3.5×10−3 3.8×10−4 7.0×10−4
Learning without observing the aggregate output
In this subsection, we examine how the schemes perform when firms are ignorant of aggregate output at
each node while a common knowledge assumption is assumed to hold.
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Suppose, the nodal price function is given by (3.38) or (3.39) and suppose Algorithm 5 (the iterative
fixed-point scheme), proposed in Section 3.3.1, is employed for learning parameters and computing equilibria.
Suppose, the noise ξ is distributed as per a uniform distribution and is specified by ξ ∼ U [−θ∗/2, θ∗/2]. Each
run comprised of 10000 steps learning a∗ and 50000 steps for learning b∗. Table 3.2 shows the scaled errors
of the learning scheme while Figures 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) illustrate the scaled errors of the learning scheme
when the number of steps, denoted by k, increases for learning x∗ and a∗, respectively. Analogous figures
for learning x∗ and b∗ are provided (see Figures 3.2(a) and 3.2(b)).
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Figure 3.1: Computing x∗ and learning a∗ (ξ ∼ U [−θ∗/2, θ∗/2], N = 10)
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Figure 3.2: Computing x∗ and learning b∗ ( ξ ∼ U [−θ∗/2, θ∗/2], N = 10)
Table 3.3: Learning x∗ and b∗ in a stochastic regime when N = 5 and W = 1, stopping at k = 10000
(a) ξ ∼ U [− b∗/2, b∗/2]
Sequential Simultaneous
Bound
‖xk−x∗‖
1+‖x∗‖
‖bˆk−b∗‖
1+‖b∗‖
max ‖xkf−x
∗‖
1+‖x∗‖
max ‖bˆkf−b
∗‖
1+‖b∗‖
32.3664 2.1×10−1 1.2×10−1 4.9×10−3 3.3×10−3
64.7329 1.2×10−1 1.0×10−1 5.0×10−3 3.3×10−3
97.0993 5.5×10−1 8.8×10−1 5.0×10−3 3.3×10−3
129.4658 7.4×10−1 1.1 5.1×10−3 3.4×10−3
161.8322 1.2 7.9×10−1 5.1×10−3 3.4×10−3
(b) ξ ∼ U [−R,R]
Sequential Simultaneous
R
‖xk−x∗‖
1+‖x∗‖
‖bˆk−b∗‖
1+‖b∗‖
max ‖xkf−x
∗‖
1+‖x∗‖
max ‖bˆkf−b
∗‖
1+‖b∗‖
b∗/5 7.5×10−2 4.8×10−2 1.9×10−3 1.2×10−3
b∗/4 9.6×10−2 6.0×10−2 2.4×10−3 1.6×10−3
b∗/3 1.3×10−1 8.0×10−2 3.2×10−3 2.2×10−3
b∗/2 2.1×10−1 1.2×10−1 4.9×10−3 3.3×10−3
b∗/1 5.3×10−1 2.3×10−1 9.9×10−3 6.7×10−3
In Table 3.3(a), we raise the upper bounds of the strategy sets of all agents and compare a sequential
scheme with our iterative fixed-point scheme. In the sequential counterpart, we employ 10, 000 steps of
stochastic approximation-based learning followed by 10, 000 steps of computation. It is seen that the error
from the sequential scheme increases proportionally to the bound, while the error associated with our si-
multaneous scheme does not change significantly. Table 3.3(b) shows that when increasing the variance of
the noise makes the difference in errors between the sequential and simultaneous schemes more pronounced.
Consequently, for the same effort, it can be seen that the simultaneous scheme performs far better to the
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sequential scheme, particularly when the variance of the noise grows.
3.5 Concluding remarks
Nash games, a broadly applicable paradigm for modeling strategic interactions in noncooperative settings,
have emerged as immensely useful in the context of distributed control problems. Yet, the development of
distributed protocols for learning equilibria may be complicated by several challenges: (i) Agents may have an
incomplete specification of payoffs; (ii) Agents may be unavailable to observe the actions of their counterparts;
and finally, (iii) Observations may be corrupted by noise. Accordingly, this chapter is motivated by developing
schemes for learning equilibria and resolving misspecification (such as in the price functions). We consider two
specific settings as part of our investigation and apply these techniques on a class of networked Nash-Cournot
games. First, we consider convex static stochastic Nash games characterized by a suitable monotonicity
property in which agent payoffs are parameterized by a misspecified vector. We consider a framework
that combines (stochastic) gradient steps with a stochastic approximation step that attempts to learn the
parameter. In such settings, we provide asymptotic statements that show that agents may learn equilibria
and the true parameters in an almost sure sense. In addition, we provide non-asymptotic error bounds that
demonstrate that the rate of convergence is not impaired by the presence of learning. Second, we refine
our statements to a Cournot regime where we assume common knowledge holds but aggregate output is
unobservable. In such a setting, we construct a learning scheme in which firms maintain a belief of the
aggregate output and the misspecified price function parameter. After each step, these beliefs are updated
by employing fixed-point steps and by leveraging the disparity between estimated and (noisy) observed
prices. We proceed to show that in the limit, every firm learns the true Nash-Cournot equilibrium strategy
in an almost-sure sense. Additionally, every firm learns the correct value of the misspecified parameter in an
almost-sure sense. Yet much remains to be studied, including weakening monotonicity requirements on the
map and boundedness requirements on the strategy sets. It also remains to be investigated as to whether
learning can allow for weakening the common knowledge assumption.
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Chapter 4
Misspecified Markov Decision
Processes
4.1 Introduction
Markov decision processes (MDPs) are an important class of models for analyzing dynamic decision making
problems. First examined in [91], such models have been used in a number of domains including robotics,
control-theory, economics, healthcare, and manufacturing. Specifically, a Markov decision process is a dis-
crete time stochastic control process. At each time step, the process is in some state s, and the decision
maker may choose an action a that is available in state s. The process responds at the next time step by
moving to a new state s′, and giving the decision maker a corresponding reward Ra(s, s′) or cost Ca(s, s′).
The next state s′ depends on the current state s and the decision maker’s action a, but given s and a, it is
conditionally independent of all previous states and actions; in other words, the state transitions of an MDP
have the Markov property. In an MDP with a discrete state space, the state transition probabilities from
time t to t+ 1 are specified by an action Ut at time t, i.e., P(s′ | s, a) , P(Xt+1 = s′ | Xt = s, Ut = a), where
at time t, Xt and Ut denotes the state of the process and the transition matrix, respectively.
Suppose A and S denote the set of actions and states. Suppose C(a, s;ψ∗) denotes the correctly specified
cost of taking action a at state s where γ ∈ [0, 1) denotes the discount factor. The probability of the system
transitioning from state s′ to s′′ based on action a is specified by P∗(s = s′′ | s = s′, a). Furthermore,
we define a policy map as pi : S → A while the value function of a policy pi is denoted by V pi : S → R
and V pi(s) denotes the expected discounted cost of policy pi when starting at state s. The objective lies
in determining a policy pi that minimizes the discounted expected sum over an infinite horizon, given by∑∞
k=0 γ
kC(sk, ak;ψ
∗), where ak+1 = pi(sk).
This chapter considers the resolution of such problems in regimes where the transition matrix P∗ and
the parametrization of the cost function ψ∗ are unavailable a priori. Estimation of transition matrices has
been studied extensively in the literature [92, 93, 94] while robust optimization approaches have also been
employed (cf. [95, 96]). A rather distinct approach in contending with the absence of information is embodied
by the Q-learning algorithm presented in [97]. This is a simulation-based technique for computing estimates
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to the value function and has a similar structure to stochastic approximation algorithms [98]. Simulation-
based approaches have also been reviewed in [99], particularly notable being the upper confidence bound
(UCB) sampling algorithm (cf. [100, 101, 102]).
Given an MDP(P∗, ψ∗) where P∗ and ψ∗ are unavailable, a standard approach is the following:
(1) Learn P∗ and ψ∗; (2) Solve MDP(P∗, ψ∗).
This technique is aﬄicted by several challenges, a subset of which we describe next:
(i) Inability to accommodate streaming data: Increasingly, MDP-based models have to be constantly updated
with new, and possibly, streaming data. Yet the traditionally developed asymptotics and error analysis for
resolving MDPs cannot accommodate streaming data.
(ii) Lack of asymptotics: Step (1) often requires solving stochastic and/or large-scale learning problems whose
solutions are obtained in an asymptotic sense. Any practical implementation of this scheme necessitates that
Step (1) terminate finitely; however, premature termination of (1) leads to estimators aﬄicted by error and
may result in significant error in the computed value function. In effect, asymptotic convergence of this
scheme cannot be claimed.
(iii) Practical implementations: Step (1) may require infinite time, particularly since it requires solving s-
tochastic optimization problems and during this period, no estimate of the optimal value function is available.
In effect, error bounds can only be prescribed after step (1) is complete.
A simultaneous scheme for learning and computation: We consider an avenue that has found
recent application for resolving misspecified optimization and variational problems in stochastic regimes
[79, 103]. This necessitates a simultaneous approach in which the learning problems for P∗ and ψ∗ are
resolved simultaneously with the original MDP. In effect, we consider the estimators from the coupled
dynamics and examine both the asymptotics and error bounds for a variety of computational schemes. Our
scheme relies on the prescription of learning problems.
(i) Learning of transition matrices: We consider the following learning problem for transition matrices based
on using observational data:
P∗ ∈ argmin
P∈P
E[g(P; η)], (LP)
where P denotes the space of stochastic matrices, i.e. nonnegative matrices with row sums equal to unity.
(ii) Misspecification of cost functions: The cost functions are parameterized by a vector ψ∗, representing a
set of parameters idiosyncratic to the machine of interest. For instance, it may pertain to the efficiency of the
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machine, the start-up/shut-down times, the skill of the workers in question etc. All of these parameters may
require learning, often via an online approach that incorporates the use of observations, possibly corrupted
by noise. Such a problem can be cast as a stochastic optimization problem, defined as follows:
ψ∗ ∈ argmin
ψ∈Ψ
E[R(ψ; ξ)], (RΨ)
where ξ a random variable and Ψ denotes the feasibility set for ψ. By using stochastic approximation, we
may generate sequences {Pk} and {ψk} such that Pk → P∗ and ψk → ψ∗ as k →∞ in an a.s. sense.
We provide an illustration of the approach by using the well-studied value iteration scheme as a basis [104].
In its original form, value iteration maintains an estimate of the value function and updates this belief based
on solving a suitable problem. When the change in the value functions falls within a suitably defined threshold
in a norm-sense, the scheme terminates. We now provide a relatively quick overview of this scheme (cf. [3]).
Let V denote the space of value functions and M : V → V be a mapping such that for each s ∈ S, M is
defined as follows:
Mv(s) = max
a∈A
{
C(s, a;ψ∗) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P∗(s′ | s, a)v(s′)
}
. (MDP(P∗,Ψ∗))
Given a v0, the value iteration scheme is defined as follows:
vk+1 :=Mvk, for k ≥ 0. (Value Iteration)
Since M is a contraction mapping on V if 0 ≤ γ < 1 (cf. Proposition 3.10.2 in [3]), convergence of the
scheme can be shown within a reasonably straightforward fashion. However, one of the challenges lies in the
availability of C(s, a;ψ∗) and P∗, motivating the development of a misspecified variant. We assume the cost
and matrix to be given by C(s, a; ψ˜) and P˜(s′|s, a). We may then define a misspecified operator M˜k : V → V
by utilizing estimates P˜k and ψ˜k:
M˜kv(s) = max
a∈A
{
C(s, a; ψ˜k) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜k(s′|s, a)v(s′)
}
. (4.1)
Specifically, we assume that P˜k and ψ˜k are sequences converging to P∗ and ψ∗ a.s. as a result of stochastic
approximation schemes.
We now present our main research questions and provide an outline of this chapter:
(i) Misspecified value iteration: In Section 2, we present a misspecified value iteration scheme for address-
ing MDPs in which the cost function and transition matrices are misspecified. We examine the asymptotics
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of the resulting scheme and providing a quantification of the degradation of the rate of convergence based
on the presence of learning.
(ii) Misspecified policy iteration: In Section 3, we consider an analogous set of questions in the regime
of policy iteration where we provide almost sure convergence statements.
(iii) Misspecified Q-learning: Finally, in Section 4, we consider Q-learning approaches for solving MDPs
with misspecified cost functions and present constant steplength error bounds for extensions that resolve the
misspecification while solving the original MDP.
4.2 Misspecified value iteration
Value iteration [91] represents amongst the oldest of schemes for solving an MDP. We begin by present-
ing a misspecified value iteration scheme for resolving MDP(P∗, ψ∗) and subsequently present asymptotic
convergence and error analysis.
We define P to be set of all transition matrices, vec(P) to be the vector drawn from the entries of P for
all P ∈ P, and vec(P) , {vec(P) : P ∈ P}. Estimating P∗ often requires the resolution of a suitably defined
learning problem, given by a stochastic optimization problem (LP), where vec(P) is a closed and convex
set, η : Λ → Rp is a random variable defined on a probability space (Λ,Fη,Pη), and g : P × Λ → R is a
real-valued function. We may specify our joint scheme for learning and computation as follows:
Algorithm 6 (Misspecified Value Iteration). Step 0: Let v˜0 : S → R, vec(P˜0) ∈ vec(P), ψ˜0 ∈ Ψ,
α0 > 0, β0 > 0 and k = 0.
Step 1: For all k ≥ 0,
v˜k+1 := M˜kv˜k, (Computation)
vec(P˜k+1) := Πvec(P)
(
vec(P˜k)− αk(∇g(P˜k) + wk)
)
, (Learning−P)
ψ˜k+1:= ΠΨ
(
ψ˜k − βk(∇R(ψ˜k) + uk)
)
, (Learning−ψ)
where wk , ∇g(P˜k; ηk) − ∇g(P˜k), g(P) , E[g(P; η)], uk = ∇R(ψ˜k; ξk) − ∇R(ψ˜k), R(ψ) , E[R(ψ; ξ)],
M˜kv(s) := maxa∈A(C(s, a; ψ˜k) + γ
∑
s′∈S P˜n(s′|s, a)v(s′)), and αk and βk are chosen according to Proposi-
tion 11.
Step 2: If k > K, stop; else k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
We begin by showing that the misspecified operator M˜k is a contraction mapping for any k. We suppress
the subscript k in this proof for purposes of clarity.
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Lemma 12 (Contractive property of M˜). Define M˜ by suppressing the subscript k in (4.1), i.e.
M˜v(s) = max
a∈A
{
C(s, a; ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a)v(s′)
}
.
If 0 ≤ γ < 1, then M˜ is a contraction mapping on V.
Proof. Let u, v ∈ V and assume that M˜v(s) ≥ M˜u(s) without loss of generality for any state s. For any
state s, let a˜∗s(v) be defined as follows:
a˜∗s(v) = argmax
a∈A
{
C(s, a; ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a)v(s′)
}
.
Then, we have the following sequence of inequalities:
0 ≤ M˜v(s)− M˜u(s) = C(s, a˜∗s(v); ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a˜∗s(v))v(s′)−
(
C(s, a˜∗s(u); ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a˜∗s(u))u(s′)
)
≤ C(s, a˜∗s(v); ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a˜∗s(v))v(s′)−
(
C(s, a˜∗s(v); ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a˜∗s(v))u(s′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term (a)
,
where the second inequality is a consequence of noting that for all s, we have the following:
M˜u(s) = max
a∈A
{
C(s, a; ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a)u(s′)
}
=
(
C(s, a˜∗s(u); ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a˜∗s(u))u(s′)
)
≥
(
C(s, a˜∗s(v); ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a˜∗s(v))u(s′)
)
.
It follows that Term (a) can be bounded as follows:
C(s, a˜∗s(v); ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a˜∗s(v))v(s′)−
(
C(s, a˜∗s(v); ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a˜∗s(v))u(s′)
)
= γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a˜∗s(v)) (v(s′)− u(s′)) ≤ γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a˜∗s(v))‖v − u‖∞ = γ‖v − u‖∞,
Consequently, ‖M˜v−M˜u‖∞ = sups∈S |M˜v(s)−M˜u(s)| ≤ γ‖v−u‖∞, implying that M˜ is contractive.
Our next proposition shows that when the estimated transition matrix is within some bound of its true
counterpart, under a suitable Lipschitzian requirement of C(s, a, ψ) in ψ, we obtain the following relationship
between the true operator and its misspecified counterpart. This lemma subsequently finds application in
the main convergence result.
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Lemma 13. Suppose
∑
s′∈S |P∗(s′|s, a) − P˜(s′|s, a)| ≤ δ for all s and a. Suppose C(s, a;ψ) is Lipschitz
continuous in ψ with constant LC uniformly in s and a. Then the following holds for all u, v ∈ V:
‖Mv − M˜u‖ ≤ LC‖ψ∗ − ψ˜‖+ γδ(‖v‖+ ‖u‖) + γ‖v − u‖.
Proof. Let u, v ∈ V and assume without loss of generality that Mv(s) ≥ M˜u(s). For a state s, we may
define a∗s(v) and a˜
∗
s(v) as follows:
a∗s(v) , argmax
a∈A
(C(s, a;ψ∗) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P∗(s′|s, a)v(s′)) and a˜∗s(v) , argmax
a∈A
(C(s, a; ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a)v(s′)).
Then, we have the following set of relations:
0 ≤Mv(s)− M˜u(s) =Mv(s)− M˜v(s) + M˜v(s)− M˜u(s)
= C(s, a∗s(v);ψ
∗) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P∗(s′|s, a∗s(v))v(s′)−
(
C(s, a˜∗s(v); ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a˜∗s(v))v(s′)
)
+ M˜v(s)− M˜u(s)
≤ C(s, a∗s(v);ψ∗) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P∗(s′|s, a∗s(v))v(s′)−
(
C(s, a∗s(v); ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a∗s(v))v(s′)
)
+ M˜v(s)− M˜u(s),
where the second inequality follows from the suboptimality of a∗s(v) with respect to a
∗(v). It follows that
C(s, a∗s(v);ψ
∗) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P∗(s′|s, a∗s(v))v(s′)−
(
C(s, a∗s(v); ψ˜) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P˜(s′|s, a∗s(v))v(s′)
)
+ M˜v(s)− M˜u(s)
≤ LC‖ψ∗ − ψ˜‖+ γ
∑
s′∈S
(
P∗(s′|s, a∗s(v))− P˜(s′|s, a∗s(v))
)
v(s′) + M˜v(s)− M˜u(s)
≤ LC‖ψ∗ − ψ˜‖+ γ
∑
s′∈S
|P∗(s′|s, a∗s(v))− P˜(s′|s, a∗s(v))|‖v‖+ M˜v(s)− M˜u(s)
≤ LC‖ψ∗ − ψ˜‖+ γδ‖v‖+ M˜v(s)− M˜u(s)
≤ LC‖ψ∗ − ψ˜‖+ γδ‖v‖+ γ‖v − u‖
≤ LC‖ψ∗ − ψ˜‖+ γδ(‖v‖+ ‖u‖) + γ‖v − u‖,
where the first inequality follows from the Lipschitz continuity of C(s, a;ψ) in ψ for fixed s and a, the second
inequality is a consequence of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the last inequality is a consequence of
85
invoking the contractive property of M˜ with constant γ.
We are now ready to prove our main convergence statement.
Proposition 11 (Misspecified value iteration: a.s. convergence and rate statement). Suppose
{v˜k}, {P˜k} and {ψ˜k} are generated from Algorithm 6. Suppose the learning function g(·) is strongly convex
in vec(P), and the learning function R(·) is strongly convex in Ψ. Suppose αk = θ1/k and βk = θ2/k with
θ1 > 1/(2µg), θ2 > 1/(2µR), µg is the strong convexity constant of g and µR is the strong convexity constant
of R. Suppose C(s, a;ψ) is Lipschitz continuous in ψ with constant LC for all s and a. Then, there exists a
constant λ such that the following hold:
(i) ‖v˜k − v∗‖ → 0, P˜k → P∗ and ψ˜k → ψ∗ a.s. as k →∞.
(ii) For any k, we have that the following holds:
E
[‖v˜k+1 − v∗‖] ≤ γkE[‖v˜0 − v∗‖] + k∑
j=1
γk−jλ√
j
= O
(
1√
k
)
.
Proof. (i) First, we have that the following holds almost surely:
‖v˜k+1 − v∗‖ = ‖M˜kv˜k −Mv∗‖
= ‖M˜kv˜k − M˜kv∗ + M˜kv∗ −Mv∗‖ ≤ ‖M˜kv˜k − M˜kv∗‖+ ‖M˜kv∗ −Mv∗‖
≤ γ‖v˜k − v∗‖+ LC‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖+ γ‖vec(P˜k)− vec(P∗)‖‖v∗‖, (4.2)
where the last inequality follows from invoking Lemmas 12 and 13. Let ak = LC‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖ + γ‖vec(P˜k) −
vec(P∗)‖‖v∗‖. Then, we have
‖v˜k+1 − v∗‖ ≤ γ‖v˜k − v∗‖+ ak ≤ γ(γ‖v˜k−1 − v∗‖+ ak−1) + ak
= γ2‖v˜k−1 − v∗‖+ γak−1 + ak ≤ · · · ≤ γk+1‖v˜0 − v∗‖+
k∑
i=0
γiak−i.
Since γk+1 → 0, it suffices to show that ∑ki=0 γiak−i → 0 as k → ∞ in an a.s. sense. Since the learning
problems for ψ∗ and P∗ are both strongly convex, we have that ak → 0 a.s. as k →∞. Then, for almost all
ω ∈ Ω, given  > 0, there exists N1(ω) such that ak ≤  for all k ≥ N1(ω). Also, for almost every ω ∈ Ω,
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ak ≤ L(ω) for all k and some constant L(ω) > 0. Thus, for k ≥ N1(ω),
k∑
i=0
γiak−i = γna0 + . . .+ γk−N1(ω)aN1(ω) + γ
k−N1(ω)−1aN1(ω)+1 + . . .+ γ
0ak
≤ (γk + . . .+ γk−N1(ω))L(ω) + 
1− γ .
Since γk → 0, there exists N2(ω) such that γk ≤ N1(ω)+1 , . . . , γk−N1(ω) ≤ N1(ω)+1 for all k ≥ N2(ω). So,
when k ≥ N(ω) , max{N1(ω), N2(ω)}, we have that
k∑
i=0
γiak−i ≤ L(ω)+ 
1− γ =
(
L(ω) +
1
1− γ
)
.
Since L(ω) is finite in an a.s. sense and  is arbitrarily chosen, proving that
∑k
i=0 γ
ian−i → 0 a.s.. We may
then conclude that ‖v˜k+1 − v∗‖ → 0 in an a.s. sense as k →∞.
(ii) By taking expectations on both sides of (4.2), we have the following:
E[‖v˜k+1 − v∗‖] ≤ γE[‖v˜k − v∗‖] + LCE[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖] + γE[‖vec(P˜k)− vec(P∗)‖]‖v∗‖. (4.3)
Recall that the learning problem for ψ∗ and P∗ are both strongly convex. Then, we may use the standard
rate estimate (see (5.292) in [42]) to get the following for suitably chosen λ1 and λ2:
E[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖] ≤ λ1√
k
and E[‖vec(P˜k)− vec(P∗)‖] ≤ λ2√
k
. (4.4)
Consequently, we obtain the following:
E[‖v˜k+1 − v∗‖] ≤ γE[‖v˜k − v∗‖] + LCλ1 + γλ2‖v
∗‖√
k
.
Let λ = LCλ1 + γλ2‖v∗‖. Then, we have
E[‖v˜k+1 − v∗‖] ≤ γE[‖v˜k − v∗‖] + λ√
k
≤ γ2E[‖v˜k−1 − v∗‖] + γλ√
k − 1 +
λ√
k
≤ γkE[‖v˜0 − v∗‖] +
k∑
j=1
γk−jλ√
j
.
Since γ−j is increasing in j and 1√
j
is decreasing in j, then there exists a K1 such that
γ−j√
j
is decreasing in
j for j ≤ K1 and γ
−j
√
j
is increasing in j for j > K1. Then, the second term in the above inequality can be
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bounded as
k∑
j=1
γk−jλ√
j
= γkλ
k∑
j=1
γ−j√
j
= γkλ
K1∑
j=1
γ−j√
j
+
k∑
j=K1+1
γ−j√
j

≤ γkλ
(
K1γ
−1 +
∫ k+1
K1+2
γ−t√
t
dt
)
.
(4.5)
Note that there exists a K2 > K1 +2 such that
γ−t
t
√
t
is decreasing for t ≤ K2 and γ
−t
t
√
t
is increasing for t > K2.
Then, we have
∫ k+1
K1+2
γ−t√
t
dt =
γ−t
ln γ−1
· 1√
t
∣∣∣∣k+1
K1+2
+
1
2
∫ k+1
K1+2
γ−t
ln γ−1
· 1
t
√
t
dt
≤ 1
ln γ−1
· γ
−(k+1)
√
k + 1
+
1
2
∫ K2
K1+2
γ−t
ln γ−1
· 1
t
√
t
dt+
1
2
∫ k+1
K2
γ−t
ln γ−1
· 1
t
√
t
dt
≤ 1
ln γ−1
· γ
−(k+1)
√
k + 1
+
1
2
∫ K2
K1+2
γ−t
ln γ−1
· 1
t
√
t
dt+
γ−(k+1)
2 ln γ−1
· 1
(k + 1)
√
k + 1
· (k + 1−K2)
≤ 1
ln γ−1
· γ
−(k+1)
√
k + 1
+
1
2
∫ K2
K1+2
γ−t
ln γ−1
· 1
t
√
t
dt+
1
2 ln γ−1
· γ
−(k+1)
√
k + 1
=
3
2 ln γ−1
· γ
−(k+1)
√
k + 1
+ L(γ),
(4.6)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that γ
−t
t
√
t
is increasing for t > K2, and L(γ) =
1
2
∫K2
K1+2
γ−t
ln γ−1 ·
1
t
√
t
dt is a constant determined by γ. Combining (4.5) and (4.6), we have
k∑
j=1
γk−jλ√
j
≤ γkλ
(
K1γ
−1 +
3
2 ln γ−1
· γ
−(k+1)
√
k + 1
+ L(γ)
)
= γkλ
(
K1γ
−1 + L(γ)
)
+
3λγ−1
2 ln γ−1
· 1√
k + 1
= O
(
1√
k
)
We now present a constant steplength error bound where the steplength is fixed by a prescribed number
of iterations, say K. The optimal “constant stepsize” derives the error minimizing steplength; in other words,
αk and βk are constants for 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
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Proposition 12 (Misspecified value iteration: constant steplength scheme). Suppose {v˜k}, {P˜k}
and {ψ˜k} are generated from Algorithm 6. Suppose the learning function g(·) is strongly convex in vec(P)
with convexity constant µg, and is continuously differentiable in vec(P) with Lipschitz gradient constant Lg.
Suppose the learning function R(·) is strongly convex in Ψ with convexity constant µR, and is continuously
differentiable in Ψ with Lipschitz gradient constant LR. Suppose αk = λg and βk = λR with λg > 0 and
λR > 0. Suppose E[‖wk‖2] ≤ ν2g and E[‖uk‖2] ≤ ν2R. Suppose C(s, a;ψ) is Lipschitz continuous in ψ with
constant LC for all s and a. If we define v¯
K = 1K
∑K
k=1 v˜
k, then
E[‖v¯K − v∗‖] = O
(
1
K1/4
)
.
Proof. Instead of (4.4) in the proof of Prop. 11, we have the following
E[‖ψ˜k+1 − ψ∗‖2] ≤ (1− qg)E[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖2] + λ2gν2g ,
where qg , 2λgµg − λ2gL2g. Suppose λg is chosen such that qg < 1. Thus,
qgE[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖2] ≤(E[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖2]− E[‖ψ˜k+1 − ψ∗‖2]) + λ2gν2g .
Then, we have
1
K
K∑
k=1
qgE[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖2] ≤ 1
K
K∑
k=1
(E[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖2]− E[‖ψ˜k+1 − ψ∗‖2]) + λ2gν2g
≤ 1
K
E[‖ψ˜0 − ψ∗‖2] + λ2gν2g .
(4.7)
By using Ho¨lder’s inequality, Jensen’s inequality applied to the counting measure, and the inequality (4.7),
we have
1
K
K∑
k=1
E[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖] ≤ 1
K
K∑
k=1
√
E[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖2]
≤
√√√√ 1
K
K∑
k=1
E[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖2]
≤
√
1
K
E[‖ψ˜0 − ψ∗‖2]/qg + λ2gν2g/qg
≤
√
ag + λ2gν
2
g
2λgµg − λ2gL2g
,
√
bg(λg),
(4.8)
where ag = E[‖ψ˜0−ψ∗‖2]/K and bg(λg) = (ag + λ2gν2g )/(2λgµg − λ2gL2g). By taking the derivative of bg with
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respect to λg, we have
∂bg
∂λg
=
2λgν
2
g (2λgµg − λ2gL2g)− (ag + λ2gν2g )(2µg − 2λgL2g)
(2λgµg − λ2gL2g)2
=
2λ2gν
2
gµg − ag(2µg − 2λgL2g)
(2λgµg − λ2gL2g)2
=
2ν2gµg
(2λgµg − λ2gL2g)2
·
[
λ2g + λg
agL
2
g
ν2gµg
− ag
ν2g
]
=
2ν2gµg
(2λgµg − λ2gL2g)2
·
(λg + agL2g
2ν2gµg
)2
− ag
ν2g
− a
2
gL
4
g
4ν4gµ
2
g
 .
Thus,
∂bg
∂λg
= 0 implies that λ∗g =
√
ag
ν2g
+
a2gL
4
g
4ν4gµ
2
g
− agL
2
g
2ν2gµg
= O(1/√K). If 0 < λg ≤ λ∗g, then ∂bg∂λg ≤ 0 and
thus bg(λg) is nonincreasing in λg; if λ
∗
g ≤ λg < 2µgλ2g , then
∂bg
∂λg
≥ 0 and thus bg(λg) is nondecreasing in λg.
Therefore, λ∗g minimizes bg. Then, bg(λ
∗
g) = (ag + λ
2
gν
2
g )/(2λgµg − λ2gL2g) ≤ O(1/
√
K). Therefore, we have
from (4.8) that
1
K
K∑
k=1
E[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖] ≤
√
bg(λg) ≤ O
(
1
K1/4
)
. (4.9)
Similarly, we have for suitably chosen λR that
1
K
K∑
k=1
E[‖vec(P˜k)− vec(P∗)‖] ≤ O
(
1
K1/4
)
. (4.10)
Now, we define v¯K = 1K
∑K
k=1 v˜
k. From (4.3), we have
E[‖v˜k+1 − v∗‖] ≤ γE[‖v˜k − v∗‖] + LCE[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖] + γE[‖vec(P˜k)− vec(P∗)‖]‖v∗‖.
Thus,
(1− γ)E[‖v˜k − v∗‖] ≤ (E[‖v˜k − v∗‖]− E[‖v˜k+1 − v∗‖]) + LCE[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖] + γE[‖vec(P˜k)− vec(P∗)‖]‖v∗‖.
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Then, we have
1
K
K∑
k=1
(1− γ)E[‖v˜k − v∗‖] ≤ 1
K
K∑
k=1
(E[‖v˜k − v∗‖]− E[‖v˜k+1 − v∗‖])
+
1
K
K∑
k=1
LCE[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖] + 1
K
K∑
k=1
γE[‖vec(P˜k)− vec(P∗)‖]‖v∗‖
≤ 1
K
E[‖v˜0 − v∗‖] +O
(
1
K1/4
)
,
where the last inequality follows from (4.9) and (4.10). Therefore, we have
E[‖v¯K − v∗‖] = E
[
‖ 1
K
K∑
k=1
v˜k − v∗‖
]
= E
[
‖ 1
K
K∑
k=1
(v˜k − v∗)‖
]
≤ 1
K
K∑
k=1
E[‖v˜k − v∗‖]
≤ E[‖v˜
0 − v∗‖]/(1− γ)
K
+O
(
1
K1/4
)
.
4.3 Misspecified policy iteration
In this section, we consider a policy iteration scheme for the resolution of misspecified MDPs. We initiate
our discussion with a formal statement of the misspecified policy iteration scheme and subsequently prove
its asymptotic convergence. If cpi(·) , C(·, pi(·);ψ∗) and c˜pik(·) , C(·, pik(·); ψ˜k), then the operatorsMpi and
M˜pikk may be defined as follows for policies pi and pik, respectively:
Mpiv , cpi + γ(P∗)piv and M˜pikk v , c˜pik + γP˜pikk v,
Next, we define the misspecified policy iteration scheme.
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Algorithm 7 (Misspecified policy Iteration). Step 0: Let v˜0 : S → R, vec(P˜0) ∈ vec(P), αk > 0,
ψ˜0 ∈ Ψ, α0 > 0, β0 > 0 and k = 0.
Step 1: For all k ≥ 0,
ak+1(s) := argmax
a∈A
(C(s, a; ψ˜k) + γP˜
pik+1
k v˜
k+1), (Computation)
vec(P˜k+1) := Πvec(P)
(
vec(P˜k)− αk(∇g(P˜k) + wk)
)
, (Learning−P)
ψ˜k+1:= ΠΨ
(
ψ˜k − βk(∇R(ψ˜k) + uk)
)
, (Learning−Ψ)
where wk , ∇g(P˜k; ηk) − ∇g(P˜k) with g(P) , E[g(P; η)], uk = ∇R(ψ˜k; ξk) − ∇R(ψ˜k), R(ψ) , E[R(ψ; ξ)]
and (I − γP˜pikk )v˜k+1 = c˜pik .
Step 2: If k > K, stop; else k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
We now provide a lemma that provides the error bound for the approximate policy iteration, which is
useful for our rate analysis.
Lemma 14 (Approximate policy iteration bound (cf. p.48 in [105])). Let v˜k be the approximate value
function. Suppose for all k
‖vk − v˜k‖ ≤ δ,
and
‖Mpi∗ v˜k −Mpik+1 v˜k‖ ≤ .
Then, we have
lim sup
k→∞
‖vk+1 − v∗‖ ≤ + 2γδ
(1− γ)2 .
Analogous to Proposition 11 for the value iteration, we can get the following convergence statement where
‖ • ‖ denotes the infinity norm for both matrices and vectors.
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Proposition 13 (Misspecified policy iteration: a.s. convergence and rate statement). Suppose
{v˜k}, {P˜k} and {ψ˜k} are generated by Algorithm 7 and the learning functions g(·) and R(·) are strongly
convex. Finally, suppose C(s, a;ψ) is Lipschitz continuous in ψ with constant LC for all s and a and ‖v˜k‖
is bounded a.s. for all k. Suppose ‖cpi∗ − cpik‖ ≤ ∆ and ‖(P∗)pi∗ − (P∗)pik‖ ≤ ∆ for all k. Then, the following
hold:
(i) ‖v˜k − v∗‖ → 0 a.s. as k →∞.
(ii) For any k, we have that the following holds:
E[‖v˜k+1 − v∗‖] = O
(
(1 + γ)∆
(1− γ)2
)
+O
(
(1 + γ2)(1 + γ)
(1− γ)3√k
)
.
Proof. (i) We proceed to show that ‖vk − v˜k‖ → 0 as k → ∞ whereby the result follows by recalling that
by the convergence of policy iteration, ‖vk − v∗‖ → 0 as k →∞. From Algorithm 7, we have
‖vk+1 − v˜k+1‖ = ‖cpik + γ(P∗)pikvk+1 − (c˜pik + γP˜pikk v˜k+1)‖
= ‖cpik − c˜pik + γ(P∗)pik(vk+1 − v˜k+1) + γ((P∗)pik − P˜pikk )v˜k+1‖
≤ LCN‖ψ∗ − ψ˜k‖+ γ‖(P∗)pik‖‖vk+1 − v˜k+1‖+ γ‖(P∗)pik − P˜pikk ‖‖v˜k+1‖.
It follows that
‖vk+1 − v˜k+1‖ ≤ LCN‖ψ
∗ − ψ˜k‖+ γ‖(P∗)pik − P˜pikk ‖‖v˜k+1‖
1− γ‖(P∗)pik‖
=
LCN‖ψ∗ − ψ˜k‖+ γ‖(P∗)pik − P˜pikk ‖‖v˜k+1‖
1− γ .
(4.11)
Recall that the learning problem for ψ∗ and P∗ are both strongly convex, implying that ψ˜k → ψ∗ and
vec(P˜k) → vec(P∗) a.s. as k → ∞. Thus, by the a.s. boundedness of v˜k and by invoking the property that
‖vk − v∗‖ → 0 as k → ∞, we have that ‖vk − v˜k‖ → 0 a.s. as k → ∞. Therefore, ‖v˜k − v∗‖ → 0 a.s. as
k →∞.
(ii) By taking expectations on both sides of (4.11), we have the following:
E[‖vk+1 − v˜k+1‖] ≤ LCNE[‖ψ
∗ − ψ˜k‖] + γE[‖(P∗)pik − P˜pikk ‖‖v˜k+1‖]
1− γ . (4.12)
Recall that the learning problem for ψ∗ and P∗ are both strongly convex. Then, we can use the standard
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rate estimate (see (5.292) in [42]) to get the following:
E[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖] = O
(
1√
k
)
and E[‖(P∗)pik − P˜pikk ‖] = O
(
1√
k
)
. (4.13)
Consequently, we obtain the following:
E[‖vk+1 − v˜k+1‖] = 1 + γ
1− γO
(
1√
k
)
.
On the other hand,
E[‖Mpi∗ v˜k −Mpik+1 v˜k‖] = E[‖cpi∗ + γ(P∗)pi∗ v˜k − (cpik+1 + γ(P∗)pik+1 v˜k)‖] = (1 + γ)O (∆) .
Then, we may use the approximate policy iteration bound (Lemma 14) to get the following:
E[‖vk+1 − v∗‖] =
(1 + γ)O (∆) + 2γ · 1+γ1−γO
(
1√
k
)
(1− γ)2 .
Therefore,
E[‖v˜k+1 − v∗‖] = O
(
(1 + γ)∆
(1− γ)2
)
+O
(
(1 + γ2)(1 + γ)
(1− γ)3√k
)
.
4.4 Misspecified Q-learning
When transition matrices are unavailable, a commonly adopted approach is a simulated approach popularly
referred to as Q-learning [97]. We consider a misspecified variant of Q-learning that incorporates learning of
the misspecified cost and examines the resulting sequence of estimators. We begin by defining the Q-function
as Q(s, a) , C(s, a;ψ∗) + γ
∑
s′∈S P∗(s′|s, a)v(s′), which allows for restating as follows:
Q(s, a) , C(s, a;ψ∗) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P∗(s′|s, a) max
b∈A
Q(s′, b). (4.14)
We define the operator T as
T [Q(s, a)] , C(s, a;ψ∗) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P∗(s′|s, a) max
b∈A
Q(s′, b).
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Then the Q-function is the fixed point of the operator T ; i.e. Q = T [Q]. Given the vector ψ˜k in the cost at
iteration n, we may define the misspecified operator T˜k at iteration n as
T˜kQ(s, a) , C(s, a; ψ˜k) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P∗(s′|s, a) max
b∈A
Q(s′, b),
where T˜kQ is used to denote T˜k[Q]. As in previous sections, we may specify our misspecified Q-learning
scheme as follows:
Algorithm 8 (Misspecified Q-learning). Step 0: Let Q˜0(s, a) ∈ R, ψ˜0 ∈ Ψ, β0 > 0 and k = 0.
Step 1: For all n ≥ 0,
Q˜k+1(s, a) := (1− δ)Q˜k(s, a) + δ
[
C(s, a; ψ˜k) + γmax
b∈A
Q˜k(s
′, b)
]
, (Q−update)
ψ˜k+1 := ΠΨ
(
ψ˜k − βk(∇R(ψ˜k) + uk)
)
, (Learning-ψ)
where δ ∈ (0, 1), s′ is the random next state reached when the current state is s and action is a, and
uk = ∇R(ψ˜k; ξk)−∇R(ψ˜k) with R(ψ) , E[R(ψ; ξ)].
Step 2: If n > K, stop; else k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
Our convergence analysis begins with a reproduction of two classical results regarding the operator T˜ , which
may be directly applied to the misspecified operator T˜k. First, T˜k is a contraction mapping.
Proposition 14 (Contractive property of T˜k [98]). If 0 ≤ γ < 1, then ‖T˜k[Q1]−T˜k[Q2]‖∞ ≤ γ‖Q1−Q2‖∞
for any two vectors Q1 and Q2.
Second, the estimated Q-function stays bounded.
Proposition 15 (Boundedness of Q function [106]). There exists Qˆmax such that ‖Qˆk‖∞ ≤ Qˆmax for
any k.
We now provide an intermediate lemma that provides a constant steplength error bound on a suitably defined
metric D.
Lemma 15. For any state-action pair (s, a), suppose Dk(s, a) = Qk(s, a) − zk and zk(s, a) be defined as
follows:
zk+1(s, a) = (1− δ)zk(s, a) + δγwk(s, a), z0(s, a) = 0. (4.15)
Then for any k, we have that E[‖Dk‖∞] ≤
(
O
(
1√
k
)
+ γ
2
1−γ
√
δW 2max
2−δ
)
.
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Proof. We utilize an approach employed in [107] and begin by defining the error Qk(s, a) as Qk(s, a) ,
Q˜k(s, a)−Q(s, a). Using (4.14) and (Q−update), the error can be written as
Qk+1(s, a) = (1− δ)Qk(s, a) + δ
[
C(s, a; ψ˜k) + γmax
b∈A
Q˜k(s
′, b)−Q(s, a)
]
= (1− δ)Qk(s, a) + δ
[
C(s, a; ψ˜k)− C(s, a;ψ∗) + γmax
b∈A
Q˜k(s
′, b)− γ
∑
s′∈S
P∗(s′|s, a) max
b∈A
Q(s′, b)
]
= (1− δ)Qk(s, a) + δ
(
C(s, a; ψ˜k)− C(s, a;ψ∗)
)
+ δγ
∑
s′∈S
P∗(s′|s, a)
(
max
b∈A
Q˜k(s
′, b)−max
b∈A
Q(s′, b)
)
+ δγwk(s, a)
= (1− δ)Qk(s, a) + δ
(
C(s, a; ψ˜k)− C(s, a;ψ∗)
)
+ δ(TQ˜k(s, a)− TQ(s, a)) + δγwn(s, a),
where wk(s, a) = maxb∈A Q˜k(s′, b) −
∑
s′∈S P∗(s′|s, a) maxb∈A Q˜n(s′, b). If zk is defined by (4.15) (as done
in [107]), then the following holds for the second moment:
E[‖zk‖2] ≤
√
γ2δW 2max
2− δ , (4.16)
where W 2max = |S ×A|4Q̂2max with |S| being the cardinality of the set of states and |A| being the cardinality
of the set of possible actions. By defining the sequence Dk , Qk − zk, we may bound it as follows:
Dk+1(s, a) = (1− δ)Dk(s, a) + δ
(
C(s, a; ψ˜k)− C(s, a;ψ∗)
)
+ δ(TQ˜k(s, a)− TQ(s, a))
=⇒ |Dk+1(s, a)| ≤ (1− δ)|Dk(s, a)|+ δLC‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖+ δ‖TQ˜k(s, a)− TQ(s, a)‖∞
≤ (1− δ)|Dk(s, a)|+ δLC‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖+ δγ‖Q˜k −Q‖∞
≤ (1− δ)‖Dk‖∞ + δLC‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖+ δγ‖Qk‖∞,
where the first inequality follows from the Lipschitz continuity of the cost function and the second inequality
follows from Proposition 14. Therefore,
‖Dk+1‖∞ ≤ (1− δ)‖Dk‖∞ + δLC‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖+ δγ‖Qk‖∞
≤ (1− δ)‖Dk‖∞ + δLC‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖+ δγ(‖Dk‖∞ + ‖zn‖∞)
= (1− δ(1− γ))‖Dk‖∞ + δLC‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖+ δγ‖zk‖∞.
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We may then derive a bound for Dk:
‖Dk‖∞ ≤ (1− δ(1− γ))‖Dk−1‖∞ + δLC‖ψ˜k−1 − ψ∗‖+ δγ‖zk−1‖∞
≤ (1− δ(1− γ))2‖Dk−2‖∞ + (1− δ(1− γ))δLC‖ψ˜k−2 − ψ∗‖+ δLC‖ψ˜k−1 − ψ∗‖
+ (1− δ(1− γ))δγ‖zk−2‖∞ + δγ‖zk−1‖∞
≤ ...
≤ (1− δ(1− γ))k‖D0‖∞ + δLC
k−1∑
l=0
(1− δ(1− γ))l‖ψ˜k−1−l − ψ∗‖+ δγ
k−1∑
l=0
(1− δ(1− γ))l‖zk−1−l‖∞.
Recall that the learning problem for ψ∗ is strongly convex implying that for some λ and for all k, we have
E[‖ψ˜k − ψ∗‖] ≤ λ√k . Therefore,
E[‖Dk‖∞] ≤ (1− δ(1− γ))k‖Q0‖∞ + δLC
k−1∑
l=0
(1− δ(1− γ))lλ√
k − 1− l + δγ
k−1∑
l=0
(1− δ(1− γ))l‖zk−1−l‖∞
≤ (1− δ(1− γ))k‖Q0‖∞ + δLC
k−1∑
l=0
(1− δ(1− γ))lλ√
k − 1− l +
δγ
δ(1− γ)
√
γ2δW 2max
2− δ
= O
(
1√
k
)
+
γ2
1− γ
√
δW 2max
2− δ ,
(4.17)
where the second inequality utilizes E[‖zk‖∞] ≤ E[‖zk‖2] together with the bound (4.16) and the last equality
utilizes a proof technique similar to that adopted in Prop. 11.
Proposition 16 (Constant steplength error bound for misspecified Q-learning). Suppose {Q˜k},
and {ψ˜k} are generated from Algorithm 8. Suppose the learning function R(·) is strongly convex in Ψ and
C(s, a;ψ) is Lipschitz continuous in ψ with constant LC for all s and a. Then, the following holds for any
k and δ < 1:
E
[‖Qk‖∞] ≤ O( 1√
k
)
+
γ
1− γ
√
δW 2max
2− δ .
Proof. The result follows directly from Lemma 15, expression (4.16), and δ < 1:
E
[‖Qk‖∞] ≤ O( 1√
k
)
+
γ2
1− γ
√
δW 2max
2− δ +
√
γ2δW 2max
2− δ
= O
(
1√
k
)
+
γ
1− γ
√
δW 2max
2− δ
= O
(
1√
k
)
+O
(√
δ
)
.
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Suppose we take m learning steps in ψ before updating the Q function. Then, we may specify our
misspecified Q-learning scheme as follows:
Algorithm 9 (Misspecified Q-learning with multiple steps of learning). Step 0: Let Q˜0(s, a) ∈ R,
ψ˜
(0)
0 ∈ Ψ, β0 > 0 and k = 0.
Step 1: For all n ≥ 0,
Q˜k+1(s, a) := (1− δ)Q˜k(s, a) + δ
[
C(s, a; ψ˜
(m)
k ) + γmax
b∈A
Q˜k(s
′, b)
]
, (Q−update)
ψ˜
(0)
k+1 := ψ˜
(m)
k , (Learning-ψ)
ψ˜
(l)
k := ΠΨ
(
ψ˜
(l−1)
k − β(l−1)k (∇R(ψ˜(l−1)k ) + u(l−1)k )
)
, l = 1, . . . ,m,
where δ ∈ (0, 1), s′ is the random next state reached when the current state is s and action is a, and
u
(l)
k = ∇R(ψ˜(l)k ; ξ(l)k )−∇R(ψ˜(l)k ) with R(ψ) , E[R(ψ; ξ)].
Step 2: If n > K, stop; else k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
Proposition 17 (Constant steplength error bound for misspecified Q-learning with multiple
steps of learning). Suppose {Q˜k}, and {ψ˜(l)k } are generated from Algorithm 9. Suppose the learning
function R(·) is strongly convex in Ψ and C(s, a;ψ) is Lipschitz continuous in ψ with constant LC for all s
and a. Then, the following holds for any k and δ < 1:
E
[‖Qk‖∞] ≤ O( 1√
mk
)
+
γ
1− γ
√
δW 2max
2− δ .
Proof. Recall that the learning problem for ψ∗ is strongly convex implying that for some λ and for all k, we
have E[‖ψ˜(m)k − ψ∗‖] ≤ λ√mk =
λ/
√
m√
k
. By using the same technique in Lemma 15, we have a similar bound
for E[‖Dk‖∞] in (4.17):
E[‖Dk‖∞] ≤ (1− δ(1− γ))k‖Q0‖∞ + δLC
k−1∑
l=0
(1− δ(1− γ))lλ√
m
√
k − 1− l + δγ
k−1∑
l=0
(1− δ(1− γ))l‖zk−1−l‖∞
≤ (1− δ(1− γ))k‖Q0‖∞ + δLC
k−1∑
l=0
(1− δ(1− γ))lλ√
m
√
k − 1− l +
δγ
δ(1− γ)
√
γ2δW 2max
2− δ
= O
(
1√
mk
)
+
γ2
1− γ
√
δW 2max
2− δ ,
(4.18)
where the second inequality utilizes E[‖zk‖∞] ≤ E[‖zk‖2] together with the bound (4.16) and the last equality
utilizes a proof technique similar to that adopted in Prop. 11. Then, the result follows directly from (4.18),
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expression (4.16), and δ < 1:
E
[‖Qk‖∞] ≤ O( 1√
mk
)
+
γ2
1− γ
√
δW 2max
2− δ +
√
γ2δW 2max
2− δ = O
(
1√
mk
)
+O
(√
δ
)
.
4.5 Numerical results
4.5.1 Problem setting
We consider a Markov decision problem. There is a chain of N states, which are labeled consecutively from
left to right, s = 1, 2, . . . , N . An agent has two possible actions, go to the left (lower state numbers; a = −1),
or go to the right (higher state numbers; a = +1). Both the first and last states in the chain, states number 1
and N , are rewarded with r(1) = r(N) = 1. The reward of the intermediate states is set to a small negative
value, i.e. r(i) = −0.1 for 1 < i < N . We consider a discount factor γ = 0.9.
If the agent wants to move to the left (a = −1), with probability P1 = 0.8 the system responds with
the correct move from the intended. So, the agent will move to the right with probability 1 − P1 = 0.2.
Similarly, if the agent wants to move to the right (a = 1), the system responds with the correct move from
the intended with probability P2 = 0.6 . The transition probabilities T (s
′|s, a) for this example are zero
expect for the following elements,
T (1|1,±1) = 1, T (N |N,±1) = 1,
T (s− 1|s, 1) = 1− P2, T (s+ 1|s, 1) = P2, 1 < s < N,
T (s− 1|s,−1) = P1, T (s+ 1|s,−1) = 1− P1, 1 < s < N.
The first two entries specify the ends of the chain as absorbing boundaries as the agent would stay in this
state once it reaches these states.
For learning the reward function, we first generate L N -dimensional random vectors Xi ∈ RN , i =
1, . . . , L, such that Xi(s) is a normal random variables with mean r(s) and variance r(s)
2/4 for 1 < s < N ,
i = 1, . . . , L with L = 1000. We assume that r(s) ≡ r for 1 < s < N . Our estimator for r is rˆ, which solves
the following optimization problems:
min
rˆ
E
N−1∑
s=2
(
rˆ −
∑L
i=1Xi(s)
L
)2 . (4.19)
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For learning the transition matrices, we first generate two N -dimensional random vectors Y1 ∈ RN and
Y2 ∈ RN , such that Y1(s) is a binomial random variables with parameters L = 1000 and P1 = 0.8 for
1 < s < N , and Y2(s) ia a binomial random variables with parameters L = 1000 and P2 = 0.6 for 1 < s < N .
Our estimators for P1 and P2 are Pˆ1 and Pˆ2, respectively, which solve the following optimization problems:
min
Pˆi
E
[
N−1∑
s=2
(
Pˆi − Yi(s)
L
)2]
, (4.20)
for i = 1, 2.
4.5.2 Results
We use the value iteration to generate 15 sample paths for each dimension of the transition matrices. We
stop at k = 1000. If we use constant steplength αk = βk = 0.01 for the learning problem in the value
iteration, we can get
Table 4.1: Misspecified value iteration
N E[‖v˜k − v∗‖/‖v∗‖]
10 4.0× 10−3
20 6.2× 10−3
50 3.9× 10−3
100 3.1× 10−3
Next, we use the policy iteration for each dimension of the transition matrices. We stop when ‖v˜k+1 −
v˜k‖ < 10−4. If we use constant steplength αk = βk = 0.01 for the learning problem in the policy iteration,
we can get
Table 4.2: Misspecified policy iteration
N ‖v˜k − v∗‖/‖v∗‖ Number of iteration Number of iteration given P∗ and r
10 2.3× 10−3 18 3
20 9.3× 10−3 7 4
50 2.7× 10−3 7 5
100 4.4× 10−3 8 4
Finally, we use Q-learning for each dimension of the transition matrices. We stop when ‖Q˜k+1 − Q˜k‖ <
10−4. If we use constant steplength βk = 0.01 for the learning problem, we can get
Table 4.3: Misspecified Q-learning
N Number of iteration Number of iteration given r
10 135 125
20 85 55
50 389 919
100 769 760
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4.6 Concluding remarks
Motivated by the increasing role of streaming data and misspecification in decision-making problems, we
consider the resolution of MDPs in which transition matrices are unknown and the cost functions are mis-
specified. We develop extensions to value iteration, policy iteration and Q-learning through which both
misspecification is resolved while solving the original MDP in an asymptotic sense. A precise characteriza-
tion of the impact of learning on the resulting error bounds is provided in the context of value iteration and
Q-learning.
We conclude with a short commentary on the nature of the error bounds. First, we assume that the
learning problems are strongly convex since deriving overall rate statements requires bounds on the expected
error in parameter estimates. In fact, the knowledge of the convexity constant in the learning problem
is crucial in the development of bounds. It is worth emphasizing that if mere convexity assumptions are
imposed on the learning problems, the currently adopted avenue cannot be utilized since error bounds are
only available in a functional value sense. Furthermore, while averaging-based techniques may be utilized
to resolve merely convex learning problems, such approaches provide bounds on the averaged iterates in
a functional sense but not on the solution iterates; in the absence of bounds on the solution iterates, one
cannot derive rate statements. Second, in the context of Q-learning, we develop a misspecified variant of the
constant steplength scheme. Naturally, diminishing steplength versions can also be developed which will be
the subject of future work. Third, throughout the chapter, we assume that the learning problems are static
and consequently, rather than regret-based bounds, we derive error bounds on the optimal functional value
or solution.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis, we consider a broad class of computational problems that have historically been addressed
in a regime when their parameters are known a priori. Yet, as we contend with challenges posed by the
presence of streaming data, growing uncertainty, and informational inadequacy, we can no longer work under
the premise that such parameters are available. Instances of such parameters include the covariance matrix
in a portfolio optimization problem, distributional parameters of arrival and service processes in a queueing
system, and machine efficiencies in a production network. In many instances, these parameters may be
estimated through a separate learning problem. In fact, the traditional approach has been to first learn
such parameters and subsequently solve the parametrized computational problem. However, if the learning
problem is a stochastic optimization problem, resolving the learning problem may require simulation-based
schemes and provide exact solutions only in a limiting sense. In practical settings, the learning process
has to be terminated finitely and thus leading to an erroneous estimator of the parameter which in turn
leads to the error cascading into the solution of the subsequent computational problem. We pursue a rather
different tack that solves the learning and computational problem simultaneously rather than sequentially
and consider three types of computational problems: (i) Misspecified stochastic optimization and variational
inequality problems; (ii) Misspecified stochastic Nash games; nd (iii) misspecified Markov decision processes.
We first consider a misspecified stochastic optimization problem in which the objective is parameterized
by a vector that can be learnt by solving a suitably defined learning problem. In both strongly convex
and merely convex regimes, we develop a set of coupled stochastic approximation schemes which produces
schemes such that almost sure convergence can be guaranteed for both the solution and parameters. Error
bounds are also provided for both regimes. For strongly convex problems, the optimal rate of convergence is
recovered while in convex regimes there is a degradation in error, i.e. O
(√
ln(K)√
K
)
instead of O
(
1√
K
)
. When
the averaging window is modified suitably, it can be seen that the original rate of of O
(
1√
K
)
is recovered.
Also, we can get an error bound for the average regret in the online decision-making setting, i.e. O
(
lnK√
K
)
for
a suitably chosen steplength. As the generalization of the misspecified optimization problem, a misspecified
stochastic variational inequality problem is considered, and we propose analogous stochastic approximation
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schemes for simultaneous computation and learning. Almost-sure convergence statements and error analysis
can be provided. Specially, for merely monotone maps, we employ (Tikhonov) regularized scheme, and we
can quantify the degradation associated with learning under suitable weak-sharpness assumption.
We then consider misspecified Nash games and present schemes for learning equilibria and parameters
under two settings. First, we consider convex stochastic Nash games in which agent payoffs are parameterized
by a misspecified vector. We propose schemes that combine a gradient step and a stochastic approximation
step. Equilibria and the true parameters can be both shown to be achieved in an almost sure sense. Second,
we consider stochastic Nash-Cournot games where we assume common knowledge holds but aggregate output
is unobservable. In such a setting, we propose an iterative fixed-point scheme by leveraging the disparity
between estimated and (noisy) observed prices. Notably, this scheme does not necessitate a separate learning
problem and instead we learn the parametrization while playing the game. We may show that every firm
learns the true Nash-Cournot equilibrium strategy and the correct value of the misspecified parameter in an
almost-sure sense.
Finally, we consider misspecified Markov decision problems in which transition matrices are unknown
and the cost functions are misspecified. We propose three types of schemes: (1) misspecified value iteration;
(2) misspecified policy iteration; and (3) misspecified Q-learning. The almost sure convergence and a non-
asymptotic bound on the mean-squared error can be derived for the misspecified value iteration scheme.
When the steplength is held constant, we may also get an optimized error bound for the averaged misspecified
value funtion. Next, we propose a misspecified policy iteration scheme and provide an analogous asymptotic
almost-sure convergence statement and an analysis of the rate of convergence. Finally, a constant steplength
misspecified Q-learning scheme is presented and a suitable error bound based on iteration steps and steplength
is provided.
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